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INTRODUCTION
Indonesia’s eventful history since independence is that of a 
rising power in Asia and increasingly important nation on the 
world stage. Many scholars have highlighted Indonesia’s large 
population and its abundance of strategic resources as the 
reason for its prominence in regional and global affairs.1 Some 
have also emphasised Indonesia’s strong sense of nationalism 
as a legacy of its long struggle for independence from Dutch 
colonialism,2 while others have stressed the importance of 
international relations during the Cold War.3 Stemming from 
these three perspectives are considerations of how much 
infl uence Indonesian leaders themselves have had on their 
nation’s future, and the degree to which outside powers shaped 
the development of Southeast Asia’s most populous country. 
Indeed, the primary source material in this chapter shows that 
Indonesia’s regional position was forged by various factors. 
Internationally, Indonesia was considered strategically and 
economically important, and examples of the close ties between 
the Suharto government and the United States reveal both 
the infl uence that Jakarta could wield and its dependence on 
foreign support.
REVOLUTION AND INDEPENDENCE
Before independence, Indonesia had been a major colony 
in Southeast Asia, ruled by the Dutch and known as the 
Netherlands East Indies consisting of wealthy estates 
producing rubber, sugar, spices, tea and other crops. Under 
the Dutch, all Indonesian expressions of nationalism were 
suppressed. The colonial administration refused requests for 
indigenous participation in the work of government, and exiled 
nationalist leaders. Thus, by 1942, many Indonesians were 
hostile to Dutch rule.
The Second World War prepared the foundation for change. 
In 1942 the Japanese occupied the Netherlands East Indies, 
freeing exiled nationalist leaders and promising Indonesian 
independence. Indonesian nationalists then exploited the power 
vacuum created by the Japanese surrender in 1945. In Jakarta 
on 17 August Achmed Sukarno proclaimed independence and 
became Indonesia’s fi rst president. Despite this declaration, 
Holland was keen to reestablish its position in Southeast Asia. 
For the Dutch, Indonesia remained of great economic value and 
was important for Holland’s post-war economic recovery as well 
as a symbol of its wider world importance. 
1       Evan A. Laksmana, ‘Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profi le: Does 
Size Really Matter?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and 
Strategic Affairs, Vol.33, No.2, August 2011, p. 157.
2       Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, (Singapore: 1994), p. 17.
3       Richard Mason, ‘Nationalism, Communism and the Cold War: The United 
States and Indonesia during the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations’, in 
Richard Mason & Abu Talib Ahmad (eds), Refl ections on South East Asia History 
since 1945, (Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2006).
However, the Dutch did not possess suffi cient military power to 
restore its colonial authority, and sought British and Australian 
assistance. Britain had the responsibility of disarming Japan 
in southern Indochina and western Indonesia, including the 
most populous island there, Java. Australia held military control 
over eastern Indonesia. Australian troops allowed Dutch 
forces to reestablish a military presence in the East Indonesian 
islands, where Republic of Indonesia forces were weaker. Yet, 
Britain was initially unwilling to permit Dutch troops to land 
in the republican strongholds of Java and Sumatra, having 
being forewarned that it would be a major military task, thus 
pressing the Dutch into negotiations. London’s concern was 
that a given area of Southeast Asia could be disadvantaged by 
instability in its other sectors, both economically and politically. 
Consequently, the welfare of British territories in the Far 
East depended on the stability of other parts of that region.4 
Recovery of trade and assets of the Netherlands East Indies 
depended on settlement of the troubles in Java. London saw its 
role as ‘trustees for our Allies the French and the Dutch, whose 
sovereignty in their respective colonial territories we have a 
strong moral obligation to restore’ and therefore hoped to play a 
leading role in a settlement between the nationalist movements 
and Britain’s own allies.5 
America and the Cold War became key factors in Indonesian 
independence. After World War II, the United States was 
rebuilding the Japanese economy with a view to preventing the 
spread of communism in the region. Japan’s economic progress 
would depend greatly on expanded exports of industrial goods 
and imports of regional resources. Washington had begun to 
consider Southeast Asia, and especially resource-rich Indonesia 
as a good market for Japanese trade. In 1947, the United 
States provided aid to the Netherlands East Indies to fast-track 
economic reconstruction and resume trade in the region. This 
aid had been supplied on the assumption that the Dutch would 
regain sovereignty over all of Indonesia. Washington noted 
that the goal of Indonesian nationalists, despite making public 
statements about welcoming private foreign capital, appeared 
‘to be the achievement of a state along Socialist lines’ and that 
republican leaders seemed to be trying to balance their ‘basic 
Socialist aspirations’ with the need to attract foreign capital for 
the sake of the economy.6
4      ‘Paper on Principal British Interests in the Far East’, (January 1946), CO 
537/4718, The British National Archives, TNA.
5       ‘Draft paper by Far East Civil Planning Unit, Circulated by Cabinet Offi ce’, (14 
January 1946), CO537/1478, TNA.
6       ‘Background Information on Far Eastern Countries: Political Conditions and 
Economic Recovery Problems, Prepared for the use of the Committee on Armed 
Services in consultation with the Department of State, 80th Congress, 1st Session’ 
– Senate Committee Print, (September 9 1947), Papers of John D. Sumner, ECA 
Files (C-I), Box 6, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (HSTL).
However, Holland was losing control of the territory, and continued 
instability in Southeast Asia could work to communist advantage.  
So, Washington lent its support for United Nations (UN)-
sponsored Indonesian-Dutch negotiations, leading to a cease-
fi re agreement in January 1948.  Later that year, the Indonesian 
army crushed a rebellion at Madiun in Java launched by the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), then closely associated with 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  For the Americans, this 
action made Sukarno a much more acceptable independence 
leader.  The Dutch made a last ditch effort at military conquest, 
but Washington responded by encouraging The Hague to agree 
in November 1949 to hand over all the islands of the NEI, with the 
exception of West New Guinea (also known as West Irian, Irian 
Jaya, West Papua), to the Indonesian Republic.
In short, the Netherlands was not a major European country that 
the United States needed to appease. American support for 
Indonesia was associated with Washington’s growing eagerness 
to halt communist expansion in Southeast Asia, particularly 
in light of communist rebellions in Malaya and the Philippines. 
The insurgency in Vietnam was also increasingly viewed as 
communist-led. Behind this lay an interest in exploiting the 
substantial natural resources in the region and the fact that in 
1950 Malaya and Indonesia produced more than half of the 
world’s natural rubber and tin, and that Indonesia’s exports in 
1949 reached the value of US$500,000,000.7 Therefore, as the 
producers of ‘strategically important commodities’, the threat 
of communist takeovers in Malaya and Indonesia could greatly 
threaten Japan’s political and economic reconstruction.8
GUIDED DEMOCRACY
By the mid-1950s there was increasing support in Indonesia for 
communism. In Indonesia’s fi rst national election in 1955, the 
PKI received almost 16 per cent of the vote – a major comeback 
after the Maduin uprising in 1948. Furthermore, the PKI had 
been allowed to campaign openly. After these elections, the 
Communists were the fourth largest party in a parliament where 
no party held a majority of seats, thus ensuring their role in 
future Indonesian governments.9 In 1957, Sukarno abolished 
parliamentary government in favour of presidential rule under the 
term ‘Guided Democracy’. As this new system took shape, the 
PKI and the army began to strengthen their positions as well as 
trying to infi ltrate each other’s organisations.10
7       ‘Address by Allen Griffi n, publisher of the Monterey Peninsula Herald, 
Monterey, California, delivered at the Institute on Southeast Asia’, (San Francisco: 
San Francisco State College, July 21 1950), Student Research File (B File), Pacifi c 
Rim: Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, #31A, Box 
1 of 2, HSTL.
8       ‘Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on 
Security of Strategically Important Industrial Operations in Foreign Countries’, (26 
August 1948), White House Offi ce, National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948–6, 
Disaster File, Box 33, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDEL).
9       Syamsuddin Haris, ‘General Elections Under the New Order’, in Hans Antlov 
& Sven Cederroth (eds), Elections in Indonesia: The New Order and Beyond, 
RoutledgeCurzon, (London: 2004), pp. 18–19.
10       M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, 3rd ed, 
(Stanford University Press, 2001), Ch.20.
From the mid-1950s Jakarta gradually moved away from 
Western support, refl ecting not only the growing infl uence of the 
PKI in the Sukarno government, but also the Indonesian leader’s 
own philosophy of independence in foreign policy. Sukarno 
emphasised that Indonesian people should see themselves as 
part of a global struggle against the forces of imperialism. In that 
context, he sought to establish himself as leader of a force of 
non-aligned states. He thus hosted a conference of non-aligned 
states at Bandung, Java in 1955. Indonesian scholar Dewi 
Fortuna Anwar has argued that Sukarno wanted to maximise 
Indonesian independence and to avoid committing the country 
to external agreements beyond its control. However, despite 
Indonesia pursuing an active foreign policy, during the 1950s and 
1960s internal subversion was viewed as the primary threat to 
national security.11
Concern over internal unrest was one of the purported reasons 
that Sukarno overthrew parliamentary democracy, although 
this did not prevent revolts from occurring. In February 1958 
an insurrection took place in northern Sumatra and the rebels 
received outside help in the form of weapons and equipment. 
Australia, Britain and the United States were involved covertly 
because of the anti-communist views expressed by the rebels 
and what they perceived as politically dangerous elements in 
Sukarno’s government. The regional uprisings were quickly 
crushed by the Indonesian military, leaving a legacy of Indonesian 
hostility to the West. As a result of this Sukarno turned to 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for military support 
and economic aid. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s visit to 
Indonesia in 1960 resulted in an arms deal with the USSR.12 
By 1961, armed with new Soviet weaponry, Jakarta turned its 
attention to West New Guinea.
There was now deep concern in Washington over the possibility 
of Jakarta slipping into the communist camp. Eager to stop the 
spread of communism in Indonesia, the United States persuaded 
the Netherlands to participate in peace talks with Indonesia. The 
result was that in August 1962 Indonesia achieved the right to 
occupy West New Guinea on 1 May 1963, subject to a face-
saving clause favouring the Netherlands. In 1969 indigenous 
people would participate in a UN-supervised vote on the future 
of the territory. Indonesia had fi nally completed its struggle for 
independence from the Netherlands. However, the international 
environment in 1963 was signifi cantly different to that of 1945. 
Indonesian nationalism and political independence had moved 
from being part of the post-war decolonisation process to an 
important factor in Cold War strategy in Southeast Asia. 
11       Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 1994, pp. 18–19.
12       Audrey. R. Kahim & G McT. Kahim, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret 
Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia, (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1995).
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Indonesia’s shift towards a foreign policy of national 
independence raised concerns in Washington. When in 1960 
Jakarta fi rst offi cially claimed sovereignty over the waters of the 
Indonesian Archipelago, the United States, Britain and their allies 
protested, refusing to recognise the claim. For the Americans 
it was vital that the area remain part of international waters, as 
any challenge to the freedom of navigation there threatened 
the status of other disputed sea-lanes and also threatened US 
access to the sea and airspace separating Australia from the 
South China Sea.13
At home, Sukarno’s New Order policies coincided with economic 
decline: the government had neglected restoration of the 
domestic economic infrastructure, which had been shattered 
during World War II and the war for independence; Indonesia 
could not gain the full benefi t of its natural resources; and there 
was massive national debt and accelerating infl ation. This period 
saw a contest between those leaders looking for economic 
stabilisation and those who ‘wanted to keep the revolution 
alive’.14 Under these conditions Sukarno initiated another 
regional military campaign, this time against the newly formed 
Federation of Malaysia. 
KONFRONTASI
Malaysia was a solution to the problem of the decolonisation of 
Britain’s remaining Southeast Asian possessions. These were 
Singapore and the territories of Brunei, Sarawak and British 
North Borneo. Of these, Singapore was the natural geographic 
part of Malaya, which had become independent in 1957. 
Singapore was administered separately by Britain and hosted a 
British naval base. However, there was pressure for Singapore’s 
inclusion in Malaya. This prompted opposition among Malay 
political leaders, because the incorporation of Singapore, where 
the majority of the population was ethnically Chinese, would 
give the latter a clear majority population. To head off such a 
prospect, in May 1961 the Malay premier Tunku Abdul Rahman 
advocated the inclusion of the British colonies in Borneo in an 
amalgamated state of Malaya and Singapore. That proposal 
would give the new nation a majority of Malay people.15 
Britain agreed to this proposal because its Borneo territories 
would have diffi culty surviving economically as independent 
countries or even as an independent federation. Also, it would 
ensure security and regional stability for Britain’s military base 
at Singapore, so that Britain could, in time, withdraw its forces 
from Southeast Asia. Within Britain’s Borneo territories there was 
only one major source of opposition to the idea from the Sultan 
13       ‘Memorandum of Information for the Secretary of the Navy’ by Richard 
S. Craighill, Director, Politico Military Policy Division, Department of the Navy, (9 
September 1964), ‘Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson President, (1963–1969)’, 
National Security File, Country File, Asia and the Pacifi c, Indonesia, Box 246, 
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJL).
14       Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), p. 22.
15       ‘Cabinet Submission, Garfi eld Barwick, Minister for External Affairs’, (25 
February 1963), A5619, C470 Part 1, National Archives of Australia (NAA).
of Brunei, who did not wish to share his country’s oil wealth 
with the rest of Malaysia; as a result Brunei became its own 
independent state.16
However, there was opposition to the creation of Malaysia, 
notably from Indonesia. In response, Sukarno launched a 
campaign against Malaysia, known as Confrontation, which 
the Indonesians called Konfrontasi. The confl ict never reached 
the level of a full-scale war, but hostilities were nonetheless 
maintained by support of Malaysia with reinforcements from 
Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Sukarno labelled the 
Federation of Malaysia as British neo-imperialism, refl ecting his 
anti-imperialist ideology. However, Konfrontasi also provided a 
useful distraction from the economic problems in Indonesia and 
the confl ict between the differing factions within the government.
Sukarno was careful not to provoke Britain into a declared war, 
which was the reason for only token intervention in Malaysia. 
He knew that his navy and air force would be no match 
against the British, and apart from communist nations, his only 
real support derived from the Philippines, which had its own 
historically based claim to Sabah. Concerned about relations 
with Indonesia, the United States had initially left Konfrontasi to 
be waged by the British. Washington regarded Indonesia as a 
vital nation in the region and was careful to seek to maintain and 
improve relations.17 However, since September 1963, American 
aid to Jakarta decreased signifi cantly and concentrated on 
civilian training within Indonesia and training Indonesian military 
personnel in the United States. Washington was careful to 
avoid providing aid that would help Sukarno’s campaign against 
Malaysia, but wanted to maintain a military training program that 
would continue the links the United States had developed with 
Indonesian army offi cers, ‘which have reinforced the army’s anti-
Communist posture and have given us unique entrée in to the 
leadership of the country’s strongest politico-military force.’18 
The two major groups in Sukarno’s government – the PKI and 
the army – backed the campaign. The British believed that even 
if Sukarno left offi ce, Konfrontasi was likely to continue, as his 
successor would probably carry on balancing the interests of 
the army and the PKI, as no leader would want to appear to be 
unpatriotic by easing Konfrontasi. For Britain, the best hope of 
ending Konfrontasi was for internal instability in Indonesia that 
would draw resources away from the confl ict.19
16       A. J. Stockwell, ‘Introduction’, in A. J. Stockwell (ed), British Documents 
on the End of Empire: Malaysia, Series B, Volume 8, Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies, London, 2004.
17       ‘Cabinet Submission no. 572’, Garfi eld Barwick, Minister for External Affairs, 
(2 February 1963), A519, C470 Part 1, NAA.
18       ‘Memorandum, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson President, 1963–1969’, 
National Security File, Country File, Asia and the Pacifi c, Indonesia, Box 246, LBJL 
(15 September 1964).
19       ‘Guidance Telegram from Foreign Offi ce to certain missions’, 6 January 
1965, FO 371/180310, & letter from A. Golds, Joint Indonesia–Malaysia 
Department to A. Gilchrist, (Jakarta: British Embassy, 18 June 1965), FO 
371/181528, TNA.
Ultimately, internal instability did take hold in Indonesia and 
Konfrontasi ended because of an attempted coup on the night of 
30 September and the early morning of 1 October 1965, which 
resulted in the murder of six army generals. The British Embassy 
in Jakarta informed London that a coup had been attempted 
by ‘elements of the Indonesian armed forces’ but had been put 
down.20 The following day, the embassy reported that the cause 
of the uprising appeared to be a split within the Indonesian army. 
Rumours were already circulating that the PKI was responsible 
for the operation; although uncertainty persists as to whether this 
was indeed the case.21 Nevertheless, as a consequence Suharto 
was able to assume power and ease Sukarno aside. The new 
Suharto government ended Konfrontasi in 1966.
THE NEW ORDER 
Indonesia’s foreign policy changed under Suharto, who was 
strongly anti-communist. Jakarta severed ties with Beijing, 
Hanoi, and Pyongyang, banned the PKI, and pursued efforts to 
obtain Western aid. Another change in policy was Indonesia’s 
decision to participate in a new regional forum, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), made up of Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. The 
initiative to form ASEAN came out of the Bangkok talks to end 
Konfrontasi. The members were all anti-communist, and the new 
organisation received support from the United States and Britain. 
For the Western powers, the creation of ASEAN heralded a new 
era of regional stability. London and Washington believed that the 
biggest threat to the region was internal insurrection rather than 
external invasion, and that economic development was therefore 
essential. There was also less perceived need for Western 
military presence because Indonesia had ended its campaign of 
confrontation and cut its ties with China. This represented a new 
diplomatic strategy, and Washington indicated that in order to 
achieve a ‘stable political security situation’, that it would disband 
bilateral relationships and introduce cooperative organisations; to 
achieve this, American assistance and directorship was vital.22
When ASEAN was inaugurated on 8 August 1967, Washington 
decided not to make a statement on the formation of the 
new group in case the United States was accused of stealing 
the initiative, or of having conceived its inception.23 ASEAN’s 
declaration stated that the countries in Southeast Asia ‘share 
a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and 
social stability of the region’.24 Even though ASEAN was not 
directly concerned with defence, it added that all foreign bases 
20       Telegram, British Embassy in Jakarta to London, (1 October 1965), 
FO371/180316, TNA.
21       Telegram, British Embassy in Jakarta to London, (2 October 1965), FO 
371/180317, TNA.
22       Airgram, ‘Bangkok to Department of State’, 6 September 1967, Box 1850, 
Central Policy Files 1967–69, Political Affairs and Relations, RG 59, [US] National 
Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
23       Department of State Circular Telegram, Box 1519, General Records of 
the Department of State, Central Policy File 1967–69, Defence, RG 59, NARA, (6 
August 1967).
24       B.K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, (1969), p. 116.
were temporary and that the countries in the region shared the 
main responsibility for defending Southeast Asia. Of the fi ve 
founding members, Indonesia was the only country that did 
not host Western forces inside its territory, and Jakarta insisted 
that the declaration should stress the temporary nature of 
the regional Western bases. At fi rst, the Philippines opposed 
the passage, acquiesced after the inaugural meeting began. 
However, the fi nal statement was a compromise: Indonesia 
initially wanted reference to no foreign bases, but accepted the 
word ‘temporary’; and Malaysia accepted this as a condition of 
Indonesian membership.25
At the start, ASEAN was loosely structured. There was no 
economic unity among member states and only Singapore gained 
any great benefi t from trade between the ASEAN nations. Internal 
tension also persisted. The Philippines’ ongoing claim to the 
territory of Sabah caused the breakdown of Philippines–Malaysian 
diplomatic relations in 1968. However, ASEAN displayed strength 
in encouraging successful resolution of this crisis. 
One factor encouraging ASEAN unity was a change in the 
strategic environment in Southeast Asia. This was signalled by 
President Nixon’s declaration in 1969 on a visit to the American 
island of Guam that the United States was not going to venture 
into any future military involvement in Asia and that Asian 
nations would increasingly have to take responsibility for their 
own defence. This statement was known as the Nixon or Guam 
doctrine. It had as much to do with internal American politics as 
with US relations with Asian countries. Nixon had commenced 
withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam, demonstrating a halt 
to new involvement. However, it did refl ect the long-held policy 
of past American administrations to support regionalism in 
Southeast Asia, and following its announcement, Washington 
began improving relations with the USSR and China through the 
policy of détente.26
The other strategic change was Britain’s announcement of 
withdrawal from its military commitment to the defence of 
Malaysia and Singapore by disbanding its military base in 
Singapore and ending the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. 
This was a result of cost-cutting measures. London was keen to 
avoid any future military expense like Konfrontasi in a region that 
had become much less important to Britain.27 
25       ‘Outward Savingram to all posts from Department of External Affairs’, (5 
September 1967), A1838, 3004/13/21 Part 3, NAA.
26       Telegram, Australian Embassy in Washington to Secretary of the National 
Intelligence Committee, Department of Defence, (30 November 1972), A1838, 
683/72/57, NAA.
27       Memorandum by Healey and Stewart, OPD (69) 27, (19 May 1969), CAB 
148/92, TNA.
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Western military retreat from Southeast Asia had been 
Jakarta’s aim during the negotiations to form ASEAN, and its 
strategic outlook suited the aims of the Nixon Doctrine. Since 
independence, Indonesia’s policy was to build its own strength 
without involving foreign powers in any commitment. Jakarta’s 
efforts to promote co-operation and self-reliance among ASEAN 
countries was greatly valued in Washington, and in the early 
1970s, Indonesia was one of the main drivers behind mutual 
support in economics, security and other areas. For the United 
States, Indonesia was ‘one of the models of the Nixon Doctrine’ 
– it was using American economic aid, military aid, and private 
investments, to build its own strength without drawing the 
United States into any military commitment. Jakarta viewed 
American fi nancial assistance as vital to achieving national 
economic development that would promote regional stability. 
This was necessary to resist the expansion of Chinese political 
infl uence and Japanese economic domination. The Australian 
Government’s assessment of the situation refl ected this position:
Indonesian attachment to the forms of an 
independent and active (i.e. non-aligned) foreign 
policy, and the ‘low posture’ scrupulously maintained 
by the United States in Jakarta, mask a very close 
relationship, based on a shared conviction that the 
two countries’ policies and performance serve each 
other’s national interests.28
For the United States, underpinning these efforts to contain 
communist infl uence in Southeast Asia was the region’s 
importance as a source of raw materials, including petroleum.29 
Washington was very grateful to Indonesia for not participating 
in the 1973 OPEC-led oil embargo. And despite Indonesia’s 
increased petroleum revenues, Washington continued to supply 
military aid to Jakarta.30 Yet the country remained one of the 
poorest in the world on a per capita basis, and while there were 
signs in 1973 that management of the Indonesian economy had 
improved over the course of several years, there was still, ‘an 
increasing risk of distortions due to the use of political power to 
enrich individuals.’31
28       ‘Summary of the situation in Indonesia in mid-1973, Department of Foreign 
Affairs’, (Canberra: July 1973), A1838, 638/72/57, NAA.
29       ‘Memorandum to Mr Peachey, from G.C. Lewis, Intelligence Assessment 
Section’, (4 September 1973), A1838, 638/72/57, NAA.
30       ‘Memorandum for the President, from Robert S. Ingersoll, Acting Secretary’, 
1 July 1975, Offi ce of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 
Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft Files, (1972) 1974–1977, Temporary Parallel 
File, Box A, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, GRFL.
31       ‘Memorandum, Department of Foreign Affairs’, (July 1973), A1838, 
683/72/57, NAA.
While Indonesia took a leading role in regional stability through 
ASEAN, it also risked instability through its own aspirations to 
incorporate West New Guinea and Portuguese Timor within its 
borders, and the United States chose not to stand in Jakarta’s 
path in achieving these ambitions. For the Americans, Indonesia 
was ‘the largest and most important non-Communist Southeast 
Asian state and a signifi cant Third World Country’.32 
When Indonesia took control of West New Guinea, which it 
called Irian Jaya, but which indigenous nationalists called West 
Papua, it started to prepare the territory for the UN-supervised 
self-determination plebiscite in 1969, as set out in the agreement 
with the Netherlands. A little over 1,000 Papuans representing 
a population of about 800,000 participated in the act of ‘free 
choice’ in front of UN representatives and foreign diplomats. 
Washington chose not to become involved. US National Security 
Adviser Henry Kissinger viewed the so-called act of free choice 
as consisting, ‘of a series of consultations rather than a direct 
election, which would be almost meaningless among the stone-
age cultures of New Guinea’.33 
A similar reaction occurred six years later when Jakarta, fearing a 
left-wing takeover in Portuguese Timor, sought to incorporate the 
small colony by force within Indonesia. Washington was aware 
that a guerrilla war would be the result of any Indonesian action. 
US President Gerald Ford and Kissinger discussed these issues 
with Suharto during a visit to Jakarta in early December 1975. 
In a meeting between the three, the Indonesian leader sought 
his counterpart’s ‘understanding if we deem it necessary to take 
rapid or drastic action’. The response from Ford was that the 
United States would ‘understand and will not press you on the 
issue. We understand the problem you have and the intentions 
you have’.34 This close relationship between Washington and 
Jakarta thus proved extremely benefi cial to Suharto in his quest 
for regional leadership and fi nancial aid. 
32       ‘Memorandum for the President, from Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of 
State’, (21 November 1975), The [US] National Security Archive, NSA.
33       ‘Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to the President on Djakarta Visit’, 
Your Meetings with President Suharto, (18 July 1969), NSA.
34       Telegram, ‘Embassy Jakarta to Secretary of State’, (6 December 1975), NSA.
CONCLUSION
Regional leadership and great power dependence are dominant 
characteristics of Indonesia’s post-war history. Since gaining 
independence from the Dutch, the new nation’s place in the 
world was viewed as pivotal by outside powers, and Jakarta 
struggled to balance its desire to avoid external interference in its 
affairs with the need for external fi nancial support. Nevertheless, 
Indonesian leaders were able to make use of their advantageous 
position and gain support for some foreign policy initiatives. 
However, internal instability continuously threatened to destabilise 
the country. Indonesia’s rise to prominence both regionally 
and globally, thus comprised a mixture of factors: certainly the 
country’s population and abundance of resources were major 
issues. However, leadership does not only derive from size and 
wealth, but is based on vision, and Indonesia’s leaders had a 
role to play in their nation’s successes as well as the setbacks. 
Their sense of nationalism and independence was inherited from 
the long struggle against the Dutch, and this helped to forge 
Indonesian foreign relations. But Indonesian leaders did not 
always capitalise on the economic potential of their nation, adding 
problems to an already unstable region, and strengthening the 
infl uence of the outside powers. This presented a contradiction 
between Indonesia’s own aspirations for non-alignment and its 
expansionist policies in regards to East Timor and West New 
Guinea against its dependence on foreign fi nancial assistance 
and a desire to maintain regional security. The onset of regional 
cooperation provided Indonesia with its chance to seize a 
leadership role, as stability could not be achieved without the 
support of Southeast Asia’s largest nation. Yet, despite its role 
in ASEAN, Indonesia continued to be dependent on external 
powers: while this dependence supported some leadership 
aspirations, it has also exposed internal vulnerabilities.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years everyone has been interested in what happens 
in Indonesia. On the political front, the election of a Chinese 
Indonesian as the Deputy Governor of Jakarta continues to 
draw both comment and disbelief. The forthcoming presidential 
elections have been drawing unprecedented public and 
international interest; the third direct election for a President in 
Indonesia’s multi-party democracy. Despite the fragmentation and 
the frequent corruption scandals in the ruling Partai Demokrat 
or Democratic Party (Indonesia), no one expects the 2014 
presidential elections to be socially violent or ideologically charged. 
With the overthrow of an elected government in Egypt and 
the violent politics of Pakistan, Indonesia is fast obtaining the 
distinction of being the only Islamic country with a stable and 
well-functioning democracy; one that also believes in open 
markets and multi-party coalition government. Indonesia’s 
political transition has been all the more impressive for having 
been crafted in the middle of the country’s deepest economic 
crisis after Independence in 1945. Indonesia’s economic fall in 
1997–98 was easily comparable to that experienced by Russia 
and several other countries in the former USSR in the aftermath 
of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1992. 
It is also breathtaking considering that within the fi rst fi ve 
years of the onset of the Asian fi nancial crisis, Indonesia had 
also comprehensively reworked its system of sub-national 
government, introducing one of the most decentralised political 
systems in the world. Furthermore, what is just as impressive 
is that social confl ict began to decline in the fi rst decade of the 
new democracy. The disastrous Tsunami that struck in 2004 
brought about comprehensive peace rather than fragmentation. 
Regional unrest was met not by force but by redrawing regional 
boundaries through a process called Pemekaran. What is 
particularly signifi cant about the Indonesian case is that 
economic recovery and political transformation have worked 
hand in hand, and over time have become mutually reinforcing. 
The result of such a virtuous cycle is refl ected in the fact that 
Indonesia is now among the fastest developing countries. It 
has managed to escape the ravages of a new global fi nancial 
crisis in 2008–09. More importantly, unlike India and China – 
which undertook stimulus spending sprees in order to keep the 
engine of their economies running – Indonesia navigated the 
crisis by employing fi scally sustainable and sound policies. In 
recent years the Indonesian economy has continued to grow 
at a rate of over six per cent. Indonesia’s economy grew by 6.2 
per cent in 2012, making it the fastest growing G20 economy 
after China. Indonesia grew by 6.5 per cent in 2011.1 It is now 
a member of the G20 group. It has become an important 
destination for foreign direct investment (FDI). The total FDI 
commitments in 2012 stood at US$20 billion, and the number 
1      Asian Development Bank (ADB), ‘Investment and Private Consumption 
to Boost Indonesia’s Growth’, 2013. available at: http://www.adb.org/news/
indonesia/investment-and-private-consumption-boost-indonesias-growth, 
accessed 9 April 2013.
for the April–September quarter in 2013 stood at US$5.93 
billion.2 This is an 18.4 per cent rise from the previous year. In 
April–June of 2013, the amount increased by 18.9 per cent 
from the same period in 2012. It has signifi cantly reduced both 
its debt-to-GDP ratio and its dependence on foreign loans and 
grants. Indonesia’s debt-to-GDP ratio has steadily declined from 
83 per cent in 2001 to less than 25 per cent by the end of 2011, 
the lowest among ASEAN countries, aside from Singapore, 
which has no government debt.3 It has recently adopted an 
ambitious economic plan: the ‘Master plan for Acceleration and 
Expansion of Indonesia’s Economic Development’ (MP3EI). 
MP3EI aims to raise Indonesia’s current level of per capita 
income from just over US$3000 to around US$14,250–15,000 
by 2025, with a total gross domestic product of USD$4.0–$4.5 
trillion.4 The latest McKinsey Report on Indonesia predicts that 
by 2030 it will become the seventh largest economy in the 
world.5 As the current campaign to promote inward investment 
to Indonesia proclaims, ‘take a look at us now’.
How does one explain the success of the Indonesian transition 
in the last decade and a half? What contribution did economic 
recovery make to its human and political security? What, if any, 
are the economic foundations of Indonesia’s security? These 
are critical questions in the context of Indonesia’s systemic 
transition. Answers to them might well contain valuable lessons 
for other countries in similar political and economic stages of 
transition. They may also explain why the Arab Spring has largely 
failed to live up to its early promise, and why Indonesia continues 
to move steadily towards a consolidated multi-party democracy 
with open markets and rapid integration into the regional and 
global economy.
2       Bank Indonesia, ‘External Sector’, 2013. available at: http://www.bi.go.id/
sds/, accessed October 23, 2013.
3       ‘Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board, Facts of Indonesia-Sound 
Economy’, 2013. available at: http://www3.bkpm.go.id/contents/general/4/sound-
economy, accessed 23 October 2013.
4       State Ministry of National Development Planning Agency / Bappenas, ‘MP3EI 
Report’. available at: http://www.bappenas.go.id/, accessed 23 October 2013.
5       Raoul Oberman et al., ‘The archipelago economy: Unleashing Indonesia’s 
potential’, (McKinsey Global Institute, 2012) available at: http://www.mckinsey.com/
insights/asia-pacifi c/the_archipelago_economy, accessed September 2012.
IS THE INDONESIAN GLASS MORE FULL 
THAN EMPTY?
An important feature of debates concerning the Indonesian 
economy is the occurrence of sharp swings in both investor 
and expert sentiment from considerable optimism to marked 
pessimism. The optimism comes from successful political 
and military transition in less than a decade, establishing not 
only separation of powers but also freedom of the press and 
of assembly. Indonesia’s successful reform agenda compares 
favourably with that attempted far less successfully in the 
countries of the former USSR and those of the Arab Spring. The 
optimism derives from the circumstances in which Indonesia 
responded to the severe decline in output in 1998 with 
consumption-led growth until the mid-2000s, transforming into 
investment-led growth towards the end of the last decade. In 
2012 the ratio of fi xed capital formation to GDP rose to 33.2 per 
cent, the highest in at least 20 years.6
Such optimism also came as the result of sharp increases 
in the international price of many of Indonesia’s mineral-
based commodities, and its success at weathering a hasty 
and ill-considered program of economic and administrative 
decentralisation. Add the sharp rise of a new middle class 
earning over US$3000 per annum and a young population 
that promises a ‘demographic dividend’ at a time when many 
developed and some developing economies – e.g., China – 
would be facing problems of an aging population and high 
dependency ratios, and one has the principal elements of the 
McKinsey claim that Indonesia is an economy to watch. 
On the other hand, pessimism arises out of a number of 
structural characteristics of the Indonesian economy. Despite 
the creation of an anti-corruption agency (the Corruption 
Eradication Commission – KPK), corruption remains systemic; 
regional governments are undermined by skill defi cits in the civil 
service and the high cost of elections, which fuel the need for 
political representatives to recoup their investment during the 
elections through political favors and lucrative business deals. 
The regulatory structure of the country displays confusion and 
administrative overlap, with one regulation or law working against 
another. Take for example the land laws, where only part of 
the national forest land is registered under the National Land 
Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional – BPN), while the rest is 
governed by local authorities and agencies. Legal certainty and 
the sanctity of contract are often undermined by the opacity 
of land and property rights and the bias of the courts against 
external companies. Certainty in property and law is also 
undermined by the extreme concentration of industrial ownership 
within a handful of business families, accounting for around 
two-thirds of market capitalisation. The policymaking process 
is still in formation, characterised by a mixture of ailing national 
policymaking institutions and ad hoc troubleshooting and 
advisory bodies. The problem is aggravated by the lack of public 
6       Asian Development Bank (ADB) ‘Investment and Private Consumption to Boost 
Indonesia’s Growth’, available at: http://www.adb.org/news/indonesia/investment-
and-private-consumption-boost-indonesias-growth, accessed 9 April 2013.
policy platforms, making future policy predictions for the majority 
of Indonesian political parties a game of chance. 
This situation of uncertainty will be compounded by the coming 
Association of Southeast Nations ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC) post 2015; it has also faced serious ongoing challenges 
in the diffi cult experience of witnessing capital fl ight to countries 
with lower labour costs, a more friendly investment climate, and 
a more skilled labour force. In addition to the churning Asian 
trade and investment fl ows in the last decade, one begins to see 
the darker possibilities of a future economic landscape. 
The conclusion is clear: economic growth and social stability 
cannot be taken for granted. Past trends of key economic 
indicators cannot only be considered in terms of linear 
progression and extrapolation. Indonesia’s economic and 
political landscape is continuously changing and evolving. It is 
a country in systemic transition, in the throes of consolidating 
both its political and its economic system. It is doing so under 
enormously high expectations of what its new political system 
can deliver in the near future. In the meantime, persistent 
fascination with the old regime abounds. 
Social cohesion also cannot be taken for granted, despite the 
recent decline in social confl ict and violence. Over half of the 
total population lives barely above the absolute poverty line. 
Upward swings in international food prices, often refl ecting the 
intertwining of international food and fuel markets – as well as 
the additional demand for food created by rising per capita 
incomes in large economies such as India and China – threaten 
to push millions of Indonesians below the poverty line. In 
many countries this sudden downward shift in entitlement has 
historically been the trigger for large-scale social confl ict and 
extremist politics. 
Horizontal or inter-regional inequalities are another potentially 
explosive ingredient in Indonesia. After a decade and a half 
of extreme decentralisation, little has been done to assess 
whether inter-regional or horizontal inequalities have been 
rising or diminishing. Neither has Indonesia established policy 
measures necessary in the event of economic inequality rising 
above a predetermined politically and socially acceptable 
level. Indeed, Indonesian economic policy debates hardly 
ever focus on the economics of inequality, preferring instead 
to observe movement in the levels of absolute poverty and 
implementing social safety net mechanisms such as conditional 
cash transfers, community based infrastructure grants, and the 
creation of new growth centres, including Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) under the MP3EI. 
Finally, the rapid pace of urbanisation and continuing migration 
of labor from rural to urban areas – from the outer islands to 
the industrial urban centres of Java and the larger islands of the 
Indonesian archipelago – continue to dissolve traditional and 
historic family ties based on mutual duty of care and collective 
enforcement of Adat property rights. Combined with the global 
polarisation of perceptions with respect to Islam, this may 
well provide a dangerous cocktail of identity crises, economic 
uncertainty and social unravelling, such as to severely undermine 
Indonesia’s political cohesion and security gains. 
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Countries in the midst of deep systemic transitions do not follow 
easy paths from the past to the future, from authoritarianism to 
democracy, from cronyism to arm’s-length competitive business 
practices, from economic stagnation to economic reform and 
growth. Cycles of optimism and pessimism are constant features 
of commentary on the function of economies in transition. 
THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF 
SECURITY: AN URGENT REFORM AGENDA
Despite remarkable progress in its systemic transition, the 
economic and political hurdles Indonesia faces are still 
considerable. Moreover, these challenges are interwoven and 
need to be overcome simultaneously.
MANAGING THE RISE IN ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
Horizontal inequality is a topic that is currently missing from the 
policy debate but which threatens social stability and therefore 
growth.7 In Indonesia, horizontal inequality occurs between 
regions and between ethnic and religious groups.8 From 2002 
to 2010, regional income dispersion in Indonesia, measured by 
the standard deviation of GSP per capita by province, grew by 
15 per cent. The threat of confl ict in resource-rich regions such 
as Aceh and Papua was one reason for the government initially 
to decentralise; regardless of this, regional income inequality 
still presents a problem. Aceh, for example, is the fi fth richest 
province in the country, with per capita GDP that is much higher 
than the national average, and with a per capita GDP of Rp. 9.8 
million, roughly US$1,090.9  
Often horizontal inequalities lead to confl ict, less because of 
the gap in prosperity between regions than because of the gap 
between a single region’s relative prosperity and community 
welfare. For example, Aceh might be one of the richest 
provinces, but there has been no corresponding improvement in 
its community wellbeing. That Aceh is the fi fth richest province 
and has the fourth highest poverty headcount is cause for 
concern.10 It is only recently, in a post-Washington consensus 
era, that these issues are beginning to gain attention. Presently, 
however, there are knowledge gaps not only in regard to the 
nature of horizontal inequality and its propensity to cause 
confl ict, but also concerning decentralisation and whether it has 
had a benefi cial effect across separate regions or not. These are 
merely some of the issues that require further attention in order 
to assess accurately Indonesia’s journey.
7       Satish Mishra, ‘Is Indonesia Vulnerable to Confl ict: An Assessment’. (Jakarta: 
Strategic Asia for USAID, July 2008), p. 16.
8       Frances Stewart, ‘Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of 
Development’ (Oxford: University of Oxford, February 2002).
9       Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, Widjajanti I Suharyo, Satish Mishra, 
‘Aspiration to inequality: regional disparity and centre-regional confl icts in 
Indonesia’. UNI/WIDER Project Conference on Spatial Inequality in Asia. (Tokyo, 
March 2003), p. 28.
10       Oleksiy Ivaschenko et al., ‘Aceh Public Expenditure Analysis: Spending for 
Reconstruction and Poverty Reduction’, (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005).
Income inequality is another factor that may impact upon 
Indonesia’s growth. Recent studies have shown that the 
economies of countries with income inequality, such as Jordan 
and Cameroon, have more frequently plunged into recession 
than economies with greater levels of income equality, which 
more often achieve sustained economic growth.11 In 2010, 
Indonesia occupied 81st place on the 2010 Gini Index (the 
internationally accepted measure of income inequality). The 
standard deviation of inter-provincial GSP per capita increased 
from IDR7.13 million to IDR 8.2 million over an 8-year period.12 If 
growth depends upon national inclusivity, Indonesia will need to 
identify and implement ways of lessening the gap between the 
rich and the poor.13
In a democratic society, excessive inequality in income generates 
pressure that can lead to unsound populist economic policy. 
Populist policy in Argentina, Brazil and Peru during the 1980s 
was intended to assist the poor by fi nancing social and transfer 
programs; ultimately, however, these policies caused recession, 
hyperinfl ation, and a decline in wellbeing across income groups.
POVERTY REDUCTION AND THE POVERTY ELASTICITY 
OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
Indonesia will also need to address poverty. This prescription 
is not as easy as it appears, since there is considerable 
evidence that the poverty elasticity of economic growth might 
be diminishing. Traditionally, growth was assumed to reduce 
poverty, and statistical research has often confi rmed this. When 
Indonesia began growing, both poverty and inequality declined.14 
However, the elasticity of Indonesia’s growth and poverty rates 
are as yet unknown. Reducing poverty may be a matter of 
increasing growth by a rate higher than in the past in order to 
accommodate for changing rates of elasticity in the ratio of 
the growth rate to poverty: this is an issue that will need to be 
researched to ensure Indonesia’s development. 
However, because both poverty and inequality in Indonesia 
post-decentralisation are newly apprehended problems, they 
lack research, which makes it diffi cult to develop policy with 
any sense of security. In addition, these issues remain absent 
from the current policy debate. To make future predictions, 
address challenges and implement appropriate administrative 
and regulatory programs, more specifi c information is needed to 
understand the nature and the extent of inequality, the best way 
of dealing with the issue in the coming decade, and the most 
effective policy instruments with which to address the issue.15    
11       IMF (2011).
12       CEIC (2013).
13       Michael Walton et al., ‘Institutional Pathways to Equity: Addressing Inequality 
Traps’  (Washington DC: World Bank, April 2008).
14       Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1998).
15       Gacitúa-Marió Estanislao, et al. (eds), Building Equality and Opportunity 
through Social Guarantees: New Approaches to Public Policy and the Realization of 
Rights, (Washington DC: World Bank, 2009). Vito Tanzi and Ke-Young Chu, Income 
Distribution and High-Quality Growth, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998); See collection 
of essays in ‘Growth, Inequality and Poverty’.
ECONOMIC GROWTH, DIVERSIFICATION AND THE 
DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND
The acceleration of economic growth in the face of the 
diminishing elasticity of poverty reduction on the one hand, and 
the employment elasticity of growth on the other, remain as 
major policy priorities. The ambitious growth vision signalled by 
the MP3EI is an indication of this primacy. However, to achieve 
this Indonesia needs to eradicate its infrastructure defi cits in 
energy, IT, transport networks, urban housing, and water and 
sanitation. The Economic Master Plan exists primarily as a vision. 
Developing a fi nancing plan for it within the immediate future 
is an urgent requirement, one that is hindered by Indonesia’s 
ineffective policymaking process and problems of inter-ministerial 
miscommunication and non-coordination. This task is rendered 
particularly diffi cult under Indonesia’s preference for a rainbow 
coalition – even when the president continues to garner a majority 
popular vote – under which individual cabinet members openly 
disagree and frequently have little political common ground.
As with the case of the McKinsey Report, much is made of 
the potential for reaping a demographic dividend in Indonesia. 
Indeed the productivity enhancing impact of Indonesia’s 
young population is expected to be a signifi cant contributor to 
overall projected GDP growth. However, reaping this dividend 
requires economic diversifi cation; this requires human capital 
development and enhanced labour market information, for which 
the young need to be trained and employed in a larger range of 
higher productivity jobs, especially in Indonesia’s industrial sector, 
which remains both small and concentrated in Java. Yet, despite 
the urgency of the problem, Indonesia has no human capital 
roadmap to accompany its economic diversifi cation strategy as 
outlined in the MP3EI and its fi ve-year development plan.
In addition to the human development issue over reliance 
on the natural resource sector is another cause for concern. 
Because the commodity driven boom, instead of infrastructure, 
education or health, is driving consumerism, a fall in prices 
could devastate growth. To avoid this, the country will have to 
develop its manufacturing sector and move up the value chain. 
This will take nuanced policy intervention, as currently more than 
half of Indonesian exports are primary commodities. However, 
as the demand for raw natural resources wanes in China – the 
largest importer of Indonesian products – Indonesia will have 
to do more than export raw natural resources such as palm oil, 
coffee, coal and iron ore. One way it can do this is by reviving the 
competitiveness of its manufacturing sector. Clothing, furniture 
and automotive sectors are strategically important for Indonesia’s 
development because they allow labour absorption, increase 
the capacity of local skills and the use of technology.16 Taking 
advantage of domestic demand and regional integration may 
help Indonesia do this. 
16       World Bank, ‘Export competitiveness in Indonesia’s manufacturing 
sector’, 5 March 2013, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
feature/2013/03/05/export-competitiveness-in-indonesia-manufacturing-sector, 
accessed 24 October 2013.
Besides raising the share of manufacturing in its GDP, Indonesia 
can add higher value products by leapfrogging the standard 
development trajectory, from agriculture to manufacturing to 
services. The concept of a static comparative advantage is 
increasingly being challenged in developing countries in Asia. 
Countries such as Korea, Thailand and Vietnam altered their 
comparative advantage by adopting high tech manufacturing 
and leapfrogging traditional development trajectories. Upgrading 
the endowment structure will enable a process of industrial and 
technological complexity and allow Indonesia to move away from 
industries that are labour and resource-intensive. Without doing 
this, Indonesia could be trapped in low value added industries 
and its workers in low-skill, poor paying jobs. Neighbouring 
economies are taking measures to enable this type of change 
by investing heavily in building research institutions and 
importing the technology necessary to establish the architecture 
of innovation. Indonesia has yet to formulate and implement 
comprehensive research and to establish the technology policy 
needed for business parks and public-private partnerships in skill 
formation and technological adaptation. 
Human capital defi cits remain a major constraint in raising 
productivity through technical change. Indonesia’s ability to build 
the right kind of human capital will factor into its ability to move 
up the value chain. Human capital currently presents a major 
obstacle to Indonesia’s development of a vibrant manufacturing 
sector; 84 per cent of employers in manufacturing report 
diffi culties in fi lling management positions and 69 per cent 
report problems in sourcing other skilled workers.17 Moving 
forward, Indonesia will need workers capable of maintaining 
skill-based versus resource-based growth, and workers with 
entrepreneurial skills who build innovation networks. Part of its 
success, therefore, depends on its ability to foster the right kind 
of human capital. 
BALANCING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT NEEDS
Within the context of a highly diversifi ed archipelago and a 
democratic polity, high rates of growth are not enough to sustain 
political legitimacy and lay the foundations of a consolidated and 
stable political system.
The current, often bitter arguments triggered by Amartya Sen’s 
latest book on India (An Uncertain Glory) illustrate how even high 
growth economies have failed to convince a signifi cant share 
of the public that economic growth alone can form the basis of 
public policy in a democratic society. Indonesia’s swift economic 
recovery does not hide its low levels of health expenditure and 
uneven social access, its poor education system and dismal 
record of research and technical innovation; nor does it conceal 
the high vulnerability of even the working population to poverty 
brought about by poor health or natural disasters.
17       Dipak Dasgupta et al., ‘Moving Up, Looking East’, (Washington DC: World 
Bank, 2010).
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There is little explicit debate on the issue. However, fi nding the 
balance between growth and human development priorities 
remains critical to formulating a vision for a democratic 
Indonesia; such a vision will require support for its new 
democracy’s ability to promote the interests of the majority, while 
at the same time providing opportunities for its elite to benefi t 
from new trade and investment opportunities unleashed by 
increasing integration into global markets.
An important aspect of the balance between growth and human 
development is the quality of, and access to, public services. 
Decentralisation was widely expected to lead to the introduction 
of nationally mandated minimum service standards across 
Indonesia’s regions. This has failed to materialise until very 
recently. The quality of public services and public expenditure 
on social sectors such as health and education varies sharply 
across the country. Moreover, while the role of watchdogs and 
public monitoring of public service provision is generally agreed 
as necessary – for example, formal engagement of civil society 
organisations in the policymaking and implementation process – 
there is relatively little agreement on how these functions can be 
established. One way would be to use e-governance techniques 
already applied in several countries such as India. However, this 
is still in its infancy in Indonesia.
LINGERING QUESTIONS OF GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY
If the abovementioned challenges to Indonesia’s development policy 
were not enough, there are a number of future shocks that may 
destabilise its systemic transformation. Three deserve mention here.
First, successfully managing decentralisation will be a 
determining factor in Indonesia’s future economic and political 
success. Through a process called Pemekaran, decentralisation 
in Indonesia has increased the number of districts by nearly 
30 per cent in the last six years. This alone will present many 
unprecedented challenges. Creating growth centres in different 
economic corridors and making infrastructure cheaper will allow 
people in certain jobs to migrate to growth areas. The implication 
is that after spending the last six years changing boundaries, 
Indonesia has created conditions in which population numbers 
could fall below the threshold. Because people will migrate 
back to growth areas, the nation’s performance will depend 
upon effi ciently administering supply and infrastructural support 
in these areas. The implications of this are not well known and 
prevent us from making confi dent predictions. 
State capture is another unprecedented threat for Indonesia 
that has arisen with decentralisation. The opportunity exists 
for private interests to corrupt regional and local levels of 
government. Unless Indonesia fi nds ways of preventing 
state capture, commercial interests threaten to undermine 
governance. State capture is a complex form of corruption 
with the potential to affect democratic institutions pervasively. 
Having arisen at the regional level with the development of local 
government, it has yet to attract extensive analysis. There are 
many instances in which dominant corporate groups interact 
with government that we know little about. Unless this issue is 
given more attention, it could obstruct Indonesia’s development 
and dampen otherwise optimistic forecasts of Indonesia’s 
continued economic rise.
Second, Indonesia’s political parties remain transactional rather 
than issue or policy oriented. Its proportional voting structure 
and its barriers to entry for new political forces into the national 
parliament discourage executive forward thinking on policy 
issues. The weakness of political parties, including the strong 
public perception that they are driven primarily by ‘money 
politics’ has also meant that there is little trust between elected 
representatives in parliament and the civil service. This continues 
to hinder an effective collaboration of the various branches of 
the state: a key requirement in a functioning democracy. One 
consequence of this is the huge backlog of legislation in the 
national parliament and complaints of senior civil servants of 
spending too much time at the beck and call of parliamentary 
commissions, to the detriment of policy implementation needs.
Third, asset ownership will play into Indonesia’s future rise and 
is currently missing from policy discourse. The Government of 
Indonesia has plans for 774 new infrastructure projects worth 
$240 billion.18 As the government moves away from dependence 
on foreign aid, persisting lack of state funds and local expertise 
will lead the government to look to the private sector for fi nancial 
support. Much of this sector is reliant upon foreign investment: 
Chinese investors were recently awarded a $4.8 billion contract 
to build a railway from Tanjund Enim coal mine, the richest 
deposit in Indonesia, to a new port in the Sunda Strait. Indonesia 
has not been able to fund railway construction: the Dutch were 
the last to build rail lines in Indonesia, prior to WWII.19 Although 
most commentators argue that the extra-national implications 
of foreign investment are irrelevant, foreign ownership has 
nonetheless caused considerable social tension in the past. Part 
of Indonesia’s massive infrastructure drive might create tension 
to which the McKinsey report is blind. There are already hints 
of growing economic nationalism in the debates around energy 
security, which have consequently led to signifi cant controversy 
around proposed revision of existing mining law.
18       Hans David Tampubolon and Nurfi ka Osman, ‘Govt readies to tout same 
infrastructure projects, again’, (Jakarta Post: Jakarta, 28 August 2012) available 
at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/08/28/govt-readies-tout-same-
infrastructure-projects-again.html, accessed 24 October 2013.
19       Janeman Latul and Neil Chatterjee, ‘Special report: The missing BRIC in 
Indonesia’s wall’, (Reuters: Jakarta, 12 January 2012) available at: http://mobile.
reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE80I0HH20120119?i=3&irpc=934, accessed 
24 October 2013.
CONCLUSION
Systemic transitions lend themselves to cycles of optimism and 
pessimism. Indonesia is no exception. However, on balance 
most observers, and a signifi cant part of the investment 
community, agree that the last fi fteen years have been marked 
by almost continuous reform in governance, economic and 
fi nancial institutions, and in political processes. During that time 
Indonesia has managed a successful transition to multiparty, 
decentralised democracy. Its economic recovery from both the 
Asian Economic Crisis and the current global fi nancial crisis has 
been impressive. Not only has the recovery been impressive, 
but the response to the crisis has also been astute. Indonesia 
has raised its visibility on the international economic and political 
stage through its accession to the G20, and is now on track to 
be a member of the OECD. Due to be admitted as a member to 
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) after 2015, Indonesia is 
set to become the overwhelming economic force in South East 
Asia. If Indonesia can achieve its required reforms in a timely 
manner, the rewards are substantial. A successful transition into 
the AEC would not only attract signifi cant economic benefi t for 
the economy, but it would also help the country to develop the 
capabilities of its governance and economic institutions and to 
strengthen its regulatory frameworks. 
Since transitions to democracy as well as high growth episodes 
are not irreversible, Indonesia’s policy makers need to anticipate 
continuously the next round of domestic and international 
shocks. If past economic crises have taught us anything, it is to 
establish preventive mechanisms rather than merely responding 
to damage once it has been caused. This will require closing 
key knowledge gaps, building effective policymaking processes, 
and establishing channels of public communication that have 
hitherto been defi cient under the New Order. Furthermore, with 
increasing integration into the regional and global economy 
and the challenges that it will bring, Indonesia will need to work 
towards long term policies in order to confront future challenges. 
Among the many tasks that need to be prioritised are: improving 
labour productivity and infrastructure; investing in human 
capital; strengthening the business and investment climate and 
the rule of law; and encouraging competition that allows for 
creative destruction and reorganisation of existing structures. 
In political terms, careful management of decentralisation could 
substantially alter – and signifi cantly improve – Indonesia’s 
prospects, ushering in a new era of equitable growth and 
development across the archipelago.
In sum, Indonesia’s transition to democracy as an Islamic 
country, its low level of violence and its continued private 
sector openness are positive signs. However, before these 
achievements generate confi dence, they require continued 
consolidation. Ultimately, to consolidate regional and national 
administration in a way that will drive economic success, 
Indonesia will need to develop its governmental institutions: 
these will be of greater consequence to the future story of the 
country than its macroeconomic policy. 
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INTRODUCTION
Indonesia has experienced an astonishing transformation over 
the last fi fteen years. Once among the political laggards of 
Southeast Asia under the regime of Suharto, it has turned itself 
into the best-functioning democracy in the region. Compared 
with Malaysia and Thailand’s political logjams and the one-party 
rule of Cambodia, Vietnam and Singapore, Indonesia is a home 
for vigorous and healthy political competition. There have been 
three peaceful transfers of power in mostly well-organised and 
fair elections, and free expression and the media are fl ourishing; 
non-government organisations and social movements such as 
organised labour are increasingly prominent. There are signs of 
growing political awareness and assertiveness on the part of the 
electorate, exhibiting a number of interesting examples of the 
use of new media to campaign around issues and grievances.1 
These changes were facilitated and strengthened by major 
institutional reforms, including direct presidential election, which 
helped to clarify the respective powers of the legislature and the 
executive. The withdrawal of the military from national politics 
was successfully negotiated. The introduction of direct election 
for the heads of regional governments refl ected the enormous 
transfer of administrative authority from the central government 
in Jakarta to the regions. Indonesia has undergone a 
simultaneous process of central regime change and geographic 
decentralisation of power. Other reforms strengthened 
mechanisms to enforce the transparency and accountability of 
government, including reinforcing the powers and resourcing 
of the national audit agency (BPK) and the establishment of an 
Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK), Ombudsman, Constitutional 
Court, and Judicial Commission.
The country’s political metamorphosis, along with successive 
years of healthy economic growth, has created a new sense 
of self-confi dence, even assertiveness, among the Indonesian 
political elite. Indonesia has resumed a leading role in ASEAN, 
has become a member of the G20, and is pushing for greater 
prominence in the Islamic world. These developments have 
drawn international attention to the country and created a feeling 
that Indonesia is a new rising power which could, in time, join 
the ranks of world leaders. For the world’s fourth most populous 
country, Indonesia’s profi le until now has been remarkably low 
and, apart from the tourism of the island of Bali, its international 
image is virtually non-existent. International recognition of 
its achievements is not before time, and a widening of that 
awareness beyond political and policy circles is well overdue. 
But we are apparently witnessing early signs that ‘this is at last 
Indonesia’s moment on the world stage’.2 
1       Stephen Sherlock, ‘The parliament in Indonesia’s decade of democratisation: 
people’s forum or chamber of cronies?’, in E. Aspinall and M. Mietzner (eds) 
Problems of Democratisation: Elections, Institutions and Society, (Institute of South 
East Asian Studies, Singapore, 2010), p. 171.
2       Anthony Reid, ‘Indonesia’s new prominence in the world’, in A.Reid (ed), 
Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, (Institute of Southeast 
Asia Studies, Singapore, 2012), p. 1.
Amid the general optimism, however, the objective of this issue 
brief is to sound a warning about serious underlying political 
problems that could jeopardise the progress of recent years. 
We should not forget the reality that countries do not become 
heavyweights in the global political economy because of a 
sound democratic record, but from the brute force of total 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), international trade and fi nance. 
Democratic India was marginalised in global affairs until its 
economy began to grow, while China under one-party rule is 
being talked about as a new superpower because its economy 
is beginning to rival that of the United States. Likewise, Indonesia 
is gaining respect because projections of its recent economic 
growth into the next decade would make it one of the world’s 
larger economies.3 
This issue brief argues, however, that Indonesia today is 
in danger of losing momentum because the institutional, 
political and policy underpinnings of future growth have 
been neglected. While the political hardware of a reformed 
constitution, democratic competition, rule of law, and institutions 
of accountability have been fi rmly established, the software of 
democratic institutionalism retains many bugs. The groups of 
people that cause these institutions to function have changed 
very little, and the mentality of the political class remains locked 
in the politics of patronage and the division of spoils among 
an entrenched oligarchy. This issue brief concentrates on one 
particular aspect of weakness in the democratic software: the 
problematic role of political parties. Specifi cally, it asks whether 
political parties are equipped to play their role in recruiting 
a viable choice of presidential candidates. It concludes that 
democratic decisionmaking processes in the parties are being 
overwhelmed by money politics, dynastic and clan in-fi ghting, 
and the incapacity to accommodate political and personal 
differences in order to build inclusive internal party coalitions. 
The 2014 elections have thrown a spotlight onto a critical 
weakness of political parties in Indonesia and onto the limitations 
of the process by which the country transformed itself from 
autocracy to democracy. Indonesia has a great deal to show 
the world about how political change can be brought about 
peacefully and the means by which institutions of democracy 
can be established and consolidated in a manner that is inclusive 
of a divergent range of social, cultural, religious and regional 
interests. However, there is a danger that the country may also 
become a salutary lesson in how the people who take power 
in a new order can fail to tackle the prosaic but crucial policy 
questions – questions that will ensure the economic and social 
stability necessary to underpin a continuing democratic future.
3       Joshua Keating, ‘The Indonesian Tiger’, Foreign Policy, December 2010.
INDONESIA’S THIRD TRANSITION: A TIME 
OF UNCERTAINTY
Indonesia today is facing its third historic transition since the 
end of the Suharto regime in 1998. The fi rst was the transition 
to democratic elections in 1999 and the second occurred with 
the change to a directly elected presidency in 2004. The third 
transition in 2014 represents the end of the fi rst entire cycle of 
a two-term directly elected presidency and the transition to a 
new popularly elected administration. The fi rst two post-new 
order Presidents were elected through parliamentary vote, so 
the 2014 election brings the fi rst handover of power between 
two directly elected Presidents. This is a time of uncertainty, not 
only because of questions regarding who will take power, but 
because it is the fi rst test of the new post-Suharto order and its 
capacity to handle such a transition successfully. 
In a presidential system with fi xed terms, such as in Indonesia, 
the constitutional process relies on the political class to produce 
the choices for a changeover of leaders according to a strict—
and arbitrary—timetable, rather than allowing it to occur in 
response to the tide of political events, as tends to be the case 
in a parliamentary system such as in the United Kingdom or 
Australia. Linz has observed that fi xed presidential terms ‘mean 
that the political system must produce a capable and popular 
leader every four years or so’.4 If the choice of voting citizens 
is to be genuinely democratic, the option to choose between 
leaders ought to be presented to the voters. This creates 
expectations that the conduit for the recruitment process—the 
party system—will be able to fulfi l this role in consonance with 
the election cycle. 
In Indonesia, the centrality of parties in the process is reinforced 
by legislation that makes it impossible to enter the presidential 
race outside the framework of the party system. In the US case, 
a highly institutionalised two-party system with broad coalition 
parties has evolved over many decades within the framework 
of a presidential constitution. The pre-selection process of the 
US primaries allows a modicum of public input into an otherwise 
internal party mechanism. Even assuming the best intentions 
on the part of the political elite, Indonesia has not had suffi cient 
time to test and refi ne the political mechanisms of its particular 
version of presidentialism, nor to nurture the informal practices, 
unspoken agreements and conventions that develop with usage 
and experience. The question is: how well will the Indonesian 
party system cope with its role in managing the transition to the 
next fi ve or ten year cycle? 
4       Juan Linz, ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’, Journal of Democracy, 1, 1, 1990, 
pp. 51–69.
STALLED REFORM AND POLICY PARALYSIS
The need for a successful transition of power is especially urgent 
because, in political and policy terms, the last few years have 
not been encouraging. Despite growing international standing, 
feelings about the domestic political scene in Indonesia are 
markedly downbeat. The excited talk of reformasi (reform) has 
largely evaporated and has been replaced by disappointment 
over lack of further progress, entrenched corruption, and 
the continuing stranglehold of the self-serving political elite. 
Recent academic analyses of Indonesian politics have talked of 
‘stagnation’5, ‘regression’,6 ‘missing…political accountability’7  
and obstruction by ‘anti-reformist elites’.8
To some extent the ebbing tide of euphoria refl ects the fact that 
Indonesia is now a ‘normal’ country,9 no longer a place of exciting 
hopes and fears, but a country where politics has assumed the 
prosaic reality of coalition-building,10 division of the spoils of offi ce, 
and wrangling over policy differences. In other words, politics as 
played out in what are regarded as ‘advanced’ democracies. 
The era of political and constitutional reformasi has passed: 
for this reason there is a need to shift attention to the stalled 
progress in implementing policy to address the increasing 
gamut of urgent national problems. The SBY administration 
was marked by policy paralysis and its apparent incapacity 
to respond to the long agenda of unfi nished business. Issues 
include: the distorting effects of oil price subsidies on the state 
budget and foreign exchange; the dilapidated state of roads, rail, 
seaports, and airports; poor-quality government services such 
as health and education; unemployment; lack of development in 
remote regions; environmental degradation; and urban pollution 
and congestion. An especially alarming development was the 
indecisive and ineffectual response by the SBY administration 
to the rise of religious intolerance and persecution of minorities, 
which threatens the pluralist compact on which the stability of 
the post-independence Indonesian state has been based.
5       Dirk Tomsa, ‘Indonesian politics in 2010: the perils of stagnation’, Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, 46:3, 2010, pp. 309–28.
6       Greg Fealy, ‘Indonesian politics in 2011: democratic regression and 
Yudhyono’s regal incumbency’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 47(3), pp. 
333–53.
7       Sandra Hamid, ‘Indonesian politics in 2012: coalitions, accountability and the 
future of democracy’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 48(3): pp. 325–45.
8       Marcus Mietzner, ‘Indonesia’s democratic stagnation: anti-reformist elites and 
civil society resilience’, Democratization, 2012, 19(2), pp. 209–29.
9       Andrew McIntyre & Doug Ramage, ‘Seeing Indonesia as a normal country: 
Implications for Australia’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, 2008.
10      Hamid, op. cit., ‘Indonesian politics in 2012’.
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Many studies have considered the sources of policy paralysis 
and defi ciency in service delivery in terms of problems caused 
by decentralisation, the need for civil service reform and the 
overhaul of government administration. Particular blame is 
usually apportioned to national and regional parliaments, as well 
as to ministerial and cabinet decisionmaking and, of course, to 
corruption and waste of state resources. It is generally agreed 
that the most telling weakness of Indonesian democracy today 
is a lack of transparency and accountability in decisionmaking. 
Politicians understand that they must be popular if they are to be 
elected, but act as if achievement of offi ce confers carte blanche 
to distribute resources without being answerable to anyone. 
Government offi cials resent having to make and implement 
policy under new levels of scrutiny from the media, the public 
and the parliament.
THE FAILINGS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM 
AND THE 2014 ELECTION 
The presidential election to be held in 2014 entails the current 
regime handing over power to a new set of national leaders; it 
thereby represents both an opportunity and a burden of great 
responsibility. The rest of this issue brief is devoted to the 
particular question of the capacity of the political elite to produce 
new leadership with the capacity to grasp the initiative on the 
agenda of urgent policy issues. 
Observation of the fi rst fi fteen years of electoral politics reveals 
a very mixed picture of the capacity of the parties to foster and 
produce successive lineups of candidacy for national leadership. 
The major problem appears to be that the parties have a 
‘winner takes all’ attitude to party leadership and to presidential 
candidacy. The corollary of this is that losing contenders conclude 
they have no alternative but to leave and form their own party. 
In the fi rst transition of 2004, for example, the eventual winner, 
SBY, did not emerge into the fi rst rank of political choices until 
quite late in the process. This was in part because his obvious 
choice of party, PDIP, was unable to accommodate him without 
threatening the prospects of the entrenched leaders of the 
party, Megawati and her husband Taufi k Kiemas. This led 
him, apparently reluctantly, to relent to pressure from ex-PDIP 
supporters and join forces with the new Democrat Party, which 
had been created as a vehicle for SBY’s candidacy.11
A succession of new parties has been formed by presidential 
candidates who could not fi nd a place within the existing parties. 
Hanura was created by former general Wiranto after he split with 
Golkar following his weak performance as Golkar’s presidential 
candidate in the 2004 election. Another presidential aspirant 
from Golkar, Prabowo Subianto, also left the party to form his 
own party, Gerindra, as a vehicle for his candidacy in the 2009 
election. A further ‘presidential’ party established by a former 
Golkar leader has recently been added to the list with the creation 
of the National Democrat Party (Nasdem) by media tycoon Surya 
Paloh in order to support his likely bid for the presidency in 2014.
11       Jun Honna, ‘Inside the Democrat Party: power, politics and confl ict in 
Indonesia’s Presidential Party’, South East Asia Research, 20, 4, 2012, p. 475.
The existing major parties maintain a poor record in two important 
respects: fi rst, producing credible candidates for national offi ce; 
and second, maintaining inclusive and cohesive internal coalitions, 
both of which are necessary for attracting winning levels of voter 
support. Golkar has driven a succession of leaders from its ranks 
and has now elected a leader, enormously wealthy businessman 
Aburizal Bakrie, who appears to have very little prospect of 
election in 2014. This is a clear sign of the fatal weakness in 
Golkar’s political culture: it has produced a leader who can 
win internal elections through the power of money but whose 
credibility as a vote-winner among the people is extremely low. 
Even a party as apparently youthful as Democrat—having 
been formed in 2003 with none of the historical baggage 
carried by Golkar and PDIP—has foundered over the task of 
establishing a post-SBY leadership. The problem of money 
politics has overwhelmed all of the fi gures who were touted 
as successors to SBY. The rising stars of the party, Anas 
Urbaningram, Muhammad Nazaruddin, Angelina Sondakh and 
Andi Mallarangeng have each been politically destroyed by 
convictions for corrupt use of funds for political purposes or 
by damaging allegations. SBY himself seems to have fallen for 
the fatal temptation of dynastic politics, pushing his son, Edhie 
Baskoro, into leading party positions in apparent disregard for 
voter perceptions of such practices.
The Islamic parties have been affl icted by their own range of 
similar problems. PKB is a tragic lesson of the fate of parties 
dominated by one extended family and unable to resolve the 
tensions produced by competing ambitions that inevitably 
arise in politics. The party has repeatedly split, with each 
splinter appearing to believe that the party’s most loyal voter 
base—traditionalist Muslims in East and Central Java—would 
automatically adhere to it. With the death of Abdurrahman 
Wahid, the party has lost its one dominant national fi gure and 
shows no sign of being able to replace him. Because of the 
party’s failings, a clear constituency of voters and a political 
tradition dating back from before independence has been left 
without what was once a united voice.
PAN was strongly identifi ed with its prominent founder, Amien 
Rais, who for a short time after the fall of Suharto was seen 
as a leading presidential contender. But in the 1999 and 2004 
parliamentary elections the party failed to win a signifi cant slice 
of the vote—six per cent and seven per cent respectively—and 
Amien’s presidential bid attracted only 15 per cent, well behind 
the leading contenders, SBY and Megawati. The party has 
survived Amien’s subsequent retirement from politics, but it has 
failed to produce any outstanding national leaders. In fact, the 
party has become notorious for its propensity to select celebrity 
candidates in national and regional elections, few of whom 
perform effectively in offi ce.12 
12       ‘PAN feels heat after two of its celebrity politicians in drug arrests’, The 
Jakarta Post, 28 January 2013.
PKS is an interesting and unusual case because it has captured 
a loyal following—principally pious Muslims in urban areas—
largely on the basis of ideas and policy, without the attractions 
of a charismatic leader. While PDIP, PKB and PAN combined 
an appeal to a well-defi ned social/religious base with prominent 
leaders—Megawati, Adburrahman Wahid and Amien Rais 
respectively—PKS has built itself behind stolid fi gures such 
Hidayat Nur Wahid. The party has attracted a great deal of 
scholarly attention.13 The literature has focused on issues 
such as PKS’s organisational capacity and the dilemmas the 
party faces in trying to broaden its base beyond an Islamic 
constituency while retaining its core support. Studies of the party 
have almost wholly ignored the personal qualities and electoral 
appeal of its leaders. 
The party rose from obscurity in 1999 and continues to argue a 
relatively well-articulated view of politics, but its very character as 
a cadre-based party limits its capacity to produce a compelling 
leadership choice in the presidential race. Its strengths in 
organisational and ideological terms mean that PKS is less 
likely to suffer the personality based schisms that weaken other 
parties, but these features also discourage the emergence of a 
fi gure capable of capturing the wider electorate’s imagination. 
The party is likely to remain a stable force in parliamentary 
politics but will continue to fi nd it diffi cult to be a major contender 
in the more personalised atmosphere of a presidential poll.14 
In the case of PDIP, the problem has been less money politics 
than dynastic politics. The fi gures who gained favour from the 
dominant Sukarno clique were members of their own family, such 
as the uninspiring Puan Maharani. A new generation of talented 
potential leaders committed to the party’s ideals of pluralist 
nationalism has languished in frustration behind an immovable 
front rank that retains the franchise on the dynastic name. As 
mentioned, PDIP could not fi nd a place for the man who went on 
to win two elections and, until recently, still seemed to be backing 
Megawati as candidate, a person who failed election three times, 
under both the indirect and direct electoral systems.
13       Najwa Shihab, & Yunuar Nugroho, ‘The ties that bind: Islamisation and 
Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)’, Australian Journal of Asian Law, 10, 2, 
pp. 233–67, 2008. Sunny Tanuwidjaja, ‘PKS in post-Reformasi Indonesia: Catching 
the catch-all and moderation wave’, South East Asian Research, 20, 4, 2012, pp. 
533–49. Michael Buehler, ‘Revisiting the inclusion-moderation thesis in the context 
of decentralised institutions: The behaviour of Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party 
in national and local politics’, Party Politics, November 2012, pp. 1–20.
14       The poor performance of Hidayat Nur Wahid in the 2012 Jakarta 
gubernatorial election is an illustration of how diffi cult it is for one of the party’s 
established leaders to perform well in the more personality-based direct executive 
elections at the national and regional level. With 12 per cent of the vote in the fi rst 
round, Hidayat captured the support of only about half of the voters who identifi ed 
themselves as PKS supporters (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, Exit Poll Pilgub Jakarta, 
2012), p. 35.
PDIP has been very fortunate that at least one new fi gure from its 
ranks has managed to achieve national prominence largely by his 
own abilities, rather than through sponsorship by the party. Joko 
Widodo—popularly known as Jokowi—who rose to prominence 
with his election to the position of Governor of Jakarta in 
September 2012, attracted attention in his previous position as 
Mayor of Solo, Surakarta, in Central Java. In that position he 
gained a reputation for non-corrupt, effective government and 
for his popularity among the people of the city. In his campaign 
for the Governorship of Jakarta he was seen as a fresh 
uncorrupted fi gure opposed to the old circles of entrenched 
power represented by his main contender, the incumbent 
Governor, Fauzi Bowo. With his election as Governor of Jakarta 
and his populist, unorthodox style in that offi ce—including 
publicly embarrassing obstructionist senior bureaucrats—he 
achieved national attention and became touted in the media as 
a presidential candidate. From early 2013 he began to appear in 
many polls as one of the leading contenders for public support. 
It is notable that despite Jokowi’s nationwide reputation, PDIP 
took a long time to accept that he was the party’s only hope of 
winning in 2014. Just as SBY’s ascent in 2003–04 was seen by 
some within PDIP as a threat, the party was initially divided about 
whether to support Jokowi’s candidacy for Jakarta Governor in 
2012. Although Megawati reportedly championed his candidacy, 
her husband Taufi k Kiemas was deeply opposed. From the 
time of the 2012 gubernatorial election Taufi k was also vocal 
in his attempts to disparage any suggestion that Jokowi was 
an appropriate candidate for the 2014 presidential election. He 
instead advocated Puan Maharani. Taufi k’s death in June 2013 
removed him from the equation. Meanwhile, Jokowi’s support 
in opinion polls continued to rise and, with Megawati’s position 
languishing in relation to the other main contender, Prabowo, the 
party saw that it had little option but to back Jokowi. Moreover, 
there were concerns within the party that Democrat or Golkar 
might offer Jokowi the position of candidacy for their party. The 
fi rst clear sign that Megawati was committed to Jokowi came 
at the September 2013 national working meeting (Rakernas) 
of the party, when she effusively praised Jokowi, declaring he 
possessed the ‘vibrations’ of her father, President Sukarno.15 
Jokowi himself rejected suggestions that he would stand, and 
expressed annoyance at being diverted from attention to his job 
as Governor.16 By the end of 2013, Jokowi had not indicated 
his intentions, but nevertheless the common view was that his 
acceptance was inevitable.
15       ‘Megawati: Jokowi punya getaran seperti Bung Karno’ (Megawati: Jokowi 
has Sukarno’s vibrations), Kompas Online, 6 September 2013, available at: http://
nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/09/06/1536589/Megawati.Jokowi.Punya.
Getaran.seperti.Bung.Karno
16       ‘Jokowi: Jangan tanya-tanya masalah itu lagi’ [Jokowi: Don’t keep 
asking about that issue], Kompas Online, 15 March 2013, available at: http://
nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/03/15/18033254/Jokowi.Jangan.Tanya-tanya.
Masalah.Itu.Lagi.
Democratic achievement and policy paralysis: Implications for Indonesia’s continued ascent 22
23 National Security College
CONCLUSION
At the time of writing, the party system has failed to put forward 
a spectrum of candidates that offers a breadth of choice to 
the electorate, with only one prospective candidate appearing 
to have much popular credibility. Until mid-2013, most polls 
were topped by Megawati (refl ecting the resilience of a core 
PDIP social base17), Prabowo (testimony to voter recognition, 
if not charisma) and, increasingly as 2013 has worn on, by 
Jokowi. Support levels have varied widely in different polls, 
which indicates their limited reliability, but none of the three often 
exceeded 20 per cent. Both Megawati and Prabowo are, for 
different reasons, deeply problematic as viable options for the 
presidency. Megawati’s poor performance as President from 
2001 to 2004, together with the drastic slump in support for 
PDIP under her leadership—from 32 per cent in 1999 to 19 per 
cent in 2009—suggest that she would attract little more than 
diehard PDIP supporters to vote for her. Prabowo may have 
the personal profi le and fi nancial resources to mount a serious 
bid, but his human rights record during the Suharto era may 
well be an electoral liability and would certainly cause problems 
for the conduct of foreign policy under any administration he 
headed. Bakrie is seen as a greedy capitalist; Wiranto a relic of 
the past; and both Jusuf Kalla’s and Hatta Rajasa’s names evoke 
a combination of the two: none has registered more than 10 
per cent support in public opinion polls. A few relatively newer 
fi gures such former Chief of the Constitutional Court and defence 
minister in the Abdurrahman Wahid administration, Mahfud MD, 
state enterprises minister Dahlan Iskan, and dynastic fi gures 
such as Puan Maharani, Edhie Baskoro and SBY’s wife, ‘Ani’ 
Kristiani Herrawati, languish in single fi gures.
Jokowi does not carry any negative baggage, has not made any 
obvious mistakes as Governor of Jakarta, and may well emerge 
triumphant in 2014. But his slight political experience as mayor 
of a middling provincial city and his short period of service as 
Governor of Jakarta does not seem suffi cient for a position of 
such immense responsibility as President of Indonesia. There 
is a strong sense that Jokowi’s appeal derives from a sense of 
desperation – in both his party and in popular opinion – that there 
is no other viable fi gure, and that the only alternative would be the 
deeply problematic fi gure of Prabowo. Jokowi could be elected 
merely because he is the only candidate without major political 
negatives. If, as seems increasingly likely, he receives and accepts 
PDIP’s nomination, he will still have limited connections and 
authority within the party itself. He holds no formal offi ce in the 
party and as president might fi nd it diffi cult to assert his control 
over the dominant fi gures in the party organisation. 
17       Marcus Mietzner, ‘Ideology, money and dynastic leadership: the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle, 1998–2012’, South East Asia Research, 20, 4, 2012, 
pp. 511–31.
The voters’ current choice is thus a range of worn-out and 
unappealing fi gures, plus one fresh but inexperienced neophyte 
who was initially reluctant to stand. After fi fteen years of 
democracy, it should be a point of concern that the party system 
as a whole could not produce a new generation of leaders 
and that the only scenario involving a new fi gure centres on 
an inexperienced provincial leader who was promoted as a 
candidate because of the absence of an alternative. The only 
encouraging element in this scenario is that the rise of Jokowi 
could constitute the beginning of a trend in which national 
leaders are recruited from the ranks of provincial executives and/
or legislatures.18  
This issue brief is not alone in raising concerns about the unclear 
choice of contenders for the 2014 election, but much of the 
previous writing has concentrated on the personal qualities of 
the leaders. What this issue brief has shown is that the problem 
is not merely an unfortunate coincidence of personalities, but 
rather the product of structural weakness within a party system 
that appears incapable of performing the vital role of recruiting 
a choice of leaders in whom a majority of the electorate can 
place its confi dence. A fi xed-term presidential system demands 
that parties produce leaders according to a precise electoral 
schedule, but the selection processes within Indonesian parties 
necessary to achieve this has been have been subverted by 
money politics, dynastic ambitions, and a systemic neglect of the 
task of developing policy alternatives. 
The problem with the party system is possibly the most critical 
example of the limitations of post-Suharto political reforms. As 
mentioned above, the hardware of constitutional and institutional 
structures are in place and there is no signifi cant anti-regime 
or anti-democratic sentiment – inchoate or organised – but the 
software of the system is still beset by operational problems. 
The people who make institutions work have become very adept 
at manipulating the system for short-term and sectional gain, 
and the old autocratic players have ‘reorganised’ themselves 
to survive and prosper in the new democratic environment.19 
Despite institutional reform, the informal rules of the political 
game as played out under the New Order regime remain 
essentially unchanged. The Suharto method was collusive but 
also suffi ciently inclusive of potential oppositional forces to 
ensure they did not openly challenge the status quo.20  
18       Another fi gure with some such promise is the Governor of Central Java, 
Ganjar Pranowo. He was elected to the offi ce as a PDIP candidate in August 
2013, after serving as PDIP member for a Central Java constituency in the national 
parliament (DPR) from 2004. Ganjar had been a party activist in Yogyakarta since 
his student days in the early 1990s, supporting Megawati in her fi ght for leadership 
of the party against the faction supported by the Suharto regime.
19       Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The 
Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets, (Routledge Curzon, 2004, London 
and New York), Vedi Hadiz, Localising power in post-authoritarian Indonesia: A 
Southeast Asia perspective, (Stanford University Press and Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2011).
20       Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime 
Change in Indonesia, (Stanford University Press, 2005).
Today there is a continuing tendency towards collusive 
consensus among the political elite rather than open competition 
and debate, especially over questions of policy. As Aspinall has 
argued, ‘the legacies of a political transition that kept the old 
Suharto regime’s ruling elite and patrimonial governing style 
largely intact continue to bedevil democratic governance’.21  
Coalition-building has been random, ‘promiscuous’, 
opportunistic, and determined by division of the spoils of 
offi ce rather than refl ecting coalitions of interests committed 
to policy outcomes.22 During his entire decade in power, SBY 
remained determined to govern with all-inclusive coalition 
cabinets, regardless of the cost to effective decisionmaking. 
Ministerial posts, and the resources attached to them, continue 
to be treated by ministers as their personal fi efdoms. In these 
circumstances, policy development and coordination is 
extremely diffi cult and the possibility of reform of government 
administration seems remote. And, as has been argued here, 
the parties through which the political elite operates have not 
been able to foster generational renewal within their own ranks 
and thus have been very slow in producing a spectrum of new 
leaders from which the electorate can choose. Unless these 
tendencies are overcome, the policy paralysis of the last few 
years will continue and the economic progress that has drawn 
attention to Indonesia’s ‘ascent’ will stagnate or even regress. 
Conditions are nowhere near so dire as to threaten the basis of 
Indonesian democracy, but if democratic institutions are seen as 
failing to deliver prosperity and opportunity to a young growing 
population there could be dangers of instability ahead. There 
are positive lessons and salutary warnings to be taken from the 
example of Indonesia.
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INTRODUCTION
Indonesia is likely to face a complex and dynamic strategic 
environment in the future. Despite national political and 
economic reforms, domestic security problems including civil 
tension, religious radicalism, and terrorism continue to pose 
dangers to the wellbeing of the Indonesian people. Meanwhile, a 
dominant theme in East Asia in recent years has been changing 
power structures; in this regard Indonesia is concerned with the 
implications of long-standing territorial disputes, their attendant 
military threats to regional stability, and cohesion within the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Given this strategic context, the following discussion will 
consider the means by which the Indonesian government 
seeks to preserve the country’s strategic autonomy in its 
external affairs by developing strategic frameworks in both 
the foreign and the defence realms. While actively engaging 
in multilateral cooperative mechanisms at regional and global 
levels, Indonesia is striving to modernise its military capabilities 
and to renew its industrial base for indigenous defence. In the 
following sections this issue brief will discuss the nature of 
Indonesia’s strategic autonomy in light of its external affairs.
INDONESIA’S ONGOING SECURITY 
LANDSCAPE
Indonesia remains susceptible to domestic and external 
pressures. In recent years the country has undergone major 
structural reforms leading to increasingly active legislative 
bodies and democratic elections, ongoing decentralisation, 
and the expansion of a market-oriented economic system. 
Regardless of these achievements, communal tensions and 
regional dissent continue to occur. 
Local elections have often been marred by violent incidents 
committed by the proponents of competing candidates. A 
recent example is the series of violent acts perpetrated in the 
months prior to the Aceh gubernatorial election in 2012; a 
trend which also occurs in confl ict-prone areas such as the 
Moluccas, Sulawesi and Papua. Although democratisation 
and decentralisation have taken root in Indonesia, maintaining 
public order remains a major challenge at the local level.
Aceh appears relatively stable in comparison with Papua, 
where there have been a string of shootings against non-
Papuans, soldiers and police offi cers. The peaceful resolution 
of on going confl ict eludes Papua, despite the adoption of 
political and economic policies intended to establish amity 
in the region. This lack of success is due to deep mistrust 
and a perception gap between the government and pro-
independence movements.
Religious radicalism has also grown in recent years. Religious 
minorities, including Ahmadiya and Shia communities have 
suffered from frequent attacks, while Christian churches 
continue to experience intimidation by Islamist groups. Despite 
ongoing investigations, the Indonesian government appears 
to lack a coherent strategy with which to address what are 
multidimensional ethnic, religious, economic and political 
problems. With extensive diversity within Indonesian society, 
communal confl ict will continue to occur if the root causes 
remain unresolved.
The increasingly blurred line between religious vigilante 
and terrorist groups is also likely to complicate Indonesia’s 
counterterrorism strategy. Terrorist groups, which enjoy indirect 
support from local Muslim clerics, have been known for their 
violent actions as a means of enforcing a fundamentalist 
agenda. Recent developments indicate that terrorist groups 
seek to exploit vigilante attacks against religious minorities as a 
way of recruiting new operatives. Regardless of the signifi cant 
reduction in terrorist attacks in recent years, the Indonesian 
government requires innovations in counter-terrorism strategy if 
it is to cope with future threats.
The Indonesian Navy and other maritime authorities are 
struggling to cope with the substantial problem of natural 
resources theft. According to some estimates, Indonesia 
annually loses US$2–3 billion from illegal logging and US$8 
billion from illegal fi shing.1
Incidents of maritime piracy have increased in recent years. 
In 2012 a total of 71 cases of actual and attempted attacks 
against commercial vessels took place in Indonesian waters. 
This number represents an eighty per cent increase from the 19 
incidents occurring in 2009.2 Indonesia’s capacity to maintain 
order within its archipelagic boundaries is critical in avoiding the 
need to provide alternative justifi cation for a foreign maritime 
military presence.
Meanwhile, recent developments in regional politics suggest 
that the major powers will increasingly favour strategic 
competition over cooperation. With the rapid pace of its 
economic growth, China continues to expand its military power. 
The Chinese Navy, for instance, is expected to become the 
paramount regional power by the 2020s, and the predominant 
global naval power by the 2050s. Meanwhile, as part of its 
pivot and rebalancing strategy, the United States seeks to 
revitalise its alliance with countries in the region. It has recently 
undertaken key initiatives to restructure its regional military 
presence, including the rotation of 2,500 marines in Darwin and 
up to four littoral combat ships in Singapore.
1       See Alda Chan, ‘Illegal Logging in Indonesia: The Environmental, Economic 
and Social Costs’ (Washington DC: Blue Green Alliance, April 2010), p. 9, ‘Forest 
Groups Call on Oz to Ban Illegal Timber Import’, The Jakarta Post (16 August 
2010), ‘RI Seeks Ties to Fight Illegal Fishing’ , The Jakarta Post (5 March 2008), ‘RI 
Forms New Courts to Fight Illegal Fishing’, The Jakarta Post (18 October 2007).
2       See ‘Annual Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Asia: January-
December 2012’, (Singapore: ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, 2013), p. 12.
As competition for military and economic prevalence among 
the major powers looms large, Indonesia is aware that East 
Asia will become the theatre for this pursuit of primacy, 
polarising regional nations. The different responses of 
Southeast Asian countries to repositioning of the US military 
presence illustrate the divergence of their strategic perceptions 
and preferences. Moreover, persisting territorial disputes over 
the South China Sea continue to test the cohesion of ASEAN. 
Although Indonesia secured a consensus on the key principles 
for drafting a Code of Conduct regarding the South China Sea, 
diplomatic differences among the members of the regional 
grouping re-emerged in late 2012 over the means of resolving 
overlapping claims.
In summary, Indonesia has become increasingly exposed 
to multifaceted security challenges in recent years. While 
confronting huge domestic problems, the Indonesian 
government must uphold civil order and security across the 
archipelago. With ongoing structural changes to the power 
balance in East Asia, Indonesian policymaking is likely to 
become further complicated in the future.
INDONESIA’S STRATEGIC INTEREST AND 
POLICY APPROACHES
Located between the Indian and Pacifi c oceans, Indonesia is 
geostrategically situated across key sea lanes of commerce and 
communication. Although the country’s position offers enormous 
economic potential, it places substantial challenges on the 
Indonesian government to maintain national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Owing to its geostrategic imperative, Indonesia 
is also susceptible to geopolitical changes in the region; the 
changing relationship between China and the United States 
has recently become the source of particular regional concern. 
Not unlike its Southeast Asian counterparts, Indonesia prefers a 
cooperative relationship, rather than strategic rivalry between the 
major powers.
In this context, the main interest of the Indonesian government 
is the maintenance of the country’s strategic autonomy. That 
policy aspiration is drawn from Indonesia’s past experiences with 
dependence upon great foreign powers. President Sukarno’s 
policies of adventurism and leniency towards the Soviet Union 
and China have led to domestic instability and economic 
catastrophe. Although the then New Order regime forged closer 
defence ties with the United States and its allies, in the early 
1990s it suffered from arms embargoes due to its repressive 
counter-insurgency campaign in East Timor.
Having learnt the need to maintain a balance of competition 
and cooperation, the Indonesian government currently 
undertakes two policy approaches that seek to preserve the 
country’s strategic autonomy. First, it adopts values of ‘liberal 
institutionalism’ in foreign policymaking to promote cooperative 
relations among countries and develop a cohesive international 
order. Second, given the past experience of arms prohibitions 
and recent strategic developments, the Indonesian government 
relies on an approach of ‘classical realism’ to enhance its 
military capabilities and strengthen indigenous industries for 
national defence. These strategic approaches have taken root in 
Indonesia’s foreign and defence policy realm.
KEY TRENDS OF INDONESIA’S FOREIGN 
POLICY
‘Independent and active’ (bebas dan aktif) remains Indonesia’s 
sacrosanct foreign policy principle underlying its aspiration 
for strategic autonomy. Nowadays, the principle has evolved 
into two key policy expressions: ‘one million friends; zero 
enemies’; and ‘dynamic equilibrium’. The fi rst phrase reiterates 
the country’s commitment to build amity and cooperative 
international relations. The dynamic equilibrium doctrine seeks 
to restrain strategic competition for dominance among the major 
nations in an attempt to avoid a preponderance of political, 
economic or military power. Hence, the Indonesian government 
stresses confi dence-building, peaceful confl ict resolution, and 
cooperative security mechanisms as means to enhance peace 
and stability at global and regional levels.
In this sense, ASEAN is a cornerstone for Indonesia’s foreign 
policy. Through the Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom 
and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
in Southeast Asia, Indonesia promotes the renunciation of the 
threat or use of force and the peaceful settlement of confl icts 
and disputes in the region. Not unlike other ASEAN members, 
Indonesia also commits to refrain from the acquisition and 
development of nuclear arsenals under the Treaty on the 
Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEAN-WFZ). In 
recent years it has actively urged those states recognised by the 
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as possessing nuclear weapons 
to adopt obligations pursuant to the treaty and refrain from using 
or threatening to use nuclear weapons against any nation party to 
the treaty or within the SEAN-WFZ.
Moreover, as part of the ongoing plan to achieve a cohesive 
ASEAN Community by 2015, Indonesia remains strongly 
committed to implementation of the ASEAN Political–
Security Community blueprint. While promoting democracy, 
good governance and human rights values, the Indonesian 
government continuously contributes to confl ict prevention 
and cooperative security mechanisms. Recently, it has played 
a central role as the mediator to regional confl icts, including 
Cambodia-Thailand border tensions, territorial disputes over the 
South China Sea, and Rohingya repression in Myanmar. Through 
ASEAN-centred multilateral forums, Indonesia discusses 
and promotes potential areas of cooperation among ASEAN 
members and extra-regional partners, such as disaster relief, 
navigation safety, fi sheries management, combating transnational 
crimes, and counterterrorism.
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In East Asia, Indonesia’s diplomacy policy aims at developing 
a norms-based regional order through inclusive security 
cooperation. In this regard the Indonesian government believes 
that ASEAN should be ‘the driving force’ shaping strategic 
initiatives for regional architecture building.3 However, ASEAN-
driven multilateral frameworks including the East Asia Summit 
(EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum can only be capable of 
performing this role if Southeast Asia remains ‘free from any 
form or manner of interference by [great] powers’.4 Given the 
need to establish that prerequisite, at the EAS in 2011 the 
Indonesian government proposed adoption of the Bali Principles, 
which promote peaceful interaction among the key countries 
including China and the United States. More recently, it has also 
promoted the concept of an Indo–Pacifi c treaty of friendship and 
cooperation to strengthen dynamic equilibrium among the major 
regional powers and thereby preserve the centrality of ASEAN.5
Aside from its regional diplomacy, Indonesia also promotes its 
strategic interests and contributes to global peace initiatives 
through active engagement in international multilateral 
frameworks, including the United Nations (UN). The UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has been 
instrumental for the Indonesian government to preserve the 
country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In a related 
manner it places great importance in the three pillars of the 
NPT: non-proliferation; disarmament; and the peaceful use of 
nuclear technology. 
Beyond the NPT and IAEA Additional Protocols, Indonesia has 
recently ratifi ed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and joined 
the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Materials, and the Joint Convention on 
the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and Radioactive Waste 
Management. The country’s participation in international 
agreements on nuclear safety and security is consistent with 
its energy development plans, which include the construction 
of nuclear power plants. Its central role in nuclear disarmament 
includes agitating on behalf of the Non-Alignment Movement 
regarding the slow progress of nuclear disarmament, and urging 
nuclear weapons states to dismantle their nuclear arsenal based 
on the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifi ability.6
3       See ‘Annual Press Statement of the Foreign Minister of the Republic of 
Indonesia, Dr R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa’, 4 January 2012, available at: http://
www.kemlu.go.id/Documents/PPTM%202012/PPTM%202012%20-%20English.
PDF, accessed 29 March 2012.
4       See ‘1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration’, adopted 
by the Foreign Ministers at the Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia on 27 November 1971, available at: http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/
pdf/1971%20Zone%20of%20Peace%20Freedom%20and%20Neutrality%20
Declaration-pdf.pdf, accessed 29 March 2012.
5       See Marty Natalegawa, ‘An Indonesian Perspective on the Indo-Pacifi c’, The 
Jakarta Post (20 May 2013).
6       See ‘Statement by H.E. Dr R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia’, at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties 
to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty in New York, 3 May 2010, 
available at: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/nam_en.pdf, 
accessed 15 March 2013.
Despite its strong commitment to the international non-
proliferation regime, Indonesia remains unsupportive of counter-
proliferation initiatives outside the universal legal framework. In the 
past, the Indonesian government rejected the US-led Proliferation 
Security Initiative for fears that it contradicts the established marine 
law and infringes its sovereignty based on the UNCLOS.7 Besides 
expressing deep concern over the expansion of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) role at the expense of ‘its utmost 
responsibility on safeguards, safety and the promotion of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes’,8 it criticises the implementation 
of nuclear security in ways that undermine the rights of all NPT 
members to access peaceful nuclear technology. To date, 
Indonesia maintains the view that multilateral export-control 
mechanisms, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Australia 
Group are part of global cartels that seek to restrict technological 
transfer to the developing countries.
In the role of peacekeeping, Indonesia seeks to enhance its 
profi le and commitment by increasing its troop contribution and 
undertaking additional international peacekeeping missions. 
Recently, it has sent warships to join in the Maritime Task Force 
of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and 
transport helicopters to assist the United Nations Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID). The Indonesian government also encourages 
an increased role of civilian personnel to support development 
and rehabilitation programs in post-confl ict areas. In addition, 
the country’s peacekeeping centre is expected to become the 
training ground and regional hub for peacekeeping troops in the 
Asia Pacifi c. Although peacekeeping is regarded by Indonesia 
as a crucial and expanding responsibility in international 
affairs, cooperative security mechanisms and peaceful confl ict 
settlement remain central to Indonesia’s foreign policymaking.
INDONESIA’S DEFENCE POLICY DIRECTION
Regarding military and defence measures, the Indonesian 
government seeks to attain strategic autonomy through fi ve 
policy actions. First, it enhances the country’s military capabilities 
through the process of defence modernisation. Based on 
Indonesia’s long-term development plan, 2005–25, the key 
purpose of defence planning is to develop the armed forces with 
‘a respectable deterrence effect’ to serve the nation’s diplomatic 
agenda.9 In the period of 2010–24, the defence ministry aims to 
build the so-called ‘minimum essential force’ – a force structure 
with key military capabilities and an adequate level of operational 
readiness in order to achieve the country’s immediate interests 
and defence objectives.10
7       See ‘Indonesia Rejects US Request for Proliferation Security Initiative’, 
Xinhuanet, 7 March 2006, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/2006-03/17/content_4313679.htm, accessed 15 March 2013.
8       See ‘Statement by H.E. Mr Suharna Supratna, Minister for Research and 
Technology of the Republic of Indonesia’, at the 54th Annual Regular Session of the 
General Conference of the International Atomic Agency in Vienna, 20 September 
2010, available at: http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC54/Statements/
indonesia.pdf, accessed 15 March 2013.
9         See Indonesia’s Law No. 17/2007 on Long-Term Development Plan – 
2005–2025.
10       See ‘Minimum Essential Force ‘Komponen Utama’, (Jakarta: Indonesia’s 
Ministry of Defence, 2010), p. 7.
To that end, the armed forces have been conducting 
organisational reforms and arms modernisation programs. The 
latter includes the implementation of ‘zero-growth’ manpower 
policy and ‘right-sizing’ of military units. Indonesia’s defence 
modernisation program will expand or upgrade the existing 
military platforms, continuing its ongoing acquisition of 
refurbished F-16 tactical fi ghters and C-130H airlifters. It will 
also selectively procure new weapon systems. The military’s 
shopping wish-list also includes missile-guided frigates, tactical 
submarines, main battle tanks, self-propelled artillery systems, 
anti-air defence systems, and multi-role jet-fi ghters.
Second, thanks to the country’s positive economic growth, 
the Indonesian government has gradually increased its annual 
defence budget to support its military modernisation plans. The 
top leadership has repeatedly promised to boost the country’s 
defence spending to 1.5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product.11  
A recent forecast suggests that Indonesia’s defence budget 
could reach US$12.3 billion by 2017.12 This budget projection 
certainly corresponds with Indonesia’s defence planning to 
complete the ‘minimum essential force’ structure by 2024. From 
2010 to 2014, for instance, the defence ministry is expected to 
spend a total of US$17 billion for weapons procurement and 
maintenance programs.
Third, Indonesia’s defence offi cials seek to avoid the path of 
dependence on a single source for arms and military materials. 
Recently, Russia and China have become the country’s emerging 
arms suppliers. While the latter sold C-705 and C-802 anti-
ship missiles, Russia has recently signed arms deals to supply 
additional Su-30MK2 jet-fi ghters and BMP-3F amphibious 
infantry fi ghting vehicles to the Indonesian Air Force and Marines. 
South Korea is also another benefi ciary of Indonesia’s expanded 
procurement strategy. In 2011, for instance, it purchased 
Korean-made T-50 Golden Eagle advanced jet-trainers to 
replace the existing Hawk Mk-53 fl eet.
Despite the past experience of arms embargoes, it is unlikely that 
Indonesia would ignore its defence relationship with the United 
States and European countries. In addition to 24 refurbished 
F-16 jet-fi ghters, the US government has recently approved 
Indonesia’s request for the purchase of AGM-65K2 Maverick and 
FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missiles. Indonesian defence offi cials 
have also fi nalised plans to procure and upgrade the German 
Army’s surplus Leopard 2 main battle tanks and three light 
frigates from existing BAE Systems.
11       See ‘Presiden: Saatnya Anggaran Pertahanan Naik Signifi kan’, Kompas (5 
May 2010).
12       See ‘Russia, Indonesia Agree to Expand Cooperation’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly (30 January 2013).
Fourth, the Indonesian government is seeking to reduce 
gradually its reliance on arms imports by rebuilding its defence 
industrial base. In recent years it has undertaken a number of 
policy initiatives, including restructuring programs and fi nancial 
assistance packages. These initiatives were critical in resolving 
mismanagement issues lingering for more than a decade in 
state-owned defence fi rms. In 2011, for instance, the Indonesian 
parliament approved legislation to commit US$1 billion to the 
country’s aerospace manufacturer (PT DI), naval shipbuilder (PT 
PAL), and land system manufacturer (PT PINDAD).13
More importantly, a new law for the defence industry was 
passed in 2012. It outlines a range of requirements, including a 
commitment to prioritise local sources in any state acquisitions, 
the potential for partial privatisation of state-owned defence 
fi rms, and the provision of offset-structured industrial 
collaboration in all defence imports. Moreover, the law underlines 
that the government is committed to procure from indigenous 
defence fi rms unless the required defence article is not resident 
in Indonesia.14
Fifth, Indonesia promotes its national interests through defence 
cooperation and diplomacy with multiple strategic partners. 
The Indonesian government is very keen to forge defence 
industry collaboration. Indonesia and South Korea have recently 
launched a joint development project of the 4.5th generation 
jet-fi ghter (KFX/IFX), in which Indonesia contributes 20 per cent 
of the overall costs in return for technologies and licences to 
procure the aircraft.15 Having signed the strategic partnership 
in 2005, Indonesia and China are now planning to establish a 
collaborative defence industrial facility for the development of 
surveillance and electronic warfare systems.16
Indonesia’s defence fi rms have also taken advantage from the 
offset programs linked to its major arms imports. The purchase 
of nine C-295 air carriers, for instance, has benefi ted PT DI 
through the offset program provided by Airbus Military.17 Through 
the on-going procurement of a Sigma 105-class frigate and three 
Type 209/1300 diesel-electric submarines, PT PAL has acquired 
relevant knowhow and technologies necessary for manufacturing 
the Navy’s future guided missile frigates and undersea naval 
platforms.18 Moreover, under a technological transfer agreement, 
Indonesia could indigenously manufacture Chinese-developed 
anti-ship missile systems to equip the Navy’s 24 KCR-40 fast 
attack crafts.19
13       See ‘Resuscitating the Long-neglected State Defence Industries’, The 
Jakarta Post (5 October 2011).
14       See Indonesia’s Law No. 16/2012 on Defence Industry.
15       See ‘South Korea and Indonesia Launch Joint Fighter Aircraft Programme’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly (3 August 2011).
16       See ‘Indonesia, China Plan Joint C4ISR Military Electronics Facility’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly (9 May 2012).
17       See ‘Indonesia and Airbus Military Reach C-295 Production Agreement’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly (26 October 2011).
18       See ‘Ministry, Daewoo Sign $1B Contract for 3 Submarines’, The Jakarta 
Post (21 December 2012).
19       See ‘Indonesia and China Confi rm C-705 Missile Production Collaboration’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly (28 September 2011).
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Aside from defence industrial cooperation, Indonesia also 
expands its military-to-military relationship with key countries. 
With Southeast Asian counterparts, Indonesia has developed 
extensive military exchange programs, regular bilateral 
exercises and coordinated maritime patrols. In cooperation with 
Malaysia and Singapore, it has recently expanded the scope 
of the coordinated Malacca Straits Patrol with the inclusion of 
hotline communication, aerial surveillance, and the participation 
of Thailand. 
As part of the ‘comprehensive partnership’, the Indonesian 
government has recently intensifi ed its military ties with the 
United States through bilateral and multilateral frameworks. 
These include International Military Education and Training 
(IMET), Cooperation Afl oat Readiness and Training (CARAT), 
the Rim of the Pacifi c (RIMPAC) military exercises, and ‘Garuda 
Shield’ military exercises. Even during the period of arms 
embargoes, Indonesia continued to benefi t from US-sponsored 
counter-terrorism training programs, Joint Combined Exchange 
Training (JCET), and ‘Cobra Gold’ multilateral exercises.
Equally signifi cant are the ‘Sharp Knife’ counter-terrorism 
exercises that Indonesia and China are currently discussing, 
with the potential for conducting a coordinated maritime 
patrol and joint naval exercise. In addition to the Lombok 
Treaty, Indonesia and Australia have recently signed a defence 
cooperation agreement. In 2012, four Indonesian Su-30MK2 
jet-fi ghters took part in the ‘Pitch Black’ air-combat exercise in 
northern Australia. These developments highlight the growing 
defence and military relationships between Indonesia and 
strategic partners in the region.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
With steady economic growth for the foreseeable future, 
Indonesia will confront new domestic and external challenges. 
In a democratic climate, a wide array of domestic security 
problems will complicate the Indonesian government’s decision-
making processes. No less signifi cant is the on-going geopolitical 
change in East Asia, which has exerted external pressure upon 
Indonesia. As competition among the major powers will always 
remain, Indonesia has begun to devote considerable resources 
to the future direction of regional politics. These strategic 
developments have been fostered by a burgeoning apprehension 
of the importance of strategic autonomy among the country’s 
strategic policymakers.
Indonesia’s complex security outlook suggests that it requires 
a coherent strategic framework. The Indonesian government 
has given preference to two sets of policy approaches: liberal-
institutionalist foreign policy and classical-realist defence policy. 
The former stresses confi dence-building measures, cooperative 
security mechanisms, and peaceful means of confl ict settlement 
so as to build a cohesive international order. Hence, Indonesian 
foreign policy offi cials actively engage in ASEAN-centred regional 
processes and the UN multilateral framework to promote the 
country’s strategic interests as well as aspirations for global order.
In relation to issues of security, Indonesia’s defence offi cials 
maintain a realistic, if not pessimistic view of the future 
geostrategic environment. Indonesia’s long-term defence 
planning suggests that the armed forces will need to increase 
the acquisition of sophisticated military technology and expand 
military power projection within Indonesia’s region of infl uence. 
Moreover, the defence ministry’s ongoing plans to rebuild 
the indigenous base for its defence industry will contribute to 
lessening Indonesia’s reliance on arms imports.
The adoption of two diverse policy trajectories unnecessarily 
represents a disconnection within Indonesia’s strategic thinking. 
Despite this, defence cooperation and military diplomacy remain 
key instruments of the country’s foreign policy. Indonesia’s 
military modernisation not only serves the purpose of deterrence, 
but also closes the loopholes of multilateral cooperative 
security strategy and anticipates the less likely event of major 
international confl ict.
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INTRODUCTION
For the purposes of this issue brief, ‘security fault lines’ are 
defi ned as political cleavages that have the propensity to be 
expressed violently in extreme conditions. The focus is on the 
premeditated and systematic use of violence for political ends, 
while acknowledging that criminality is an inevitable companion 
of such action. Cathartic outbreaks of violence, such as that 
following the recent regime change in Indonesia, are mentioned 
only peripherally, as they derive primarily from frustration and the 
inability of governments to adapt effectively or quickly enough to 
changing domestic or international circumstances, rather than 
from sustained, willful attempts to overthrow a government or 
split the nation. 
The key security fault lines in Indonesia have been religious, 
ideological, social, racial, ethnic, and regional.1 Since 
independence was declared Indonesia has struggled to reconcile 
the competing tensions inherent in and across these fault lines.2  
In the midst of the war of independence (1945–49) the nascent 
state had to combat two internal rebellions: one undertaken by 
the communists; and another by Darul Islam seeking to establish 
an Islamic state. 
Having achieved independence, Indonesia endured a number of 
rebellions—many involving mutinous military offi cers and units—
and other confl icts, until the Aceh peace agreement was signed 
in 2005.3 The annexation and liberation of East Timor was unique 
because it was never part of the colonial inheritance, nor was it 
recognised by the United Nations. 
The two current intractable fault lines are constituted by Papua 
and Islamic extremism. No new fault lines are evident but some 
old ones could become more attractive or be revived. For 
example, should modernisation not succeed, or not succeed 
fast enough, or exacerbate structural inequalities, then support 
might grow for alternatives that could include the adoption of an 
Islamic state (Sharia Law), populist nationalism, or separatism, or 
a combination of these potential outcomes. Although it currently 
appears unlikely, in this context political revival by the army—the 
only organisation to usurp state power successfully—could not 
be ruled out.
1       For a recent iteration of this see Perkembangan Lingkungan Strategis Tahun 
2012, (Lemhannas: Jakarta, April 2012).
2       For a historical perspective on the creation of Indonesian identity and 
its inherent tensions see R.E. Elson, ‘Problems of Identity and Legitimacy for 
Indonesia’s Place in the World’, in Anthony Read, Ed., Indonesia Rising: The 
Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012).
3       See Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, (Cornel: Ithaca, 
1988), and Political Reform in Indonesia after Suharto, (ISEAS: Singapore, 2010).
MILITANT ISLAM
Although 90 per cent of Indonesians profess Islam, adoption 
of an Islamic state or Islam as the offi cial religion of the state 
was rejected by the founding fathers, who feared that it would 
alienate non-Muslims and incite separatist movements.4 The 
Muslim community was also divided on the issue depending on 
the extent of orthodoxy or syncretism in their adherence to the 
tenets of the faith.5 Consequently, a number of groups resorted 
to violence to force the adoption of Islamic law, even though a 
democratic forum for this program existed in the early 1950s.6  
Darul Islam was the most prominent expression of this type of 
movement. When its demands for an Islamic state were rejected 
in 1949 it launched a guerrilla campaign that lasted until its 
leader, Kartosuwiryo, was captured and executed in 1962. In 
the early years, defeating Darul Islam was impeded by tensions 
between the government and the military and sympathisers in 
the Islamic parliamentary parties who shared its demand for 
Islamic law.7 Nevertheless, in the constitutional debates curtailed 
by the declaration of Guided Democracy in 1959, Islamic parties 
could only muster 43 per cent of the vote in the Constituent 
Assembly for the inclusion of Islamic Law in the constitution. 
Thereafter, the major Islamic parties were outlawed or corralled 
during Guided Democracy and the New Order, and after 1998 
the major parties abandoned the quest for Islamic law, leaving 
the fi eld open to smaller, more radical parties.8 
The internationalisation of Islamic extremism and the broadening 
of its agenda by some groups to include a Caliphate have 
added another dimension to the challenge of countering 
extremism in Muslim communities. Real and perceived injustices 
at home and abroad combined with the mobilising power 
of extremist interpretations of the Koran makes a powerful 
rationale for the use of violence. Advances in social media have 
also made it easier for such groups to disseminate messages 
and to conduct operations. 
Consequently, although perpetrators of Islamic extremist violence 
have been supressed and their doctrinal justifi cations countered, 
periodic acts of violence are likely to continue for many years 
to come. Because of its historical origins in Indonesia, this 
conclusion is unlikely to be affected by the reduction of US 
forces in the Middle East and Central Asia or democratisation in 
these regions. 
4       M.C. Recklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1200’ Third Edition, 
(Palgrave: Basingstoke, 2001), p. 262, and Azyumardi Azra, ‘Islam, Indonesia and 
Democracy’, Strategic Review, vol.1, no.1, August 2011, p. 73-80. 
5       Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, (Cornell: 
Ithaca, 1962), p. 31
6       Personal ambition and regional issues were also interwoven with the declared 
aims in these revolts.
7       Feith, The Decline, p.412.
8       Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia, (ISEAS: 
Singapore, 2009), p. 341.
SEPARATISM
There have only been two serious and prolonged secessionist 
movements in Indonesia: one in Aceh, the other in Papua. An 
earlier separatist revolt in Maluku was quickly defeated, although 
ineffectual remnants persisted until the early 1960s.9 This issue 
was revived when Maluku exploded in sectarian violence after 
the fall of Suharto, but it was a peripheral phenomenon raised for 
political advantage by both sides. After the fall of Suharto there 
were murmurings of possible independence movements, but 
the advent of democracy and decentralisation of government 
functions and revenue along with the proliferation of regional 
governments quickly defused these.10
ACEH
The revolt in Aceh erupted in 1953, seeking the adoption  of 
Shari’a law, respect for local leaders, and recognition of Aceh as 
a Province. Compromises eventually resulted in a settlement by 
the early 1960s, but the centralising impulse of the New Order and 
its failure to involve the locals in resource exploitation sparked a 
renewed rebellion in 1976 demanding independence.11 
The rebellion by the Aceh Liberation Movement (Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka, or GAM) was quickly contained and the leaders 
forced into exile, but the movement adapted and endured 
despite repressive measures taken by the New Order.12 When 
Suharto resigned in 1998 the rebels and their sympathisers 
thought their hour had come and reinvigorated the campaign 
for independence. However, when in 2005 it became evident 
that Indonesian society was not going to disintegrate in 
Suharto’s absence; that GAM could not win militarily, and that 
the international community was not coming to its assistance; 
under the pall of the Tsunami, GAM accepted the compromise of 
regional autonomy that Suharto had not been prepared to offer.13 
9       Ramadhan KH, A.E., Kawilarang: Untuk Sang Merah Putih, (Pustaka Sinar 
Harapan: Jakarta, 1988), p.241.
10       The resource-rich provinces of Riau and East Kalimantan were mentioned 
but Riau was quickly split into two provinces, and North Kalimantan was split from 
East Kalimantan in 2013.
11       For a full account of the revolt in Aceh see Edward Aspinall, Islam and 
Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia, (Stanford University Press: 
Stanford, 2009).
12       Robin Simanullang, Sutiyoso The Field General: Totalitas Prajurit Para 
Komando, (Pustaka Tokoh Indonesia: Jakarta, 2013), pp.153–65 gives a fi rst-hand 
account of the hunt for the GAM leadership in 1978.
13       Aceh, like Jogjakarta, previously had special status but no meaningful 
autonomy.
PAPUA
Papua is the only other case where a serious long-term, but 
fragmented independence movement emerged and continues to 
wage a low-key, persistent struggle for independence.14 Papua 
was part of the Netherlands East Indies, but its accession to the 
new state of Indonesia was delayed by Dutch politics. The Dutch 
fi nally surrendered the region when Sukarno, under pressure 
from the PKI and the military, mounted a concerted diplomatic 
offensive backed by the infi ltration of guerrilla forces and the 
threat of invasion. Pressure from the United States was crucial 
in averting military confrontation. Dutch victory would have 
discredited the Indonesian military and advanced the cause of 
the PKI; while Dutch defeat would have further demoralised a 
NATO ally.
The agreement brokered by the United States involved 
face-saving measures for the Dutch that included interim 
nominal United Nations administration for six months before 
Indonesia assumed governmental control in May 1963, and 
a plebiscite to be held within fi ve years to gauge Papuan 
support for incorporation within Indonesia. The 1969 plebiscite 
produced an almost unanimous vote for incorporation from 
the representative body set up for that purpose. Although all 
parties, except Indonesia, admitted that the Act of Free Choice 
had not been free, the results were accepted by the UN and 
the international community.
The newly arrived Indonesian administration swept aside Papuan 
political and economic interests and the military plundered 
the province, setting the repressive standard for ensuing 
years.15 Small-scale armed resistance quickly emerged and 
has continued sporadically at a low scale ever since. There 
is no doubt that an act of free choice would result in almost 
unanimous support from the Papuans for independence, but 
Indonesia has repeatedly rejected this option. Successive 
governments have attempted to mollify the Papuans in various 
ways, none of which have succeeded.16
The Papuans do not possess the political cohesion to mount an 
effective challenge to Indonesian authority; their small numbers, 
divided allegiances and geographic fragmentation make it 
unlikely that they will be successful in the future.17 Meanwhile, the 
proportion of migrants to Papua is increasing, which inevitably 
and simultaneously weakens the political and economic clout of 
the Papuans and strengthens their sense of exclusion, neglect, 
and racial and religious identity.18 This can only compound the 
challenge of pacifying Papuan grievances.19  
14       See Robin Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, 
(Allen & Unwin: North Sydney, 1985), and various International Crisis Group reports for 
the background and current assessments of the problems of managing Papua.
15       Jusuf Wanandi, Shades of Grey: A Political Memoir of Modern Indonesia 
1965–1998, (Equinox: Jakarta, 2012), p. 99.
16       Eddie Walsh, ‘Peace and stability in Papua requires a comprehensive policy 
approach’, Strategic Review, vol.2, no.2, April-June 2012, pp. 68–77.
17       For a description of the effects of political fragmentation see ‘Carving Up 
Papua: More Districts, More Trouble’, IPAC Report No. 3, Jakarta, 9 October 2013.
18       Walsh, ‘Peace and stability in Papua requires a comprehensive policy 
approach’, p. 72.
19       Ibid., p. 73.
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Consequently, it is unlikely that Indonesia will be capable of 
eliminating periodic bouts of armed resistance; it faces the 
continuing challenge of managing the modernisation of Papua in 
a way that will incorporate Papuan political, economic and social 
aspirations and perhaps blunt the demand for independence.20  
While this confl ict in itself is unlikely to threaten national unity, it 
is a continuing reminder of the tensions inherent in Indonesia’s 
construction of nationhood, and diminishes its international 
credentials accordingly.
CATHARTIC VIOLENCE
Cathartic violence occurs intermittently across the archipelago, 
but by defi nition it is localised and generally short-lived. In a 
limited number of cases, such as Poso, unresolved tensions 
simmer and explode periodically.21 Such circumstances often 
arise from seemingly minor incidents such as accidents, the 
eviction of squatters, fi ghts between individuals over rents, 
gambling, or access to women, but then take on larger 
dimensions because of underlying ethnic or religious tensions 
or confl icting economic interests resulting from land disputes, 
access to surface mining resources, electoral competition, or 
other forms of economic and social inequality. In many cases 
national political and economic interests are engaged and the 
police and military are compromised.
Individually such incidents do not represent a direct challenge 
to the state unless their frequency and intensity is suffi cient to 
worry investors or undermine the government’s legitimacy.22 
The issuing of Presidential Instruction Number 2 of 2013 
relating to the management of communal disturbances is an 
indication that such incidents have reached this threshold, 
especially in the lead-up to the 2014 elections, and that better 
leadership and coordination is needed to deal with such 
incidents and their causes.
TNI
The Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia – TNI) has been a key political actor since the 
revolution and the only organisation to usurp the authority of 
the state successfully. It conducted a staged withdrawal from 
formal politics between 1998 and 2004, but continues to play 
an informal political role and has yet to complete the transition 
to full democratic control.23 It also maintains a legislated 
supporting role in internal security and counter-terrorism under 
Police direction.
20       For proposals in this regard, see Bambang Darmono, ‘Solving Papua’s 
problems’, Strategic Review, vol.2, no.2, April–June 2012, pp. 78–84; see ‘Otsus 
Plus: The Debate over Enhanced Special Autonomy for Papua’, IPAC Report No. 4, 
Jakarta, 25 November 2013.
21       The tensions in Poso have also been exacerbated by its use as a haven for 
terrorist training or terrorists on the run, see ‘Weak, Therefore Violent: The Mujahidin 
of Western Indonesia’, IPAC Report No. 5, Jakarta, 2 December 2013.
22       The Wahid Institute reported that there were 274 incidents of religious 
intolerance in 2012 compared to 121 cases in 2009. ‘Public blames Yudhoyono for 
rising religious intolerance’, The Jakarta Post, 11 November 2013.
23       Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia, p. 380; and 
Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia after Suharto, p. 177.
Issuance of the presidential instruction mentioned above was 
necessitated by ineffective political and institutional leadership 
and coordination in pre-empting and overcoming incidents of 
violent political or social unrest. It was also made necessary, 
in part, by the refusal of parliament over several years to pass 
a draft bill on national security designed to outline the division 
of responsibilities between the various departments, levels of 
government, and agencies for maintaining national security. 
The bill has been rejected by community groups fearful that it 
allows the army to return to national politics; and it has also been 
rejected by the police, who fear that the army will try to usurp its 
responsibility for internal security. 
The purposes of the bill could be achieved by identifying 
shortcomings in existing legislation and instituting specifi c 
amendments, rather than by pushing for an umbrella law. 
However, delays in passing the bill are as much about 
competition for resources – public and private – between the 
police and the military as they are about fears of a political revival 
by the army.24 Until this problem is resolved and the funding for 
both forces is provided solely by the state, fundamental reform of 
the police and the military will remain stalled. 
THE FUTURE
In their book ‘Why Nations Fail’, Acemoglu and Robinson 
posit that it is the absence of inclusive political and economic 
institutions that entrenches poverty and tyranny.25 Their thesis is 
that plural inclusive political and economic structures of power, 
accompanied by effective government, are essential to fostering 
the ‘creative destruction’ that unleashes the genius of the people 
to create and sustain prosperity. They warn that the predictive 
power of their thesis is limited because of the variability of ‘small 
differences’ and ‘contingencies’. The book is not without its 
critics, but it has not been substantively rebutted and for the 
purposes of this issue brief its thesis will be used to explore 
where Indonesia stands in this regard, and what its current 
condition might tell us about its future prospects for sustaining 
peace and security.
Indonesia began its journey back to democracy in 1998 and has 
recovered from the 1997–8 Asian Financial Crisis, posting growth 
rates of over six per cent in recent years. However, it confronts 
a number of obstacles that it will need to overcome before it 
can be said have created sustainable and inclusive political and 
economic institutions supported by effective government. 
24       Passage of the draft law was also complicated by the inclusion of provision 
for establishing a National Security Council. It should have been the subject of a 
separate bill or administrative arrangement.
25       Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, ‘Why Nations Fail: The Origins of 
Power, Prosperity and Poverty’, (Profi le Books: London, 2012).
Access to politics remains restricted by the way in which political 
parties function as personal fi efdoms or private companies, 
rather than as open organisations reliant upon membership in 
which aspiring leaders can emerge based on merit.26 The source 
of party fi nances is often unclear; becoming a party candidate 
and running for election requires resources that are often 
obtained with strings attached. The only way such debts can be 
repaid is through corruption or by supporting policies inimical to 
the public interest.27 On the positive side, such political parties 
need to maintain broad geographic representation, which 
restricts their ability to represent particular sectional interests and 
forces them to adopt relatively centrist policies.28
Economic institutions also continue to exhibit traces of their 
past reliance on resource and wealth extraction rather than 
seeking to establish a sustainable economic environment. In 
general terms the economy comprises a large state enterprise 
sector, large Chinese conglomerates, large indigenous 
conglomerates, a mixed small and medium business sector, 
and a broad micro informal and subsistence farming sector. 
Only the fi rst three have decisive political impact, although the 
other sectors rely upon political connections, especially outside 
Jakarta, and the micro informal sector constitutes an index of 
those living on the margins.
State enterprises retain many active business functions that 
create opportunities to syphon off funds – either directly 
or through out-sourcing arrangements – for the benefi t of 
individuals or political parties. Although the Indonesian Chinese 
community represents less than four per cent of the population, 
it is over represented in the large private sector. The advent of 
democracy has seen most of the restrictions on Indonesian 
Chinese cultural and religious life lifted, but its economic 
dominance feeds economic nationalism and contributes to the 
retention of 141 state enterprises, many of which are ineffi cient 
loss-making entities that oblige Chinese businesses to pay 
protection money to the police, military, politicians, and other 
state agencies.29
As with the rest of the business sector, indigenous business 
conglomerates were badly affected by the Asian Economic 
Crisis, but more especially by the loss of political patronage 
when Suharto was forced from offi ce. Many of these businesses 
have since been revived or restructured and have established 
new political patronage networks linking the elite through political 
parties, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, state enterprises, and the 
security services. 
26       A recent court ruling relating to the allocation of votes within parties might 
help to loosen the grip of party bosses.
27       Mahfud MD, a 2014 presidential hopeful, has described the process of 
political recruitment as being based on ‘dirty politics’, ‘Pemimpin Indonesia Lahir 
Dari System Transaksional’, Antaranews, 21 January 2013.
28       Jon Fraenkel and Edward Aspinall, ‘Comparing Across Regions: Parties 
and Political Systems in Indonesia and the Pacifi c Islands’, CDI Policy Papers on 
Political Governance, 2013/02, (ANU: Canberra, 2013). 
29       ‘Laba bersih 141 BUMN tidak capai target’, Antaranews, 28 December 2012.
The Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan 
Korupsi – KPK) has shone a light on many of these elicit 
practices and jailed a number of offenders in senior positions 
of power.30 However, although an anti-corruption strategy was 
released in December 2012, it has so far had little impact on 
what is an endemic problem.31  
A telling cipher for the myriad defi ciencies in the political and 
economic spheres is that members of the TNI are not subject to 
civil law for civil offences, are not subject to investigation by the 
KPK, and are effectively immune to charges of abuse of human 
rights. Unsurprisingly, this bastion of the authoritarian past will 
not become subject to recent democratising norms until the 
military is fully funded by the state, freeing it from the necessity of 
competing with the police and others to obtain illicit funding, and 
closing the gap between what the state provides and what its 
members think they need.32 Although the TNI no longer operates 
formal business structures beyond those associated with its 
cooperatives, many of its members maintain additional sources 
of income, some of which are illicit and hidden, or complicitly 
shared to preclude exposure. 
Apart from tensions arising from these transitional obstacles, 
there are a number of contingent factors that could cause a 
breakdown of social order; some of these are beyond human 
control, such as natural cataclysms and pandemics, and 
others are embedded in the social structure, or could arise as a 
consequence of modernisation.
Fortunately, Indonesian Islam is overwhelmingly Sunni: as a 
consequence intra-Muslim violence is not a major fault line. 
Nonetheless, the violence infl icted on its small minorities is 
a measure of continuing intolerance, political cynicism, and 
ineffective law enforcement. In the absence of challenges to 
domestic Islam there is little impetus for the Islamic community to 
unite. It can also afford to be tolerant of other minorities, although 
this is more often observed in the breech than in the observance.33 
30       Since 2002, ‘At least 360 Indonesians jailed for corruption: VP’, The Jakarta 
Post, 31 October 2013.
31       ‘Indonesia ranking 118 negara bebas korupsi’, Antaranews, 9 December 2013.
32       General Moeldoko surprised many when he freely disclosed his personal 
wealth to be about $3.6 million in parliamentary hearings examining his suitability 
to be promoted to chief of the TNI in 2013. This included contributions from 
businesses during the New Order arranged by one of his former superiors; ‘Selamat 
Datang, Panglima Tajir’, Tempo, 2 September 2013.
33       ‘Indonesia: Defying the State’, International Crisis Group Asia Brief No.138, 
Jakarta/Brussels, 30 August 2012.
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Should economic modernisation falter, or fail to meet 
expectations fast enough, or fail to breakdown glaring 
inequalities for whatever reason, then the political reaction could 
be to seek alternatives.34 Economic nationalism continues to 
have some attraction across the political spectrum, despite 
grudging surrender to a more liberal trading and investment 
climate since the beginning of the New Order. Although it will be 
diffi cult for any political party or presidential candidate to claim 
ownership of economic nationalism, some will try forcing others 
to follow.35 In the absence of class-based parties it is unlikely that 
a leftist party of the Hugo Chavez variety will arise, but economic 
nationalism could be combined with calls for a more Islamic 
agenda, or nationalist parties could claim the mantle of both. 
Separatism could be revived either by rebellion or, as Robert 
Cribb has canvassed, by Java declaring independence from 
the rest of Indonesia.36 Cribb was not suggesting that the latter 
option is imminent, but was outlining the costs and benefi ts of 
running a geographically fragmented and racially and ethnically 
diverse empire and the conditions under which elites might 
decide that the costs are not worth the benefi ts. There are no 
signs of this eventuating and there are no signs, apart from 
Papua and possibly Aceh, of a revival of historically based or 
new separatist movements.37
At fi rst glance Indonesia’s geographic fragmentation and ethnic 
diversity appears to make it a prime candidate for separatist 
movements, but this is illusory. Indonesia’s strength is that it 
has only one large geographically confi ned ethnic group, the 
Javanese, located in Central and East Java (41 per cent of the 
population). The next largest is the Sundanese of West Java 
(15 per cent). All the other large islands comprise substantial 
numbers of much smaller ethnic groups. Consequently, although 
no other group has the strength to compete with the Javanese, 
their geographic concentration, despite domestic migration, 
means that the Javanese need to give due quarter to all the 
minorities if Indonesia is to remain united. 
None of the separatist movements to date have had any 
real prospect of success, and in all cases emerged as a 
consequence of the failure of the central government to 
appreciate the political and economic interests of the regions 
concerned, rather than from any innate passion to break away. 
34       For example, a Centre for Strategic and International Studies economist has 
warned of increasing disparities and relatively low employment creation despite 
high growth rates: ‘Pande Radja Silalahi, Pertumbuhan Semu’, Suara Karya Online, 
4 March 2013.
35       For example, the Deputy Chairman of the Regional Representatives Council 
(DPD) has urged the government to restrict foreign ownership in the mining 
industry: ‘Government told to restrict foreign ownership in mining industry’, The 
Jakarta Post, 20 February 2013.
36       Robert Cribb, ‘Independence for Java? New National Projects for an Old 
Empire’, in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds.), Indonesia Today: Challenges 
of History, (ISEAS: Singapore, 2001), pp. 298–307.
37       The International Crisis Group has cautioned against complacency in Aceh. 
‘How will Partai Aceh Govern?’, Tempo, 19 April 2012. For the challenges in Papua 
see ‘Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua’, International Crisis Group Asia 
Report No.232, Jakarta/Brussels, 9 August 2012.
The most prominent racial cleavage in Indonesia has been that 
of the Indonesian Chinese. They have not initiated violence, but 
have been the victims of it when larger political fault lines have 
arisen over political power, or economic  rent, or both.38 Rarely 
has anyone been brought to account in these instances. This 
fault line is and will continue to have an impact on Indonesia’s 
modernisation for several reasons: as political eunuchs the 
Indonesian Chinese possess little power to change the overall 
political and economic arrangements of the country. They are 
therefore forced into alliance with the existing rent-seeking elites, 
further weakening the impetus for reform. 
There is no indication that generational tensions, urbanization, 
or labour militancy will produce major fault lines in themselves, 
but they could give rise to occasional episodes of cathartic 
violence and add to other pressures promoting political reform 
or political alternatives. The use of social media could increase 
the frequency and intensity of these events, but it is equally likely 
that people will become more discriminating and cautious in 
responding to such incitement, and governments more adept at 
countering it.39
Indonesia’s fate depends on the extent to which the current 
political stasis can be attributed to either structure or leadership. 
An example of how effective leadership could challenge the status 
quo is the recent political renaissance in Jakarta, where the new 
gubernatorial team elected in 2012 has opened the budget and 
contracts to public scrutiny and greatly accelerated improvements 
in public administration, social services, and public works. 
Whether this reformative zeal can be implemented nationwide has 
yet to be seen, but it will inevitably encounter resistance. 
Perhaps the best measure of when Indonesia has completed its 
democratic consolidation is not when power can be handed over 
peacefully after free and fair elections, which has happened, but 
when the government can subject the TNI to legal redress for 
civil offences, open it to investigation by the KPK, and end its de 
facto immunity from prosecution for contemporary, if not past, 
human rights abuses. That can only occur when the military is 
totally funded by the government and the justice sector is judged 
to be effective, fair, and impartial. Until that time there is always 
the potential for the siren call of the authoritarian past to be 
heard again.
In conclusion, Indonesia’s time might have come and the 
security fault lines of the past relegated to the dustbin of 
history. However, reinvigorating the democratic reform agenda, 
managing Papua, and containing terrorism will be continuing 
challenges. Until Indonesia completes its democratic transition 
and provides the services that open and sustain inclusive political 
and economic institutions, the potential for various forms of civil 
unrest, including violent fringes accompanied by the resurgence 
of authoritarian impulses, are possibilities that cannot be ignored.
38       See Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996–1999, (University of 
Hawaii Press: Honolulu, 2006) for analysis of the ambiguous status of Chinese-
Indonesians and the origins of violence against them.
39       David Clemente, ‘Compelled to control: confl icting visions of the future of 
cyberspace’, (ASPI: Canberra, Special Report, October 2013) discusses various 
views on the utility and control of cyberspace.
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INTRODUCTION
Indonesian foreign policy has changed substantially since the 
fall of Suharto in 1998. Early post-Suharto governments were 
preoccupied with the business of democratic transition—
establishing democratic institutions, withdrawing the military 
from politics, and resisting the various threats to reform. In 
more recent years, however, foreign policy has attracted 
more attention, and the government—under President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, fi rst elected in 2004—has tried to improve 
Indonesia’s international image and enhance its role in Southeast 
Asia and in the world. The foreign policy priorities for 2013, 
set out by current Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa,1 reveal 
plans for what The Jakarta Post calls a more ‘activist’ approach 
to Indonesia’s foreign relations.2 This approach emphasises 
peace, prosperity and stability—in both the immediate region 
and globally—and Indonesia’s role in pursuing these goals. 
Natalegawa argued that these aspirations refl ected Indonesia’s 
approach of ‘dynamic equilibrium’: the notion that ‘dynamic 
changes in the region’ can be managed but also embraced, 
thereby recognising the nexus between ‘security, common 
interest and partnership’.3
There is an instrumental dimension to Indonesia’s growing focus 
on foreign policy given the material benefi ts of a greater infl uence 
on the world stage. Obvious benefi ts derive from developing 
strategic relationships with major powers and seeking stability 
in the immediate region. Moreover, a higher international profi le 
may boost economic growth through foreign investment and 
negotiated trading arrangements. However, the evolution of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy also refl ects shifting domestic political 
roles and interests. The changes associated with Indonesia’s 
democratic transition have broadened the range of voices in 
the foreign policymaking process. The ‘democratisation’ of 
this process has revealed a genuine desire by many actors—
parliamentarians, activists, representatives of nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs)—to advance democracy and human rights 
as central political values in contemporary Indonesia. 
To what extent, then, is Indonesian foreign policy shaped by 
these various factors? What impact does Indonesia’s emerging 
‘democratic identity’ have on its foreign relations, and does 
this represent a shift in political values? Moreover, to what 
extent might its foreign policy ambitions be constrained by 
continuing domestic challenges, such as corruption, terrorism 
and communal tensions? This article explores these questions 
by reviewing the recent development of Indonesian foreign 
policy, and analysing the roles of different actors and interests. 
I argue that Indonesia’s ‘democratic identity’—refl ecting a set 
of democratic values—is certainly an important factor in its 
foreign policy, and thus infl uences Indonesia’s changing role in 
the world. The democratisation of foreign policymaking—that 
1       Marty M. Natalegawa, ‘Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs: 2013 Annual 
Press Statement’, (Jakarta, 4 January 2013), available at: http://kemlu.go.id/Pages/
SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Menteri&IDP=791&l=en.
2       The Jakarta Post, ‘Editorial: RI’s activism on Syria’, (9 January 2013).
3       Marty Natalegawa, ‘Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs’.
is, refl ecting a democratic process—also shapes Indonesia’s 
role, as a broader range of domestic actors are able to express 
their views and infl uence the decisions of political elites. 
However, domestic constraints are likely to continue to hinder 
Indonesia’s foreign policy ambitions, and remind us that while 
Indonesia’s democratic transition bodes well for its future, there 
are segments of the population who are not engaged in the 
democratic project, and/or do not benefi t from the country’s 
rising international status.
A ‘MORE ACTIVIST’ FOREIGN POLICY
In his annual press statement delivered on 4 January 2013, 
Marty Natalegawa set out Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities. 
He outlined nine specifi c objectives for 2013, which are, in 
summary: to improve bilateral cooperation with strategic 
partners; to expand Indonesia’s non-traditional export markets; 
to intensify border diplomacy with Indonesia’s neighbours; to 
enhance protection of Indonesians overseas; to maintain peace 
and stability in the region; to ‘consolidate democracy and human 
rights values in the region and at the global level’; to strengthen 
regional economic resilience and growth; to contribute to global 
peace, security, and justice; and to promote a ‘just global 
economic and development order’.4
The statement thus set out Indonesia’s vision as a positive force 
for regional stability – for example, in encouraging a resolution to 
the South China Sea disputes – but also as an increasingly vocal 
player in global issues, such as violent confl ict and economic 
problems. Natalegawa refers to Indonesia’s role in ‘high-level 
forums’ such as ASEAN; APEC, which Indonesia chairs in 2013; 
the G20; the WTO; and the UN.5 He argues that ‘Indonesian 
foreign policy always makes [a] clear and concrete contribution’ 
in the face of ‘transnational and global issues…from natural 
disasters, food and energy security, to transnational crimes 
such as terrorism, traffi cking and other types of threats’. Indeed, 
‘whatever the source of challenge…Indonesia has projected itself 
as part of the solution’.6 Clearly the Indonesian Foreign Ministry 
seeks to position Indonesia as an important actor in multilateral 
diplomacy. A few days after Natalegawa’s statement, an editorial 
in The Jakarta Post described it as having ‘outlined the nation’s 
more activist foreign policy approach for 2013’.7 
4       Ibid.
5       He also mentions the Pacifi c Island Forum (PIF), the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG), the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation, and the 
Non-Aligned Movement.
6       Marty Natalegawa, ‘Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs’.
7       The Jakarta Post, Editorial.
In addition to these various security and economic concerns, 
the 2013 foreign policy objectives include what we may 
refer to as Indonesia’s ‘democracy agenda’. As mentioned, 
consolidating democracy and human rights values ‘in the region 
and at the global level’ form one of the nine priorities for 2013. 
Natalegawa’s comments do not explicitly mention Indonesia’s 
own democratic transition, but focus instead on Indonesia’s role 
in encouraging ‘democracy and political transformation in the 
region’.8 This involves advancing democracy and human rights 
as priorities in the ASEAN Political and Security Community – 
the creation of which was an Indonesian initiative; encouraging 
the development of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission 
on Human Rights and ASEAN Human Rights Declaration; and 
founding and hosting the Bali Democracy Forum. Indonesia 
also encourages democratic transition in Myanmar and—to a 
degree—in the Middle East following the Arab Spring. These 
initiatives refl ect the promotion of democracy as a value, as well 
as a particular regime type.
‘DEMOCRATIC IDENTITY’ IN FOREIGN POLICY
This democracy agenda in contemporary Indonesian foreign 
policy must be seen in the light of the state’s profound political 
changes since 1998.9 These changes have contributed to 
the promotion of a ‘democratic identity’ which is based on 
democratic values. While there is little scholarship that precisely 
defi nes the concept of ‘democratic identity’, Jarrod Hayes notes 
that ‘the norms that inform democratic identity are agreed to 
include non-violent confl ict resolution, rule of law, compromise, 
and transparency’.10 Similarly, in relation to Indonesia specifi cally, 
R. E. Elson argues that:
8       Marty Natalegawa, ‘Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs’.
9       Since the fall of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime in 1998, competitive elections 
have been held in 1999, 2004, and 2009; at the time of writing, the next elections 
are scheduled for 2014. There is now a separation of powers among the executive, 
legislature and judiciary, and the military is under civilian rule, albeit with some 
continued political infl uence, and no longer holds seats in parliament. There is a 
genuine multi-party system in which many political parties engage in free and fair 
contests. A series of changes to the 1945 Constitution – four since 1999 – have 
increased the power of the House of Representatives (DPR) and introduced a 
number of checks and balances. Robust debate among parliamentarians indicates 
the desire of the DPR to engage in debate, in contrast with its previous rubber-
stamp role under Suharto. In terms of civil liberties, Indonesians now enjoy a free 
press and relative freedom of assembly and organisation. Civil society organisations 
have fl ourished. See, for example, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘The Impact of Domestic 
and Asian Regional Changes on Indonesian Foreign Policy’, Southeast Asian 
Affairs, vol.2010 (2010), pp. 126–41.
10       Jarrod Hayes, ‘Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: 
The United States and the Divergence of Response to India and Iran’s Nuclear 
Programs’, International Studies Quarterly, vol.53, (2009), p. 982.
The strengthening of Indonesia’s democratic 
identity…should become evident in the non-arbitrary 
exercise of the rule of law, a gradual decline in offi cial 
corruption, an acceptance that universal norms of 
human rights are to be taken seriously and enforced, 
and the growth of a more vibrant civil society.11 
Thus, the political values associated with democratic systems 
are evident in the concept of democratic identity. While this 
identity may be perceived as constructed by political elites, 
researchers fi nd that the underlying values resonate with 
the majority of the Indonesian public. For example, a 2012 
poll undertaken by the Lowy Institute fi nds that ‘Indonesians 
overwhelmingly believe in core democratic values’.12 They 
have also embraced the opportunities afforded by greater 
political freedoms and participation; for example, civil society 
organisations increased sevenfold in the decade following the 
fall of Suharto.13 
11       R. E. Elson, ‘Problems of Identity and Legitimacy for Indonesia’s Place in 
the World’, in Anthony Reid (ed), Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Indonesia’s 
Third Giant, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), p.183.
12       The Lowy poll reports that ‘almost every Indonesian adult (97 per cent) 
agrees that ‘the right to a fair trial’ is important in Indonesia. There is a similar near-
universal agreement over ‘the right to freely express yourself’ (96 per cent), and ‘the 
right to vote in national elections’ (95 per cent). Notably, these views are powerfully 
held, with considerable majorities saying they ‘strongly agree’ with these rights. Of 
the four democratic values presented, the only one over which Indonesians are split 
is ‘the right to a media free from censorship’ (52 per cent agree and 43 per cent 
disagree), perhaps owing to concerns over media integrity in Indonesia picked up 
in other polling. However, we should also note that only 34 per cent of Indonesians 
believe that ‘promoting democracy in other countries’ is a ‘very important’ 
foreign policy goal: Fergus Hanson, ‘Shattering Stereotypes: Public Opinion and 
Foreign Policy’, Lowy Institute Indonesia Poll 2012 (Sydney: The Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2012), available at: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/
indonesia-poll-2012-shattering-stereotypes-public-opinon-and-foreign-policy.
13       Alan Collins, ‘A People-Oriented ASEAN: A Door Ajar or Closed for Civil 
Society Organisations’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.30, no.2, (2008), p. 320.
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This democratic identity is seen by political elites as benefi cial 
to Indonesia’s international image. As Don Emmerson notes, 
President Yudhoyono seeks to ‘leverage his country’s stature 
as the world’s third largest democracy’ in its foreign affairs.14 
This stature is bolstered by Indonesia’s global ranking as the 
fourth most populous nation. Indonesia is often seen as the 
most successful democratising state in Southeast Asia.15 
Further, it is the most populous Muslim state in the world. As 
Greg Barton points out, Indonesia’s recent political development 
demonstrates that—contrary to a widespread assumption—
secular democracy and Islam are not incompatible.16 Indeed, 
the fact that Indonesia is a secular democratic state with 
a majority Muslim population places it in a rare position 
in international relations. Hassan Wirajuda, former foreign 
minister (2001–09), emphasised this as ‘an important asset for 
Indonesia’s foreign relations’.17 As President Yudhoyono argues, 
it enables Indonesia to be a ‘problem-solver’ and a ‘peace-
builder’.18 Indonesia is, notes Rizal Sukma, ‘projecting itself as a 
moderating voice in the Muslim world, and as a bridge between 
the Muslim world and the West.’19
In international organisations and regional forums, post-
Suharto Indonesian foreign ministers have advanced the notion 
that democratic values in Indonesia contribute to its growing 
international role. For example, in September 2006, Wirajuda told 
the UN General Assembly that Indonesia’s international role had 
grown as a result of the inclusion of democratic values in foreign 
policy.20 More recently, after succeeding Wirajuda, Natalegawa 
referred in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 
2011 to the political transitions in the Middle East and North 
Africa as a result of the Arab Spring. He reiterated Indonesia’s 
support for democratic transformation in these states, pointing 
out that:
14       Donald K. Emmerson, ‘Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends’, in Anthony Reid 
(ed), Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Indonesia’s Third Giant, (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), p. 59.
15       For example, Larry Diamond, ‘Indonesia’s Place in Global Democracy’ 
in Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (eds), ‘Problems of Democratisation in 
Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society’, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 23–4.
16       Greg Barton, ‘Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and Islam’, 
Politics & Policy, vol.38, no.3, (2010), pp.471–96. Barton also refers to Turkey as 
challenging this assumption.
17       Rizal Sukma, ‘Indonesia Finds a New Voice’, Journal of Democracy, vol.22, 
no.4, (2011), p. 113.
18       Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ‘Indonesia and the World’, Keynote Address to 
the Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA), (Jakarta: 19 May 2005), available at 
ttp://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2005/05/19/332.html.
19       Rizal Sukma, ‘Domestic Politics and International Posture: Constraints and 
Possibilities’, in Anthony Reid (ed), Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Indonesia’s 
Third Giant, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), pp. 81–2.
20       Michael J. Green & Daniel Twining, ‘Democracy and American 
Grand Strategy in Asia: The Realist Principles Behind an Enduring Idealism’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia vol.30, no.1, (2008), pp.18.
A decade or so ago now, Indonesia too went 
through a tumultuous process of democratic change. 
Today, as the third largest democracy, Indonesia is 
reaping the democratic dividends of such change. 
That is why we believe that political development, 
democratization, should constitute a priority item on 
our agenda.21 
Natalegawa noted that Indonesia’s creation of the Bali 
Democracy Forum—‘the only intergovernmental forum for 
sharing of experience and cooperation in political development in 
Asia’—was part of this prioritisation.22  
Indonesia’s democratic values are also promoted as part of its 
regional role. For example, in Natalegawa’s statement at the UN 
Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review for Indonesia 
in May 2012, he argued that it was ‘not without coincidence’ 
that Indonesia’s democratic transformation had been paralleled 
by change within ASEAN:
In 2003, while undergoing internal reform, Indonesia, 
as then Chair of ASEAN, introduced the concept 
of an ASEAN Community that is fully committed to 
democratic values and the promotion and protection 
of human rights. Since then, ASEAN has adopted 
its Charter, by virtue of which the member states 
committed themselves to democratic values and to 
the promotion and protection of human rights.23 
21       Marty Natalegawa, ‘Statement By H.E. DR. R. M. Marty M. Natalegawa 
Minister For Foreign Affairs Republic Of Indonesia At The General Debate Of The 
66th Session Of The United Nations General Assembly’, (New York: 26 September 
2011), available at: http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.asp
x?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Menteri&IDP=725&l=en.
22       Ibid.
23       Marty Natalegawa, ‘Statement by H.E. Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, at the 13th Session of 
the Working Group Meeting on the Universal Periodic Review for Indonesia’, 
(Geneva, 23 May 2012), available at: http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/
SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Menteri&IDP=769&l=en. 
Despite the political diversity of ASEAN states—among them 
democratic, ‘soft authoritarian’, socialist, and quasi-military 
regimes—Wirajuda asserted in 2006 that ‘we must envision 
an ASEAN that is democratic and respects human rights’.24 
Indonesia sees itself as the natural leader of ASEAN—given 
that it is the largest, most populous state and one of the 
founding member states—and seeks to promote its values at 
the regional level. At the same time, Indonesia represents the 
region to an extent in its growing global roles – for example, in 
its membership of the G20.25 Thus, Indonesian foreign ministers 
advance the notion that Indonesia’s democratic transition and 
democratic values directly contribute to both its regional and 
international roles.
MOTIVATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS IN THE 
FOREIGN POLICY NEXUS
There has, then, been a profound change in Indonesia’s 
international image since the fall of Suharto. However, one may 
ask whether the ‘democratic identity’ forming part of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy objectives is an image constructed and projected 
for instrumental reasons, for example, to improve foreign 
relations, investment opportunities and so on. Or does this 
projected identity refl ect genuine political values in Indonesia? 
In a sense, both are true. Rizal Sukma, a prominent Indonesian 
analyst and advisor in foreign policy, argues that: 
The initial embrace of democracy was driven by 
considerations of national image, but as matters 
stabilized and reformasi began to produce more positive 
results, the levels of national conviction and confi dence 
behind the ‘democracy talk’ began to grow.26
24       Hassan Wirajuda, quoted in Sinar Harapan (Jakarta: 22 August 2006), cited 
in Sukma, Indonesia Finds a New Voice, p. 113.
25       As the only ASEAN state to be a member of the G20 (the Group of Twenty 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors), Indonesia can potentially represent 
its neighbours on certain issues, especially when it is acting as chair of ASEAN. 
In February 2011, for example, Reuters reported that Indonesia had asked the 
other G20 members ‘to pressure fi nancial market players to not speculate on food 
prices after rising costs for staples such as rice drove infl ation in Southeast Asia’s 
biggest economy to a 21-month high last month’: Reuters, ‘Indonesia wants G20 
to pressure mkts not to speculate on food’, 16 February 2011.
26       Sukma, Indonesia Finds a New Voice, p.113.
Thus, while Wirajuda, Natalegawa and Yudhoyono have 
advanced the notion that Indonesia’s democratic transition could 
benefi t its international image, the political value of democracy 
was gaining traction internally. This is apparently the case not 
only among political elites, but also within the general public, 
the majority of which continue to indicate their support for the 
democratic project.27 Democracy has become both a political 
system and a projected identity.
When we consider Indonesia’s projection of a democratic 
identity in its own region, it seems even clearer that it is being 
motivated by more than mere instrumentalism. The political 
diversity of the ASEAN states has traditionally underpinned 
a regional norm of noninterference, including refraining 
from commenting on or criticising each other’s political 
circumstances. It is diffi cult to conceive of clear material 
gains vis-à-vis Indonesia’s relations with its neighbours 
from advancing democratic ideas within ASEAN. It seems 
that genuinely held political values in regard to democracy 
and human rights are behind Indonesia’s recent ‘norm 
entrepreneurship’ in the region. Sukma argues that ‘Indonesia 
now views its own regional neighbourhood through the lens 
of democracy’.28 It promotes the inclusion of references to 
democracy and human rights in ASEAN’s core documents, 
such as the Charter, despite the tensions that this has caused 
at times with other ASEAN states.29 This refl ects Indonesia’s 
new political identity. Interestingly, Sukma claims—based on 
his interviews with foreign ministry offi cials—that Indonesia’s 
support for democracy in a regional context is ‘also a tactical 
move to help deter antidemocratic forces inside Indonesia from 
reversing political reform’.30  
27       For example, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems found in 
2010 that 75 per cent of those surveyed believe that Indonesia is a democracy, 
and 72 per cent prefer democracy as a system of government. Further, ‘a sizeable 
majority of Indonesians strongly (74 per cent) or somewhat (4 per cent) agree 
that voting gives them a chance to infl uence decision-making in Indonesia’: 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems, ‘IFES Indonesia: Electoral Survey 
2010’, Washington, D.C., pp.15 and 34, available at: http://www.ifes.org/Content/
Publications/Survey/2011/~/media/Files/Publications/Survey/2010/20110119_
Indonesia_Electoral_Survey.pdf
28       Sukma, Indonesia Finds a New Voice, p.113.
29       Avery Poole, ‘Institutional Change in Regional Organizations: The Emergence 
and Evolution of ASEAN Norms’, PhD dissertation, The University of British 
Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, (2013).
30       Rizal Sukma, ‘Political Development: A Democracy Agenda for ASEAN?’ in 
Donald K. Emmerson (ed), Hard Choices: Security, Democracy and Regionalism in 
Southeast Asia, (Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacifi c Research Center, 
2008), p.144.
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The motivations for promoting Indonesia’s status as a Muslim-
majority democracy refl ect both a constructed image and 
demonstrable change in political values. Particularly since 
the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 
2001 and the Bali bombings in 2002, many Indonesians have 
sought to resist the negative stereotypes of political Islam. 
In demonstrating its commitment to counterterrorism—for 
example, by attempting to eradicate terrorist groups such as 
Jemaah Islamiyah—the Yudhoyono government has sought to 
improve Indonesia’s international image and capitalise on its 
positive example. The projection of its democratic identity is 
also partly an attempt to overcome the damage to Indonesia’s 
international image, given the actions by the Indonesian military 
and militias following the independence vote in East Timor in 
1999, and in other sites of separatist turmoil such as West 
Papua. The Indonesian government has sought to demonstrate 
that the military has now come under civilian rule, through the 
creation of democratic institutions.31 
‘DEMOCRATISING’ FOREIGN POLICY
Thus, the nexus among domestic factors and foreign policy 
is complex and multifaceted. In large part, this is because of 
the democratisation of policymaking itself. Domestic politics 
has opened up to an increasingly wide range of views, and 
the number of actors participating outside government has 
increased. As Dewi Fortuna Anwar notes, the political changes in 
Indonesia since 1998:
Have led to a re-structuring of relations between state 
and society, between the central government and 
the regional governments, and between the various 
institutions of the state, which in turn has transformed 
the ways that decisions are made.32 
More specifi cally, democratisation has ‘opened both the conduct 
of international relations and foreign policymaking to a larger 
number of actors’ than were involved when Indonesia was 
authoritarian.33 There is a broader range of voices attempting to 
infl uence foreign relations. 
31       Anwar is a prominent Indonesian analyst and, at the time of writing, advisor 
to Vice President Boediono: see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘The Impact of Domestic and 
Asian Regional Changes on Indonesian Foreign Policy’, pp.126–7.
32       Ibid.
33       Ibid., Anwar was also an adviser to former President Habibie during his 
administration (1998–99). She has various roles in Indonesian foreign relations, 
research and academia: see Dewi Fortuna Anwar.
In the 2000s, elites recognised the need for wider public 
consultations and participation in the foreign policymaking 
process. Hassan Wirajuda made: 
A conscious effort…to democratize the process 
of foreign policy making by actively consulting and 
engaging with think tanks, academics, religious 
groups, the media, and civil society organizations as 
well as with members of Parliament.34
Marty Natalegawa later reiterated in one of his early speeches as 
Foreign Minister that he would continue this effort to democratise 
the foreign policymaking process, and incorporate the interests 
of various stakeholders.35 During the ASEAN Charter process, 
for example, Indonesia was apparently the only member state 
that conducted extensive consultations with civil society groups, 
academics and politicians. Dian Triansyah Djani, the Indonesian 
representative to the ASEAN High Level Task Force which 
drafted the Charter, argues that these consultations shaped 
Indonesia’s offi cial position that democracy and human rights 
must be included in the Charter.36 
Of course, democratic reforms mean that the Foreign Ministry 
is more open to public scrutiny as well as public contribution. 
Moreover, democratic transition inevitably gives way to some 
instability as communal tensions and intolerance movements 
that were previously repressed by an authoritarian regime are 
able to gain more leeway. The establishment of democratic 
institutions and civil liberties may facilitate the expression of 
anti-reform views. For this reason democracy as a process may 
undermine democracy as a set of values. Sukma notes that 
Indonesia’s ‘democratic credentials’ have been challenged by 
such problems as corruption, terrorism, communal tensions, 
weak law-enforcement and religious intolerance. He argues 
that ‘these domestic challenges often threaten to undermine 
the democratic identity that Indonesia has carefully tried to 
project to the international community’.37 However, relative to 
the immediate post-Suharto period, such problems have been 
addressed in the context of increasingly stable domestic politics. 
This has enabled the government to focus on foreign policy.38
34       Anwar, The Impact of Domestic and Asian Regional Changes on Indonesian 
Foreign Policy, p. 131.
35       Ibid.
36       Dian Triansyah Djani, ‘A Long Journey’ in T. Koh, R.G. Manalo & W. Woon 
(eds), The Making of the ASEAN Charter, (Singapore: World Scientifi c, 2009), pp. 
141–2.
37       Rizal Sukma, ‘Indonesia Finds a New Voice’, p. 118.
38       Emmerson, ‘Is Indonesia Rising?’, p. 60–61; Anwar, The Impact of Domestic 
and Asian Regional Changes, pp. 126–7.
Moreover, Indonesia’s economic growth and increasingly visible 
role in economic diplomacy are enhancing its international 
profi le and providing incentives for other states to engage with 
Indonesia.39 In recent years, strong economic growth rates—at 
more than 5 per cent since 2004 and 6.4 per cent in 201140—
together with expanding trade have underpinned claims that 
Indonesia is an emerging economic power. It has also facilitated 
Indonesia’s economic recovery from regional and global fi nancial 
crises. As in other areas of foreign policy, there is an increasing 
number of actors with an interest in advancing economic 
diplomacy.41 Of course, widespread poverty and infrastructure 
problems persist,42 providing a challenge to Indonesia’s future 
growth and to the equitable distribution of its growing wealth, 
and thereby to economic diplomacy. However, as Emmerson 
points out, ‘Indonesia’s perceived ascent is largely a product 
of its interaction with, and its portrayal by, the outside world’.43 
Enthusiasts who are ‘encouraging investment in Indonesia 
because they believe it has a promising future…help to ensure 
the very rise that they anticipate’.44 Thus, perceptions play an 
important role in Indonesia’s foreign policy nexus and prospects 
for its ascent.
39       Peter McCawley notes that President Yudhoyono ‘has made it clear to his 
ministers that he wants Indonesia to be an effective player in the G20’. He is also 
promoting Indonesia’s role in economic diplomacy by nominating ministers for key 
positions in international organisations. In 2010, he successfully nominated his 
then Minister for Finance, Dr Sri Mulyani, for the position of Managing Director in 
the World Bank group. In December 2012 he unsuccessfully nominated Dr Mari 
Pangestu, a former trade minister and current Minister for Tourism and Creative 
Economy, as a candidate for the position of Director General of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Peter McCawley, ‘Indonesia’s WTO Candidate’, Interpreter, 
Lowy Institute for International Policy, 16 January 2013, available at: http://www.
lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/01/16/Indonesias-WTO-candidate.aspx. 
40       The World Bank, ‘Indonesia’, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/
country/indonesia.
41       I. B. Made Bimanta, ‘Seizing the year of economic diplomacy, now or never’, 
The Jakarta Post, 13 March 2013, p.6.
42       The World Bank estimates that 12.5 per cent of the population were living 
below the national poverty line during 2011. This represents the continuation of 
a decline in poverty rates since 2003 (17.4 per cent), but remains high relative to 
developed countries: The World Bank, ‘Indonesia’. Moreover, income inequality is 
not narrowing as poverty rates decline. President Yudhoyono reiterated in January 
2013 that alleviating poverty and narrowing the wealth gap are priorities for his 
government: Ezra Sihite, ‘SBY turns to KEN for advice on wealth gap’, (The Jakarta 
Globe, 23 January 2013.)
43       Emmerson, Is Indonesia Rising?, p. 49.
44       Ibid., p. 58.
Indonesia’s contemporary foreign policy is infl uenced by a 
burgeoning range of actors, some of whom are advancing 
‘democratic identity’ as a crucial aspect of Indonesia’s 
international image. Democratic transition and economic growth 
have contributed to Indonesia’s self-confi dence in its foreign 
policy, and to perceptions that it is a rising power—potentially 
even the ‘fi rst Muslim and democratic superpower’.45 The 
objectives of Indonesia’s more activist foreign policy are more 
likely to be achieved as a result, demonstrating the benefi ts of 
promoting democracy as a set of values. However, we must 
also consider the impact of Indonesia’s evolving democratic 
processes, which shape foreign policymaking. The projection 
of Indonesia’s ‘democratic identity’ faces possible constraints. 
Some Indonesians seek to challenge the domestic democratic 
project; many have not yet benefi ted from its economic growth 
or rising international status. It is unclear whether the increased 
salience of democratic values in the polity can counteract the 
effect of these constraints in the long term. As we move closer 
to the elections in 2014, the foreign policy nexus will no doubt 
continue to evolve.
45       Joshua E. Keating, ‘The stories you missed in 2010’. Foreign Policy, 
December 2010, available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/29/
the_stories_you_missed_in_2010.
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INTRODUCTION
Indonesia is the world’s third largest democracy, 
and the largest country in Southeast Asia. We are 
passionate about our independence, moderation, 
religious freedom and tolerance. And far from being 
hostile, we want to create a strategic environment 
marked by ‘a million friends and zero enemies’.
Indonesians are proud people who cherish our 
national unity and territorial integrity above all else. 
Our nationalism is all about forging harmony and unity 
among our many ethnic and religious groups… 1 
Since the end of the Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia has 
experienced a signifi cant political transformation. Over time, the 
associated political reforms have moved from a procedural to a 
more substantive democratisation process. The electoral process, 
for example, now occurs by direct vote every fi ve years. Three 
electoral cycles have now passed without any serious dispute 
or violence. By constitutional amendment the directly elected 
President is limited to two terms; and in 2014, for the fi rst time 
in Indonesia’s history, a two-term incumbent will step down and 
hand over the presidency to the winner of the presidential election.
In the wake of the tragedy of 9/11, Indonesia’s foreign policy also 
confronted challenges of the ‘global war on terror’ waged by the 
United States. This campaign infl uenced Indonesia’s interaction 
with the international community. As a newly emerging democratic 
country, Indonesia could position itself as a tolerant and moderate 
nation in which Islam and democracy were able to coexist. 
Indonesia’s international stature has consequently risen due to its 
standing as a stable democracy with a majority Muslim population.
1       Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ‘Speech before the Australian Parliament’, 
Great Hall, Parliament House, Canberra, March 10 2010, available from http://
www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2010/03/10/1353.html 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s speech to the Australian 
parliament in 2010, cited above, lists some of the main 
normative priorities behind Indonesia’s foreign policy: democracy 
nationalism; independence; moderation; tolerance; and religious 
freedom. However, there are contradictory elements to the 
policy that weakens its message. To explore the implications of 
these contradictions, this issue brief makes three interrelated 
claims. The fi rst claim, as discussed in the next section, is that 
Indonesia’s current policy elite, for the most part continues to 
adhere to the narrow and nationalistic inward-looking norms 
inherited from the New Order regime, as represented by the 
Archipelagic Outlook (Wawasan Nusantara) and National 
Resilience (Ketahanan Nasional). The second claim, as analysed 
in the section that follows, is that Indonesia has undergone 
political transformation that allows it to present itself as a leading 
normative proponent of democracy, tolerance and human 
rights; thus linking the key normative priority of nationalism to 
those international norms. The third claim, the focus of the fi nal 
section, is that the gap in rhetoric and action is a result of the 
contradiction between Indonesia’s predominantly inward-looking 
nationalism and its evolving democracy. 
NATIONALISM AND THE ARCHIPELAGIC 
STATE
The geography of the archipelago has played a defi ning role in 
the history of Indonesia. For one, it is the largest archipelagic 
state in the world. Its sheer size is magnifi ed by its strategic 
location within the Asia Pacifi c region, which controls four of 
out of the seven major maritime chokepoints in the world. The 
rich natural resources residing within the archipelago, including 
oil and gas, heightens the strategic importance of Indonesia. 
Yet paradoxically, the size of the country and its resources also 
induces insecurities in Indonesian policy makers as they seek to 
ward off external threats and to control internal security threats 
to the unity of the country.2  
On one hand, the vast archipelago is seen as a strong 
buffer that can effectively protect the country from outside 
threats. It also could provide the wherewithal to become 
a major power, particularly if its natural resources and 
workforce could be harnessed. On the other hand, the often 
contentious relationship between the central government and 
the regions, together with the level of ethnic, economic, and 
religious diversity have made the geographic scope of the 
archipelago the source of a vulnerable and weak Indonesia. 
Because of these considerations, Indonesian policy makers 
have been predisposed towards a land-based perspective, 
while practicing benign neglect of the more outward-focused 
maritime perspective. 
2       Evan A. Laksmana, ‘The Enduring Strategic Trinity: Explaining Indonesia’s 
Geopolitical Architecture’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.7, No.1, June 
2011, pp. 95-116, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1979860
This perspective has been infl uenced by a history of the 
archipelago that featured – with few exceptions such as the pre-
colonial kingdoms of Sriwijaya and Majapahit – geographically 
limited land-based powers. The consolidation of the archipelago 
into the colonial Netherlands East Indies, buttressed by a 
focus on internal security threats, strengthened the land-
based perspective that has continued mostly unabated to the 
present. On 28 October 1929, young Indonesian nationalists 
at a conference in the then Netherlands East Indies planted the 
seeds of nationalism and the geopolitical unifi cation of modern 
Indonesia with the declaration of the Youth Pledge or Sumpah 
Pemuda. The pledge proclaimed three ideals – one motherland; 
one nation; and one language – that clearly demarcated the 
notion of an archipelagic state. Ironically, those young nationalists 
were, for the most part members of a small, Western-educated 
multilingual elite that shared a cosmopolitan outward view. That 
international outlook gradually withered as the new nation of 
Indonesia took a decidedly nationalist inward-looking turn after 
its declaration of independence in 1945.3 
After independence, Indonesia derived its territorial claim from 
the Netherlands 1939 Ordinance on Territorial Waters and 
Maritime Zones, which had separated the archipelago into 
several areas. These territorial divisions and the three-mile extent 
of its territorial sovereignty were later perceived as making 
Indonesia vulnerable to foreign maritime encroachment in the 
archipelago. Increased smuggling and growing regional unrest 
were other concerns related to the extent of the archipelagic 
boundaries. In December 1957, in response to those concerns 
then Prime Minister Juanda Kartawidjaja abolished the 1939 
Ordinance and declared Indonesia an ‘archipelagic state’. 
The archipelagic state referred to a belt of baselines (islands 
and water between islands) that contained the territory of the 
Indonesian modern state.4 Based on the Juanda Declaration, the 
new government of President Suharto’s New Order formulated 
the Archipelagic Outlook or Wawasan Nusantara in 1966. 
3       R. E. Elson, ‘Problems of Identity and Legitimacy for Indonesia’s Place in the 
World’, in Anthony Reid (ed.), Indonesia Rising, the Repositioning of Asia’s Third 
Giant, (ISEAS Singapore: 2012), p. 172.
4       For more details, see John G. Butcher, ‘Becoming an Archipelagic State: The 
Juanda Declaration of 1957 and the “Struggle” to Gain International Recognition 
of the Archipelagic Principle’, in Robert Cribb and Michele Ford (eds.), Indonesia 
Beyond the Water’s Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State, (ISEAS: Singapore, 
2009), pp. 28-48.
With the formalised commitment to the Wawasan Nusantara 
concept, the New Order government campaigned for 
acceptance of the Archipelagic State concept in the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and other 
international forums. Finally, in 1982 the archipelagic state 
terminology was adopted in the third United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). Indonesia ratifi ed the 
UNCLOS in 1985 through Law No. 17/1985.5 Within the country, 
citizenship and national resilience education across the country 
spread the concept of the archipelagic state.6 Despite these 
domestic and international developments, the spirit of the 
Wawasan Nusantara has been predominantly inward-looking, 
characterised by continued concerns regarding the strategic 
geographical location of Indonesia, a distrust towards potentially 
exploitive external powers wishing to take advantage of the 
location and Indonesian resources, and a concern for national 
unity in the face of separatist threats.
POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS
With the post-New Order emergence of democracy, President 
Yudhoyono steered Indonesia’s foreign policy to an active 
and outward orientation based on democratic and idealistic 
values. In May 2005, in what he termed his fi rst foreign policy 
speech since he was elected president, he defi ned Indonesian 
nationalism as ‘a brand of nationalism that is open, confi dent, 
moderate, tolerant, and outward looking’.7 On many other 
occasions the president emphasised the same themes, 
stressing tolerance as an important ingredient of freedom 
and democracy. For example, when he opened the 2011 Bali 
Democracy Forum, he stated, ‘we believe that freedom must 
be coupled with tolerance and rule of law, for without them 
freedom leads to unbridled hatred and anarchy’.8 On another 
occasion, at a speech given in London in 2012, the president 
said that Indonesia would be increasingly active in setting the 
norms related to overlapping territorial claims that would guide 
regional countries and would emphasise ‘the importance of 
having a set of norms and rules that could prevent violence and 
confl ict caused by hatred and intolerance’.9  
5       Hasjim Djalal, ‘Regime of Archipelagic States’, Manila, Philippines, March 2011, 
p. 9, available at http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/fi les/Archive/18th/ARF%20
Seminar%20on%20UNCLOS,%20Manila,%208-9Mar2011/Annex%20K%20-%20
Prof%20Hasjim%20Djalal%20-%20Regime%20of%20Arch%20States.pdf
6       Ermaya Suradinata, ‘Hukum Dasar Geopolitik dan Geostrategi dalam 
Kerangka Keutuhan NKRI’, (Suara Bebas: Jakarta, 2005), p. 20.
7       Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ‘Speech before The Council on World Affairs 
(ICWA)’, Jakarta, 19 May 2005, available at http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/
pidato/2005/05/19/332.html
8       Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ‘Opening Statement at the Bali Democracy 
Forum IV’, Bali, 8 December 2011, available at http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.
php/eng/pidato/2011/12/08/1762.html
9       Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Speech on ‘Indonesia’s Role as Regional and 
Global Actor’, Wilton Park Annual Address, 2 November 2012, available at www.
presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2012/11/02/2001.html
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In the practice of these norms, the traditionally independent 
and active foreign policy of Indonesia – as formulated by the 
fi rst Indonesian Vice President Mohammad Hatta – has been 
adapted to the present globalisation period. Where Hatta 
used the metaphor of ‘rowing between the two reefs’ of the 
Eastern Communist and Western Capitalist blocs, President 
Yudhoyono used the metaphor of ‘navigating a turbulent ocean’. 
In order to achieve this, he advocated Indonesia’s adoption of a 
‘constructive approach’ as an instrument with which to interact 
with global and regional actors. This constructivism would use 
Indonesia’s independence and activism as a peace maker, 
confi dence builder, problem solver, and bridge builder.10 
One of the more successful public diplomacy initiatives to 
emerge from this approach has been the Bali Democracy Forum 
(BDF). Established in 2008 as an intergovernmental forum 
to share experiences, lessons learned, and best practices of 
democracy, it has grown from 32 participating countries at its 
commencement to 86 countries in the sixth BDF in 2013.11  
Along with the growth in participant numbers, the forum’s 
credibility and prestige has also burgeoned. The forum has been 
emblematic of Indonesia’s transformation from an authoritarian 
past under the Suharto regime to one of the largest democracies 
in the world actively advocating political reform and democracy.
10       Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ‘Speech before The Council on World Affairs 
(ICWA)’, Jakarta, 19 May 2005 available at http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/
pidato/2005/05/19/332.html
11       ‘Participants praise Indonesia for Bali Democracy Forum’, The Jakarta Post, 
November 9 2013, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/11/09/
participants-praise-indonesia-bali-democracy-forum.html
Globally, an important step by Indonesia was its membership 
in the G20 and its associated attempt to represent the voice of 
the developing world through that forum. Regionally, Indonesia 
also sought to enhance its role as one of the leaders in the 
Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). For example, 
it succeeded in obtaining a consensual statement on the 
South China Sea dispute after the failure of the ASEAN foreign 
ministers’ 2012 annual meeting to issue a joint communique. 
Indonesia also mediated the confl ict between Thailand and 
Cambodia over a disputed temple site.12 It has also emerged 
as a major player in environmental diplomacy after successfully 
holding the UN Conference on Climate change in Bali in 
2007. Following the conference, Indonesia pledged to reduce 
emissions by 26 per cent by 2020. In May 2009, Indonesia 
hosted the World Ocean Conference.13  
The success of these foreign policy initiatives is interlinked with 
substantial advances in democracy at home. As pointed out 
in the introduction, Indonesia has made substantial advances 
in electoral democracy and peaceful transitions of government 
through elections. Other notable achievements have been in 
military reform, freedom of the press, decentralisation of the 
regions, and an easing of past ethnic tensions, particularly 
between indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese 
Indonesians. Ethnic Chinese representatives occupying cabinet 
posts – deputy Governor of Jakarta, and a vice president 
candidate on a prospective ticket for the 2014 presidential 
elections – are only a few examples of the many instances of the 
latter. While these advances are still evolving, they have placed 
Indonesia as one of the more democratic countries in the region. 
At the same time, however, evolving democracy has provided 
space for hard-line political groups to vent their prejudices and 
ill-will, often by violent means, a contradiction examined in the 
next section.14
12       Michael Vatikiotis, ‘Indonesia’s Quiet Diplomacy’, August 10 2012, available 
at http://michaelvatikiotis.com/?p=180
13       ‘Indonesian President makes speech at CIFOR on sustainable growth with 
equity’, Center for International ForestryResearch, 13 June 2012, pp. 4-5 available 
at http://blog.cifor.org/9657/
Indonesian-president-makes-speech-at-cifor-on-sustainable-growth-with-equity/#.
UM8wL9iJ9KC
14       Colin Brown, ‘Democratisation in Indonesia’, presented to the Australian 
Institute of International Affairs, Brisbane, 23 October 2012.
CONTRADICTIONS IN NORMATIVE 
PRIORITIES
The Yudhoyono administration has been adept in combining 
action and rhetoric in the pursuit of foreign policy based on 
democratic normative priorities. However, it has been less 
successful in bridging the gap between foreign policy and the 
domestic policies that affect the democratic environment within 
the country. The image of tolerance, burnished by President 
Yudhoyono, has increasingly been viewed as paradoxical with the 
reality of Indonesian domestic dynamics. In particular, that image 
is in confl ict with the trend of religious intolerance in Indonesia. 
While the Indonesian Constitution guarantees freedom of 
religion and freedom to worship, the government offi cially 
recognises only Islam, Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. However, it is not only 
congregations of unrecognised religions, or indeed, the minority 
offi cial religions such as Christians, that face the possibility of 
discrimination. Increasingly, minority Muslim sects considered 
deviant, such as Ahmadiyya and Shiite Muslims, have also 
suffered from discrimination and violence.15 Government offi cials 
have often been indifferent to such acts or have responded with 
discriminatory state legislation that encourages further attacks. For 
example, in 2008 the government, through a joint decree of the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Interior Ministry, and the Attorney 
General, barred Ahmadiyya Muslims from proselytising. Some 
local governments then issued legislation ranging from closing 
Ahmadiyya mosques, banning the building of Ahmadiyya religious 
facilities, to the banning of Ahmadiyya believers in the local area.16 
A part of the reluctance to stand fi rm against small hard-line 
Muslim groups has been attributed to the nationalistic sentiment 
associated with the Archipelagic Outlook. According to Wiryono, 
former Indonesian ambassador to Australia, the reluctance of 
the majority Indonesian Muslim moderates to speak out is due 
to fear that they would be accused of siding with the West in 
its war against Islam. In the same way, the government is also 
reluctant to take action against hard-line Islamists, as it would 
appear it is dictated to by Western powers urging control of 
the hardliners.17  However, for the most part it is the radical 
groups, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela 
Islam or FPI), who have been effective in using the democratic 
environment to their advantage.18
15       ‘Indonesia’ Report, Freedom House, (2013), available at http://www.
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/indonesia
16       Rafendi Djamin, ‘The Paradox of Freedom of Religion and Belief in 
Indonesia’, available at www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression /ICCPR/
Bangkok/RafendiDjamin.pdf
17       S. Wiryono, ‘An Indonesian View: Indonesia, Australia and the Region’, in 
ed. John Monfries, Different Societies, Shared Futures, Indonesia Update Series, 
(Research School of Pacifi c and Asian Studies, the Australian National University, 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore: 2006), p. 17
18       Colin Brown, Op. cit. p. 4
The post-New Order democratic environment has also had an 
impact on government political decisions previously hostage 
to the inward-looking nationalism and Wawasan Nusantara. 
A primary example of this was the Aceh peace process and 
the resulting Aceh peace agreement in 2005, which ended the 
almost 30-year-long confl ict between the central government 
and the Aceh separatist movement. The Aceh peace accord 
was a product of the fi rst Yudhoyono administration. At the end 
of its second and fi nal term, the Yudhoyono government has 
struggled to deal with the dynamics of domestic politics and 
the Papua separatist movement. As in the case of Aceh, the 
frequently repressive actions justifi ed in the name of ‘national 
unity and territorial integrity’ paradoxically create momentum for 
the separatist movement to grow.19  
CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF SOFT POWER
The presentation of the World Statesman Award for promoting 
religious freedom to President Yudhoyono provides a good 
illustration of both the advantages and limits of soft power. The 
Appeal of Conscience Foundation, a US-based interfaith group 
founded by Rabbi Arthur Schneier presented the award to the 
President in May 2013. The award sparked furore among human 
rights groups abroad and in Indonesia, protesting the award as 
undeserved given the spread of religious intolerance in Indonesia 
under Yudhoyono’s watch. Yet it gave the President yet another 
platform to claim: that despite problems with intolerance, the 
country was an example of moderation, saying that ‘Indonesia is 
an example to the world that democracy, Islam, and modernity 
can live in positive symbiosis’.20  
The domestic protests were such that the Indonesian 
Ambassador to the United States Dino Patti Djalal felt compelled 
to respond. While acknowledging limitations and fl aws, he 
cited the President’s record for increasing the global status of 
Indonesia as a stable democracy, improving on the record of 
human rights of previous Indonesian governments, ensuring 
effective peacekeeping diplomacy, and making Indonesia a 
global player in such areas as the G-20 Forum, climate change, 
environment and ocean conservation, and inter-faith activities. 
He did not discount the weaknesses that needed to be 
addressed, including corruption, poverty, and social confl ict.21 
19       Yanto Sugiarto, ‘The Papua Problem: Seeds of Disintegration’, The Jakarta 
Globe, August 18 2011, available at http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/the-
papua-problem-seeds-of-disintegration/
20       Sara Schonhardt, ‘Is Indonesia still a model of religious tolerance?’, 
(Christian Science Monitor, May 31 2013).
21       Dino Djalal, ‘Dino: The World Statesman Award for President SBY Not 
Surprising’, 20 May 2013, available at http://www.setkab.gi,ud/artikel-8713-
seputar-pemberian-world-statesman-award-kepada-sby.html
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As a contestant in the convention established to select the 
presidential candidate from the Democratic Party, Dino Patti 
Djalal represents a new generation hopeful of taking over 
national leadership from the New Order generation. The 
outcome of the presidential election is, of course, diffi cult to 
predict. Nevertheless, whatever generation the new president 
represents, he or she will have the choice of foreign policy 
featuring the democratic norms espoused by the past 
administration or reverting to a nationalistic strain in line with 
Wawasan Nusantara. Domestically the new government also 
may choose to concentrate on issues of domestic security 
threats, as in the case of separatist threats in Papua, or instead 
emphasise policy means of resolving religious intolerance. 
It could cater to the narrow minority brand of intolerance 
and extreme nationalism in Indonesian society or strengthen 
democratic institutions capable of supporting the majority 
proponents of moderate and tolerant nationalism.
The extent of Indonesia’s ascent will depend on narrowing the 
gap between rhetoric and action, particularly on its domestic 
front. Without that narrowing, and with only geographic size, 
a large population, and an abundance of natural resources to 
justify its standing as a regional power, the normative priority of 
tolerant democracy supporting an active foreign policy would be 
seen to be Indonesia’s version of the ‘emperor’s new clothes’. 
Foreign policy does indeed begin at home.
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INTRODUCTION
Indonesia has been active in international institutions since its 
independence. It joined the United Nations in 1950 and was 
an early and active participant in its peace-making forces. In 
1967, Indonesia was a founding member of the Association of 
Southeast Nations (ASEAN), created to maintain security and 
stability in Southeast Asia. In the post-Cold War period, Indonesia 
was a founding member of Asia Pacifi c Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) in 1989 and hosted the APEC Summit in 1994. More 
recently, in 1999, Indonesia joined the Group of Twenty (G-20), a 
selected group of advanced and emerging economies that has 
become a key forum for global economic governance. 
This issue brief focuses on Indonesia’s involvement in three major 
and uniquely different international institutions, the Non Aligned 
Movement (NAM), the United Nations (UN), and the G-20 
respectively. Through analysis of public statements of President 
Yudhoyono, it will look at how the Yudhoyono government has 
kept the essence of the traditional narratives of Indonesian 
foreign policy while reshaping them in the context of Indonesia’s 
economic and political ascent. 
The fi rst section briefl y looks at the genesis of the ‘independent 
and active’ orientation of Indonesia’s foreign policy and the 
1955 Asia–Africa Conference in Bandung, both of which laid 
the ideological foundation of Indonesia’s foreign policy. The 
next three sections will examine Indonesia’s membership and 
role in the above three international institutions, beginning with 
NAM as inspired by the Bandung Conference and Indonesia 
as a founding member, the UN as the universal international 
institution, then the G-20 as a selected premium group of 
industrialised and emerging nations. 
INDEPENDENT AND ACTIVE FOREIGN 
POLICY
When Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, nationalist 
leaders had already envisioned a nation-state active in fostering 
global order. Their idealism was refl ected in the Preamble 
of the 1945 Constitution, which stated that Indonesia must 
take responsibility for contributing to establishment of a world 
order in accordance with the principles of independence, 
eternal peace, and social justice.1 Not long after, in 1948, 
Vice President Mohammad Hatta, in what was to become a 
landmark speech, stressed that Indonesia should be ‘a subject, 
not an object’ in its international affairs. He advocated the 
‘independent and active foreign policy’ that, after six presidents 
and major changes in government systems, remains the 
bedrock of Indonesia’s foreign policy.2  
1       The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia: as amended by 
the First Amendment of 1999, the Second Amendment of 2000, the Third 
Amendment of 2001 and the Fourth Amendment of 2002, available at: http://www.
embassyofi ndonesia.org/about/pdf/IndonesianConstitution.pdf.
2       Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ‘Speech before The Council on World Affairs 
(ICWA)’, Jakarta, 19 May, 2005 available at: http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/
pidato/2005/05/19/332.html
The First Asia-Africa Conference held in Bandung in 1955, 
widely considered as a historical milestone, was a manifestation 
of this foreign policy philosophy. Five countries, Indonesia, 
India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma initiated the conference. 
Twenty-nine countries from Asia and Africa participated in the 
conference.3 Representing Africa were Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, 
Libya, the Sudan, and the Gold Coast, while the remaining 
member-states were from Asia. Despite disagreements during 
the course of the conference, caused in part by the fi ssures of 
the prevailing Cold War, the conference participants united in a 
fi nal communique that incorporated the Ten Bandung Principles.4 
As Shimazu argues: 
This diplomatic performance lent legitimacy 
symbolically to the twenty-nine participating states 
as a new collective ‘actor’ in international relations. 
What is striking about Bandung is that it was an act of 
confi dent assertion vis-à-vis the ruling elite international 
society, and not a passive act of seeking acceptance. 
Symbolically, not a single ‘white’ or ‘Western’ state was 
present. Thus, it was a daring act, proud and defi ant, 
borne out of the political momentum created by the 
global process of decolonization. 5
3       Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China (People’s Republic), Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Gold Coast, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, 
Turkey, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Yemen.
4       The principles are: 
(1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations, 
(2) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, 
(3) Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large 
and small, 
(4) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country, 
(5) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in 
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, 
(6) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the 
particular interests of any of the big powers and abstention by any country from 
exerting pressures on other countries,
(7) Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any country, 
(8) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, 
conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the 
parties’ own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations,
(9) Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation, 
(10) Respect for justice and international obligations.
5       Naoko Shimazu, ‘Diplomacy as Theatre: Recasting the Bandung Conference 
of 1955 as Cultural History’, Asia Research Institute, Working Paper Series No. 
164, October 2011.
INDONESIA AND THE NON-ALIGNED 
MOVEMENT (NAM)
The 1955 Bandung Conference inspired the founding of the 
Non-Aligned Movement in 1961.6 At the Belgrade Summit in 
September of that year, 25 countries declared their commitment 
to maintain independence in the context the Cold War between 
the Western and Eastern Blocs. When Indonesia chaired NAM 
in 1992, there were 113 member-states. In 2012, NAM had 119 
member-states, equivalent to two thirds of the UN members. 
However, the Non Aligned Movement represented diverse 
interests and political orientations that created serious obstacles 
to consolidation as a single voice. Nevertheless, with the 
dramatic increase of membership the movement has been able 
to claim a continuing legitimacy.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
relevance of the movement to the world’s post-cold war politics 
came into question.7 Amid ensuing skepticism Indonesia was 
elected to chair NAM in 1992. At the 10th NAM Summit in 
Jakarta, NAM leaders agreed on the Jakarta Message and a Final 
Document of the Tenth Summit with a realistic, inclusive, non-
confrontational approach. These documents highlighted the new 
NAM’s roles: from advocate of decolonisation in the context of 
the West–East confrontation to the promoter of dialogue aimed 
at mitigating increasing polarisation between the North and the 
South. The Jakarta Message defi nes the new objectives of NAM: 
to increase constructive cooperation between nations, focus on 
economic cooperation, and increase South–South cooperation to 
develop the economic potential of member-states.8  
President Suharto ended Indonesia’s term as chair in 1995 with 
a declaration of confi dence in NAM. In his speech, delivered 
at the Eleventh NAM Summit in Cartagena, Columbia on 18 
October 1995, he said:
The tenth Summit Meeting of our Movement has 
indeed been a watershed. It established beyond 
doubt the continuing relevance of Non-Alignment in 
the post-Cold War era as validated by subsequent 
events. Just as important, our Movement emerged 
from that Summit with a new orientation and a new 
approach in its relationships with the developed 
countries and with international institutions.9
6       The initiators of the formation of NAM were President Soekarno (Indonesia), 
President Joseph Broz Tito (Yugoslavia), President Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), 
President Gamal Abdul Nasser (Egypt) and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (India).
7       Antoinette Handley,’Non-Aligned Against what? South Africa and the Future 
of the Non-Aligned Movement.’ SAIIA Report No.10, South African Institute of 
International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1998, p. 1
8       ‘Non-Aligned Movement’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, available at: 
http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/IFPDisplay.aspx?Name=MultilateralCooperation&IDP
=3&P= Multilateral&l=en
9       President Soeharto’s Address as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement of 
the inaugural session of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government 
of the Non-Aligned Countries in Cartagena, Columbia, 18 October 1995.
At the 16th Ministerial Conference and Commemorative 
Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Bali in 2011, President 
Yudhoyono defi ned three major roles that NAM could play in 
response to the complex challenges of the twenty-fi rst century: 
contribution to the achievement of a global culture of peace 
and security; a vigorous advocate of political development and 
social justice; encouraging and strengthening democratic values 
and achieving good governance; and operating as a force for 
equitable global prosperity in regard to economic development.10 
Transforming NAM to become an effective force faces similar 
challenges. The Non-Aligned Movement has been vocal in 
mobilising support for world-wide recognition, but with little 
effect. Indonesia has played an active role in this advocacy. 
At the Summit in Teheran in August 2012 the head of the 
Indonesian delegation, Vice President Boediono, called on 
NAM members to be more proactive in supporting Palestinian 
independence by taking action in relation to fi ve pressing issues: 
First, how to respond effectively to Israeli illegal 
activities. Second, how to support and promote 
Palestinian bid for UN membership. Third, how 
to promote and support the institutional capacity 
building of Palestine. Fourth, how to support 
reconcilitiation among Palestinians; and fi nally, 
how to effectively engage the media to raise public 
awareness on the Palestinian cause.11  
The Vice President also pointed out the need for NAM to build an 
effective organisation arguing that ‘having 120 members means 
nothing if we do not have the power of collective infl uence, a 
power that we can only earn through hard work and a reputation 
for being reliable partners.’12  
10       Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, ‘Fighting for Peace, Justice and Prosperity in 
the 21st Century’, Speech delivered at the inaugural address at the 16th Ministerial 
Conference and Commemorative meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Bali 
25 May 2011 available at: http://www.setkab.go.id/berita-1836-fi ghting-for-peace-
justice-and-prosperity-in-the-21st-century.html
11       Statement by H.E. Dr. Boediono Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia 
at XVI Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement 
available at http://wapresri.go.id/index/preview/pidato/158
12       Ibid.
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INDONESIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS
Indonesia became a member of the UN on 28 September 
1950 and has been active in the organisation since that date. 
Indonesia chaired the UN General Assembly in 1971, the 
second Asian representative to chair the Assembly. Indonesia 
was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security 
Council in 1974, 1995 and in 2007. In 1970 and again in 2000 
Indonesia was elected president of the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC), the largest of the UN’s six organs. It was vice 
president of the ECOSOC in 1969, 1999 and 2012. The country 
has been a member of the UN Human Rights Council since the 
Council was established in 2006, and in 2009 was chosen to 
become vice president of the Council. Besides being active in 
the UN organs, Indonesia has contributed actively to the UN 
peacekeeping forces since 1957, sending troops as part of UN 
missions to Congo, Vietnam, Iran, Kuwait, Bosnia, Campuchea, 
the Philippines, and Lebanon.13 
Since its inception, the UN has frequently been a target of 
criticism from different quarters. One important organisational 
aspect of the UN that has perennially come under attack has 
been the role of the Security Council.14 As an increasing number 
of countries play important roles on the world stage, whether 
economically or politically or both, the limited number of Security 
Council members (fi ve) and their composition (USA, UK, Russia, 
China, and France) have become increasingly anachronistic to 
many member states. 
In a speech addressed to the General Assembly at the UN 
in September 2012, President Yudhoyono emphasised the 
importance of the UN Security Council reform in refl ecting the 
reality of the twenty-fi rst century: 
We have moved from the era of the Cold War to 
an era of warm peace. In this ‘warm peace’, the 
world remains stuck with an outdated international 
security architecture that still refl ects 20th century 
circumstances; in contrast with the global economic 
architecture that has done much better to adjust to 
the 21st century.15 
13       Kementrian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, ‘Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa,’ 
available at: http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/ IFPDisplay.aspx?Name=MultilateralCo
operation&IDP=12&P=Multilateral&l=id; Indonesia Permanent Mission to the United 
States New York, ‘Indonesia and the United Nations’ http://www.indonesiamission-
ny.org/menu_atas/a2_indo_un/indonesia_unitednations.php
14       Richard Butler, ‘Reform of the United Security Council, Penn State Journal 
of Law & International Affairs, Vol.1 No.1, available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/
jlia/vol1/iss1/2, 2012, pp. 23-39; Sahar Okhovat, ‘The United Nations Security 
Council: Its Veto Power and Reform’, CPACS Working Paper No.15/1, December 
2011, available at http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_confl ict/docs/working_papers/
UNSC_paper.pdf
15       Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ‘Speech at the General Debate of the 67th 
session of the United Nations General Assembly’, New York, 25 September 2012 
available at: http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2012/09/26/1970.html
At the opening of the fi fth Bali Democracy Forum in November 
2012, the President reiterated the need for Security Council reform:
We need to ensure a harmony between the 
aspirations of the Security Council Members and 
members of the General Assembly. Such harmony 
requires the promotion of multilateralism and rejection 
of unilateralism.16  
He went on to say that ‘an effective Security Council must be 
one that better represents contemporary global realities (and 
serves as) an intergovernmental forum for exchanging ideas and 
sharing experiences on democracy.’17  
While calls for Security Council reform has had little impact, 
whether from Indonesia or otherwise, it has not prevented 
Indonesia from intensifying its peacekeeping involvement in the 
UN. In 2013, Indonesia was the 16th largest contributor to the 
UN peacekeeping forces, totalling 1,815 personnel deployed on 
six UN operations. The increased involvement was an indication 
of the growing national confi dence arising from recent economic 
growth and political stability. Increased resources have allowed 
the country more scope to contribute to UN operations. A case 
in point was the establishment of a Peacekeeping Mission 
Education and Training Facility at the Indonesia Peace and 
Security Center (IPSC) in West Java in 2011. It is the largest 
international training facility for UN peacekeeping forces in 
Southeast Asia.18 
INDONESIA AND THE GROUP OF TWENTY
The Group of Twenty (G-20) was established in 1999 as a forum 
for fi nance ministers and central bank governors from major 
economies19 to deal with the global impact of the Asian economic 
crisis and to prevent similar crises in the future. However, the 
group became prominent in 2008 when the fi rst G-20 Leaders’ 
Summit was convened in Washington DC to stabilise the 
global economy in the aftermath of the American economic 
crisis.20 There have been eight Summit meetings since the fi rst 
Washington Summit in 2008, with a continuing focus on global 
economic growth and emphasising job creation and open trade.21 
16       President SBY’s speech delivered at the opening of the Fifth Bali Democracy 
Forum in Bali 8 November 2012; ‘SBY Reiterates Urgency for UN Security Council 
Reform’, available at: http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/sby-reiterates-
urgency-for-un-security-council-reform/555029
17       Ibid.
18       Natalie Sambhi, ‘Indonesia’s push for peacekeeping operations’, The 
Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 17 September 2013, available at: 
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indonesias-push-for-peacekeeping-operations/
19       Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union.
20       Yulius Purwadi Hermawan, et.al, (2011). ‘The Role of Indonesia in the G-20: 
Background, Role an Objectives of Indonesia’s Membership’. (FES: Jakarta, 2011), 
pp. 4-10.
21       ‘A short history of the Group of Twenty’ September 3, 2013 available 
at: http://g20.org.thebricspost.com/a-short-history-of-the-group-of-twenty/#.
UwA_SIVQM-M 
Indonesia’s engagement in the G-20 was a breakthrough in the 
history of Indonesian diplomacy. On one hand, its membership 
in the G-20 provides an opportunity to contribute to establishing 
a new form of global governance – an agenda with which 
NAM, the UN, and the industrialised countries are seriously 
concerned. On the other hand, Indonesia needs to ensure that 
the new architecture of global governance benefi ts developing 
countries in order to assure both an international and a domestic 
public audience that Indonesia’s membership, engagement and 
compliance with commitments to the G-20 remains compatible 
with Indonesia’s commitment to other international institutions, 
such as the UN and NAM. 
NAM refl ects the expectations Indonesia has for the G-20. As 
expressed by President Yudhoyono, the G-20 is a ‘civilizational 
powerhouse’, not only an economic one:
The G-20 for the fi rst time accommodates all the major 
civilizations – not just Western countries, but also 
China, South Korea, India, South Africa, and others, 
including signifi cantly, three countries with large Muslim 
populations: Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Indonesia. The 
G-20 is representative of a multi-civilizational global 
community. Perhaps this is why the G-20 has been 
successful in arresting a global meltdown.22 
At the same time, with its diplomatic history and tradition taken 
into account, Indonesia’s notion of membership in international 
institutions goes beyond national focus. It also considers itself as 
representing the interests of the developing world: 
For long, within the Non-Aligned Movement as well 
as the G77, Indonesia has regarded the needs and 
interests of developing nations as a priority in its 
global diplomacy. We pioneered the discussion on the 
right to development and exerted concerted efforts to 
promote its global support.
Therefore, Indonesia with other emerging economies in 
the G20 leads the way in the discussion on the issue of 
development in the G20 forum. We promote fi nancial 
inclusion in the forum, an issue which is increasingly 
critical to the economy of developing countries.23 
22       Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. (2009) ‘Towards Harmony among Civilizations’, 
speech delivered at the John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 
Boston 29 September 2009, available at: 
http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2009/09/30/1228.html.
23       Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2012) ‘Indonesia’s role as a regional and global 
actor’, speech at the 2nd Annual Address at the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Offi ce, London, 2 November 2012 available at: 
https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/president-yudhoyonos-speech-at-our-annual-address/
At the 2012 Los Cabos Summit in Mexico, Indonesia joined 
with Mexico and Chile in the initiative for a reciprocal learning 
program on fi nancial inclusion to increase access to credit 
for the poor. Indonesia also proposed the funding scheme for 
infrastructure development, a global infrastructure initiative aimed 
at overcoming bottlenecks in economic development.24 The 
initiative is in line with Indonesia’s major policy initiative on the 
Master Plan for Planning, Extension and Accelerating Economic 
Development (MP3EI). It is also compatible with the interests of 
emerging economies, an important matter given the frequent 
opposition to G-20 positions from civil society organisations 
(CSOs) both domestic and international.25 
INDONESIA AND INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS: BEYOND SYMBOLISM 
As Hurrel26 points out, foreign policy can be derived out of 
an ‘embedded guiding narrative’, an ideology born out of a 
country’s history shaped from domestic and international trends. 
As this issue brief illustrates, Indonesia’s guiding narrative has 
been its ‘independent and active’ foreign policy—the legacy of 
the fi rst Vice President Mohammad—and the 1955 Bandung 
Conference, which became a symbol of that policy. That 
narrative has guided Indonesia’s policy in its involvement in 
the NAM, the UN, and the G-20, for example, in its role in re-
establishing ties between NAM and the industrialised countries 
in its calls for Security Council reform and its UN peacekeeping 
activities; and in joining coalitions in the G-20 to orient the Group 
to development concerns. 
And if, as Hurrel also suggests, ‘sovereignty may be increasingly 
defi ned not by the power to insulate one’s state from external 
infl uences but by the power to participate effectively in 
international institutions of all kinds’,27 then history suggests that 
Indonesia has not acquitted itself poorly in this respect. Whether 
it can continue to do so in the future raises a key question: Is 
numerical strength, as typifi ed by the mantra of being the third-
largest democracy, the largest Muslim country, and the fourth 
largest population in the world—not to mention the third Asian 
economic giant—suffi cient to shape the direction and agenda of 
the international institutions? 
24       Maria Monica Wihardja, ‘Indonesia and the G20: a door left half open’, 
East Asia Forum, 29 June, 2012, available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.
org/2012/06/29/Indonesia-and-the-g20-a-door-left-half-open/
25       Hermawan, et.al., op. cit. pp. 99-127.
26       Andrew Hurrell, ‘Some Refl ections on the Role of Intermediate Powers 
in International Institutions’, in Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of 
Intermediate States, Andrew Hurrell, Andrew F. Cooper, Guadalupe Gonzalez 
Gonzalez, Ricardo Ubiraci Sennes, Srini Sitaraman, (eds.), Latin American Program, 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 2000, p. 1
27       Ibid., p. 4
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Assuming the necessary link between internal national strength 
and international power, Indonesia will face both external and 
internal constraints to translation of its power into infl uence in 
world politics. Internally domestic issues that require attention 
include rampant corruption, communal and sectarian tensions, 
and poor law enforcement, all within an evolving democracy.28  
An economy based on commodities is also vulnerable to 
global economic uncertainty. Externally, Indonesia faces greater 
powers unwilling to respond to demands for fundamental and 
progressive changes in international institutions. 
Indonesia has repeatedly expressed its idealistic views on 
the roles of international institutions as agencies that can be 
delivered shared benefi ts for both industrialised and emerging 
countries. Calling on other nations to realise its vision of a 
fair and just global governance will no longer be suffi cient. 
To emerge as a middle power, Indonesia will have to play an 
increasingly assertive, broader role in international institutions: 
to be a ‘subject’, as envisioned by Mohammad Hatta, and not 
an ‘object’. This issue brief has described Indonesia’s increasing 
engagement in three international institutions as evidence of a 
more confi dent diplomatic role on the global stage. But in the 
future, political and economic strengths emanating from the 
Indonesian domestic front will be needed in order to strengthen 
Indonesia’s systemic infl uence in the NAM, the UN and the G-20. 
28       Rizal Sukma, ‘Domestic Politics and International Posture: Constraints and 
Possibilities’, in Anthony Reid (ed.) Indonesia Rising, The Repositioning of Asia’s 
Third Giant. (ISEAS: Singapore, 2012), pp. 82-90.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
‘A short history of the Group of Twenty’ September 3, 2013 
available at: http://g20.org.thebricspost.com/a-short-history-of-
the-group-of-twenty/#.UwA_SIVQM-M
Butler, Richard, (2011) ‘Reform of the United Security Council’, 
Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs, Vol.1 No.1, 
available at: 
http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/vol1/iss1/2, 2012, pp. 23-39; 
Sahar Okhovat, The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto 
Power and Reform, CPACS Working Paper No.15/1, December, 
available at: 
http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_confl ict/docs/working_papers/
UNSC_paper.pdf 
Handley, Antoinette, (1998) ‘Non-Aligned Against What? South 
Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned Movement’, The South 
African Institute of International Affairs, SAIIA Report No.10, 
Report on a conference held on 10 March 1998 Jan Smuts 
House Johannesburg. 
Hermawan, Yulius Purwadi, et.al., (2011) ‘The Role of Indonesia 
in the G-20: Background’, Role an Objectives of Indonesia’s 
Membership, FES: Jakarta.
Hurrell, Andrew, (2000) ‘Some Refl ections on the Role of 
Intermediate Powers in International Institutions’, in Paths to 
Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States, Andrew 
Hurrell, Andrew F. Cooper, Guadalupe Gonzalez Gonzalez, 
Ricardo Ubiraci Sennes, Srini Sitaraman, (eds.), Latin American 
Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 
March, pp. 1-11. 
‘Indonesia and the United Nations’, Indonesia Permanent 
Mission to the United States, New York, available at: 
http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/menu_atas/a2_indo_un/
indonesia_unitednations.php 
‘Non-Aligned Movement’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, 
available at: 
http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/IFPDisplay.aspx?Name=Multilater
alCooperation&IDP=3&P= Multilateral&l=en
‘Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa,’ (United Nations) Kementrian 
Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Indonesia), available at: 
http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/IFPDisplay.aspx?Name=Multilater
alCooperation&IDP=12&P=Multilateral&l=id
‘President Soeharto’s Address as Chairman of the Non-Aligned 
Movement of the inaugural session of the Eleventh Conference 
of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries 
in Cartagena’, Columbia, 18 October 1995.
Sambhi, Natalie. (2013) ‘Indonesia’s push for peacekeeping 
operations’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 
17 September 2013, available at: 
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indonesias-push-for-
peacekeeping-operations/
Shimazu, Naoko, (2011) ‘Diplomacy as Theatre: Recasting the 
Bandung Conference of 1955 as Cultural History’, Asia Research 
Institute, Working Paper Series No. 164, October.
Statement by H.E. Dr. Boediono Vice President of the Republic of 
Indonesia at XVI Summit of Heads of State or Government of the 
Non-Aligned Movement available at: 
http://wapresri.go.id/index/preview/pidato/158
Sukma, Rizal, (2012) ‘Domestic Politics and International 
Posture: Constraints and Possibilities’, in Anthony Reid (ed.) 
Indonesia Rising, The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, ISEAS, 
Singapore.
‘The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia: as amended 
by the First Amendment of 1999, the Second Amendment of 
2000, the Third Amendment 0f 2001 and the Fourth Amendment 
of 2002’, available at: 
www.embassyofi ndonesia.org/about/pdf/IndonesianConstitution.
pdf.
Wihardja, Maria Monica, (2012) ‘Indonesia and the G20: a door 
left half open’, East Asia Forum, 29 June, available at: 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/06/29/Indonesia-and-the-
g20-a-door-left-half-open/ 
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, ‘Speech before The Council on 
World Affairs (ICWA)’, Jakarta, 19 May, 2005 available at: 
http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2005/05/19/332.html
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, (2009) ‘Towards Harmony Among 
Civilizations,’ Speech before The John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, 29 September, available at: 
http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2009/05/30/1228.
html
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, ‘Fighting for Peace, Justice and 
Prosperity in the 21st Century’, Speech delivered at the inaugural 
address at the 16th Ministerial Conference and Commemorative 
meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Bali 25 May 2011, 
available at:
http://www.setkab.go.id/berita-1836-fi ghting-for-peace-justice-
and-prosperity-in-the-21st-century.html
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, ‘Speech at the General Debate of 
the 67th session of the United Nations General Assembly’, New 
York, 25 September 2012 available at: 
http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/
pidato/2012/09/26/1970.html
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, ‘Opening Statement at the Bali 
Democracy Forum V’, Bali, 8 November 2012, available at: 
http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/
pidato/2012/11/08/1999.html
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, ‘Indonesia’s Role as Regional and 
Global Actor’ Speech at the Wilton Park Annual Address, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Offi ce, 2 November, 2012, available at: 
http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/
pidato/2012/11/02/2001.html
 
Indonesia in international institutions: Living up to ideals 66
67 National Security College
National Security College Issue Brief
No 9 May 2014
National Security College
Indonesia and the Law of the Sea:    
Beyond the archipelagic outlook    
Leonard C Sebastian, Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto 
and I Made Andi Arsana
National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry
Authors:   C Sebastian, Leonard; Supriyanto, Ristian Atriandi; Made Andi Arsana, I.
Title:   Indonesia and the Law of the Sea: Beyond the archipelagic outlook [electronic resource] / Yongwook Ryu.
ISSN/ISBN:  ISBN 978-1-925084-10-8 
  ISSN  2203 - 4935  (print)
  ISSN  2203-5842 (online)
Series:   National Security College issue brief (Online)
Notes:      Includes bibliographical references.
Subjects:    National security--Australia--21st century.
   Military planning--Australia.
   Political leadership--Australia--21st century.
   Australia--Politics and government--21st century.
Other Authors/Contributors:
  Australian National University, National Security College
Dewey Number:  355.0330994
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Associate Professor Leonard C Sebastian is Coordinator, Indonesia Programme, S Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, Singapore; Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto is Senior Analyst, Maritime Security Programme, 
S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore; and I Made Andi Arsana is from Geodesy and 
Geomatics, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia, and is currently an Australian Leadership Award Scholar 
(PhD Candidate), Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of 
Wollongong, Australia.
Indonesia and the Law of the Sea: Beyond the archipelagic outlook 68
69 National Security College
INTRODUCTION
As the pivotal state1 in Southeast Asia, Indonesia uses maritime 
diplomacy as a means of establishing cooperative regional 
relationships, thereby achieving two objectives: fi rst, ensuring 
its security; and second—by actively resolving its border 
disputes—demonstrating its leadership credentials to mediate 
interstate boundary disputes in the region. Lacking sea power 
capable of projecting its maritime interests and securing its 
borders, the alternative of using maritime diplomacy reduces 
the causes of insecurity, thus augmenting Indonesia’s national 
security. Indonesia’s management of its border disputes is a 
classic example of implementing preventive diplomacy in the 
management of regional issues that involve or threaten military 
confl ict; such an approach signifi cantly bolsters its claim to 
regional leadership. 
This paper analyses how a rising Indonesia may redefi ne the 
security of its maritime domain in light of the increasingly assertive 
presence of major powers in the sea-lanes of East and Southeast 
Asia. While much analysis of Indonesia’s maritime security is 
viewed through the lens of the Archipelago Outlook (Wawasan 
Nusantara), which emphasises the importance of national unity 
and territorial integrity, the current geopolitical situation in the 
region, characterised by the rise of maritime powers in Asia and 
beyond, has increasingly made Indonesia’s archipelagic sea-
lanes (ASLs) and its associated maritime choke-points (Malacca, 
Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar Straits) critical, and therefore 
consequential to its foreign policy strategic planners. Not only 
are ASLs a crucial factor in global trade, but even more so than 
in previous decades they are becoming the fl ashpoints for the 
projection of maritime power. The consequences and therefore 
the contention of this paper is that Indonesia will take incremental 
steps to re-orient its diplomatic, legal, and security focus 
towards meeting potential external maritime challenges. This is 
a fundamental issue to address as it will shape and infl uence the 
evolution of Indonesia’s ascending power. 
The research we embark upon is important for several reasons. 
First, while much of the literature has explained Indonesia’s 
inward-looking strategic psyche in descriptive terms, little 
attention has been given to the country’s outward-looking 
orientation. With the rise of China and India, compounded 
by the United States’ pivot to Asia with the aim of reinforcing 
its status as the region’s principal strategic actor, Indonesia’s 
geopolitical calculus has become more convoluted, especially 
in the maritime domain. Our research will be the fi rst attempt 
to chart out Indonesia’s strategic maritime environment in the 
post-Suharto era. 
1       The qualities of the Republic of Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous 
country, the largest democracy in the Muslim world, and geo-strategically, 
Southeast Asia’s most signifi cant state give it the attributes of a ‘pivotal state’. 
According to the authors of an infl uential study, a pivotal state is ‘geo-strategically 
important state to the United States and its allies’, and its importance is attributed 
to its ability not only to ‘determine the success or failure of its region but also 
signifi cantly affect international stability’, See Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul 
Kennedy eds., The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. policy in the 
Developing World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc 1999), pp: 6 and 9.
Second, this paper will critically examine the Archipelago 
Outlook concept, especially with the intention of ascertaining 
the extent to which it applies to Indonesia’s external maritime 
settings. It will argue that while the Archipelago Outlook remains 
an identity for Indonesia as a unitary state, it provides little if 
any guidance for Indonesia to manoeuvre through the current 
geopolitical landscape characterised by competition between 
the major maritime powers. 
Third, in light of an increasingly challenging maritime strategic 
environment, we then speculate how Indonesia may designate 
its east/west archipelagic sea lanes, particularly in terms of the 
opportunities and vulnerabilities they pose. 
Fourth, the paper describes Indonesia’s strategic maritime 
environment beyond the scope of the Archipelago Outlook with 
reference to the presence and role of major powers in the region 
and the implications of their maritime projections for the security 
of Indonesia’s ASLs and choke-points. 
Fifth, in the conclusion we explain how Indonesia attempts 
to shape, infl uence, and adapt to the prevailing strategic 
environment: specifi cally, how Indonesia will deal with the 
increasingly intertwined interests of major powers and the 
implications of that complexity for the security of Indonesia’s 
maritime domain. 
ARCHIPELAGO OUTLOOK: THE 
EVOLUTION OF A CONCEPT
Indonesians often refer to their archipelago as the ‘cross-road 
location’ (posisi silang) between the Indian and Pacifi c Oceans 
and between the Asian and Australian continents,2 emphasising 
that geographical position should be viewed not only in terms 
of physical location, but also in terms of perceptions of status, 
power and national aspirations. The geopolitics of Indonesia is 
informed by its national identity and its aspirations. For example, 
considering its archipelagic nature, Indonesia is a ‘maritime 
nation’, although much less a seafaring one. The Archipelagic 
Outlook constitutes the self-identity of Indonesia as based on 
territorial integrity stretching ‘from Sabang to Merauke’ (dari 
Sabang sampai Merauke).3  
2       Evan Laksmana, ‘The Enduring Strategic Trinity: Explaining Indonesia’s Geopolitical 
Architecture’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region Vol.1, No.1, (2011), p. 96.
3       Sabang and Merauke are respectively Indonesia’s westernmost and 
easternmost cities located in the Provinces of Aceh and Papua.
The Archipelagic Outlook is also constitutive of an obsession with 
national security, which is driven by the common perception that 
Indonesia is always vulnerable to stronger foreign powers using 
strategies that divide and rule. This is evident in its articulation of 
the Wawasan Nusantara concept, which comprises a number of 
elements: the prevailing concern over national disintegration; the 
resulting emphasis on unity; the need for economic development, 
particularly in the less-developed provinces; economic nationalism; 
an emphasis on political stability; the sanctity of national borders; 
and, lastly, the importance Indonesia attaches to the Law of the 
Sea as the means by which to ensure the Wawasan Nusantara. 
In giving recognition to Indonesia‘s concept of the archipelagic 
state, the Law of the Sea recognizes the key element of 
Indonesia’s national outlook. The concept of territorial and 
national unity which regards Indonesia as an inseparable union of 
land and water (tanah-air or homeland) was fi rst mooted in 1957. 
More importantly, the extension of territorial seas to 12 nautical 
miles and the concept of archipelagic sea lanes that preserve 
international sea routes have given Indonesia greater control over 
the exploitation, use and security of its archipelagic waters.4 
In the late 1950s there was general consensus among all 
domestic Indonesian political parties and groups that the 
seas of the Indonesian archipelago required increased 
control. For Hasyim Djalal, the pockets of high seas between 
Indonesian islands enabled foreign warships and submarines 
to traverse the archipelago unregulated; they often conducted 
manoeuvres visible from the coast, thereby provoking ‘domestic 
consternation and political upheaval’.5 The solution was to draw 
baselines along Indonesia’s outermost islands, from which the 
12-mile territorial sea limit was drawn. On 13 December 1957 
Indonesia declared that all the waters within these baselines 
became ‘internal or national waters’ and were considered 
‘integral parts’ of the Indonesian state. In these waters, foreign 
vessels, civilian or military, were only entitled ‘innocent passage’. 
4       Leonard C. Sebastian, ‘Domestic Security Priorities, ‘Balance of Interests’ 
and Indonesia’s Management of Regional Order’, in Joseph Chinyong Liow and Ralf 
Emmers, eds., Order and Security in Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Michael 
Leifer, (London/New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 178.
5       Hasyim Djalal, ‘Indonesia and the Law of the Sea’, (Jakarta: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 1995).
Part of the declaration was the creation of the Archipelago 
Outlook. As a political concept it bound a geographically 
dispersed and socio-culturally diverse chain of islands together 
as a single unifi ed archipelago. On the one hand, the concept 
refl ects a deep-seated concern bordering on paranoia towards 
any party—domestic or external—that could provoke, incite, 
assist, or endorse secessionist elements within Indonesia. On 
the other hand, it is indicative of Indonesia’s acute sense of 
vulnerability towards its maritime domain.6 The Archipelago 
Outlook, therefore, has re-defi ned the way Indonesia views its 
maritime domain. It has created a sense of entitlement7 and 
ownership in the control of internal waters—territorial seas and 
archipelagic waters—while providing the political legitimacy 
necessary for Jakarta to unite the diverse archipelago. 
The reaction of maritime powers such as the United States and 
the United Kingdom to the declaration was expeditious and 
resolute: Indonesia was accused of violating the sacrosanct 
principle of freedom of navigation and free transit, whereby no 
single entity could possess the sea, which—refl ecting Grotian 
tradition—was regarded as a global commons. Regardless of 
this, Jakarta persisted in charting a lonely course, beginning a 
25-year struggle for recognition as an archipelagic state. During 
these years Indonesian diplomats lobbied the international 
community, at times engaging the great powers in negotiations, 
arguing that Indonesia as an archipelago should deserve special 
rights in International Law. Indonesia’s lobbying efforts fi nally 
bore fruit in December 1982, when the special provisions in 
Part IV dealing specifi cally with the unique requirements of 
archipelagic states in the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into force.8 According to Part IV, 
Indonesia is entitled to draw baselines around its archipelago, 
but in the process should consult with neighbouring states 
affected by those baselines and designate sea lanes for ships 
that normally transit Indonesian waters. The waters enclosed 
by the baselines would become archipelagic waters where 
Indonesia holds full sovereignty, but ‘archipelagic sea lanes’ may 
be designated for foreign vessels for normal transit.  
6       See Michael Leifer, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’, cited in Leonard C. 
Sebastian, Domestic Security Priorities, ‘Balance of Interests’ and Indonesia’s 
Management of Regional Order’op.cit, p. 54.
7       Ibid.
8        ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES, MARITIME 
BOUNDARIES, AND CHOKE-POINTS
Archipelagic waters fall within the sovereignty of a state 
regardless of the breadth of distance between its islands.9 In 
Indonesia’s case, for example, there are no longer high seas 
between Java and Kalimantan; maritime areas previously 
regarded as part of the high seas and which were used for 
international navigation now belong exclusively to Indonesia. To 
avoid situations in which such an interpretation would hinder 
previous freedom of navigation in archipelagic waters, it was 
necessary for Indonesia to designate archipelagic sea lanes. 
ASLs are the trade-off recognised by a state in return for being 
granted archipelagic state status and for being able to exercise 
sovereignty over archipelagic waters. Such an arrangement 
allows for compromise between coastal states with growing 
jurisdiction over maritime areas adjacent to them and other 
maritime states insisting on retaining their historical right to 
freedom of the seas.10 
Indonesia determined that the concept of archipelagic sea 
lanes would be appropriate to its maritime domain because 
the archipelago is located on the major shipping routes 
between the Indian and Pacifi c Oceans. However, although 
designating archipelagic sea lanes in Indonesian waters would 
permit the government to concentrate its efforts on providing 
navigational safety and security in relation to foreign vessels, the 
promulgation of UNCLOS would not permit the government to 
prevent foreign vessels transiting through the routes they used 
to navigate. From Indonesia’s perspective, the fact that vessels 
could continue arbitrary transit meant that the security benefi ts of 
archipelagic status were not suffi cient. Foreign vessels, civilian or 
military, remained able to sail through Indonesia waters regarded 
sensitive to national security and safety, such as the Java Sea, 
located in close proximity to the vast majority of Indonesia’s 
population and key economic centres. 
Indonesia’s effort to implement Archipelagic Sea-lane Passage 
(ASLP) in its archipelagic waters commenced immediately 
subsequent to its ratifi cation of UNCLOS, which culminated in a 
National Working Group meeting in Cisarua in early 1995. The 
meeting managed to establish consensus on a proposal of three 
north–south ASLs that had been proposed during the Indonesian 
Navy Strategic Forum in 1991.11 Puspitawati (2005) has noted 
that the proposal was submitted to the International Maritime 
9        UNCLOS, Article 49 (1).
10      Penny Campbell, ‘Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes’, in Papers in 
Australian Maritime Affairs No.5.
11       NP Ello, ‘Hasil Sidang IMO dan Konsultasi IHO tentang ALKI dalam rangka 
implementasi UNCLOS 1982’ [Results of IMO Assembly and IHO Consultation on 
Indonesia’s Archipelagic Sea Lanes in relation to the Implementation of UNCLOS 
1982], cited in D. Puspitawati, ‘The East/West Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage 
Through the Indonesian Archipelago’, Maritime Studies, Vol. 140, January-February 
(2005), p. 3.
Organization (IMO)12 in 1996 during the 67th meeting of the 
Maritime Safety Commission (MSC–67). Three related institutions 
and 22 states provided their responses, with a majority of states 
commenting on the lack of east–west ASLs. The proposal was 
reconsidered in order to address these concerns, but Indonesia 
subsequently failed to implement a plan that included east–west 
ASLs. In its London proposal to MSC–69 Indonesia maintained 
its original position, designating only three north–south ASLs, 
which were approved by the IMO on 19 May 1998. However, 
even though Indonesia’s original ASL submission did not opt for 
a partial designation, its proposition was deemed only ‘partially 
designated’ since it did not include all normal passage routes 
used for international navigation, and in particular because it 
excluded east–west ASLs.13 During consultations with other user 
States – namely, the Maritime states – prior to the submission, 
Australia and the United States specifi cally proposed possible 
east–west ASLs that Indonesia should include in its submission 
to the IMO, but which it omitted. In making their own proposals 
concerning east–west ASLs, Australia and the United States 
were motivated by their concern regarding the application of 
innocent passage rules to east–west routes.14  
HOW TO DESIGNATE EAST–WEST 
SEA-LANES
In order for detailed rules to be applied regarding the ASLs, 
Indonesia, Australia and the United States fi rst informally agreed 
on several points called the ‘19 rules’. The 19 rules specifi cally 
govern the rights and obligations of transiting vessels in 
Indonesia’s designated ASLs.15 An important point to deduce 
from the ‘19 rules’ is that in areas where ASLs have yet to be 
designated, the right of ASLP ‘may be exercised in the relevant 
archipelagic waters in accordance with the Law of the Sea 
Convention, 1982.’ This stipulates that where ASLs have yet to 
be designated Indonesia agrees to permit transiting vessels to 
navigate through its archipelagic waters along any routes normally 
used for navigation, as specifi ed by Article 53 (12) of UNCLOS. 
12       IMO is considered as the ‘competent international organization’ as governed 
by UNCLOS, Article 53 (9) for the purpose of the designation of ASLs. There 
are views that question the legitimacy of IMO to be considered as ‘competent 
international organization’ on this matter. For an argument on this, see for example, 
Chris Forward, ‘Archipelagic Sea-Lanes in Indonesia –Their Legality in International 
Law’, Australian & New Zealand Maritime Law Journal, Vol.23, No.2, November 
2009, pp. 143–156. Puspitawati, on the other hand views that ‘the competence of 
the IMO as the organisation is appropriate’. See, Puspitawati, 2005, op. cit., p. 4.
13       Puspitawati, 2005, op. cit., p. 4.
14       Puspitawati, 2005, op. cit., p. 6.
15       For a complete documentation of the ‘19 rules’, see: Puspitawati, 2005, op 
cit, p. 9-10.
To illustrate Indonesia’s detraction from international laws in 
relation to sea lane transit, Indonesian Government Regulation 
37/2002 regarding the implementation of the ASL and ASLP 
does not accord with UNCLOS and the ‘19 rules’. The interests 
of Indonesia as a coastal state differ from maritime user states 
such as Australia and the United States, as is made clear in 
Indonesian government regulation. Government Regulation 
37/2002 does not specifi cally state whether Indonesia has 
opted for partial ASL designation. An important point to note 
from the regulation is that ASLP can be exercised in any part 
of Indonesia’s archipelagic waters ‘as soon as archipelagic sea 
lanes have been designated in those waters.’16 This is clearly 
inconsistent with UNCLOS, which allows transiting vessels 
to navigate through normal routes used for navigation within 
archipelagic waters. In other words, UNCLOS prescribes that 
all foreign vessels can navigate through archipelagic waters 
with or without ASLs being designated, and that a coastal state 
has neither the right to prevent foreign vessels from conducting 
transit, nor the authority to suspend the right of transit.
By not specifying its east–west ASLs, Indonesia has only partially 
designated the required complement of ASLs necessary to qualify 
under UNCLOS. Any complete designation of ASL requires 
careful study and consideration so that Indonesia can balance 
its national interests and international obligations. Elements 
within the security agencies have argued that the designation 
of east–west ASLs will place Indonesia in a vulnerable position, 
with foreign vessels enjoying freedom of transit in Indonesia’s 
archipelagic waters; others have similarly contended that 
Indonesia’s national security may be compromised.17 Besides 
these issues, there are those who would point to Indonesia’s role 
as the host state, raising concerns over its practical capacity 
to monitor busy navigation activity and ensure the safety and 
security for vessels in the ASL.18 Such reservations are valid 
considering Indonesia’s lack of adequate equipment and facilities 
to conduct comprehensive surveillance. 
16       Government Regulation Number 37 of 2002, on The Rights and Obligations 
of Foreign Ships and Aircraft when Exercising the Right of Archipelagic Sea Lanes 
Passage through Established Archipelagic Sea Lanes, [hereinafter Government 
Regulation Number 37 of 2002], Article 3 (1). An English translation is available at: 
http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/fi les/dmfi le/GovernmentRegulationNo2.pdf.
17       In an informal discussion on 15 May 2013 in Sydney, Australia, Indonesian 
Air Marshal (Rtd), Eris Herryanto, former Secretary General of Ministry of Defence 
indicated that the designation of east-west ASLs may compromise Indonesia’s 
national security. The discussion was in conjunction with the Australian–Indonesian 
Next Generation Defence and Security Forum, organised by the Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute (ASPI).
18       Head of Commission I of the Indonesian House of Representative (DPR), 
Mahfuz Sidiq, stated that the primary defence weapon system (Alutsista) of the 
Indonesian Navy is inadequate to guard and protect Indonesia’s ASLs. See, 
Sindonews, 27 December 2012, ‘Alutsista TNI AL minim, negara rugi Rp40 T’, 
[Navy’s Alutsista inadequate, Indonesia suffers IDR 40 trillion of loss], available at: 
http://nasional.sindonews.com/read/2012/12/27/14/701229/alutsista-tni-al-minim-
negara-rugi-rp40-t.
Yet, our contention is that as Indonesia grows in confi dence the 
issue of ASLP will be viewed prevailingly from a perspective of 
benefi t and obligation. As previously highlighted, designation of 
ASLs is commonly regarded as compensation for Indonesia’s 
recognition as an archipelagic state with sovereignty over 
archipelagic waters. Even though coastal states do not have 
to designate ASLs, strategic planners of national and foreign 
policy in Indonesia may conclude that such action is benefi cial 
for the following reasons. First, coastal states can focus only 
on particular routes when it comes to ensuring the safety and 
security of foreign vessel transit routes. Should ASLs not be 
designated, foreign vessels would then use a variety of possible 
routes normally used for international navigation. Such haphazard 
usage adds further complexity and the possibility of incidents 
at sea, thereby adding to the already complicated situation of 
navigation in archipelagic waters. Second, the designation of 
east–west ASLs could enhance Indonesia’s diplomatic position 
since maritime user states will view this as a collaborative and 
cooperative approach on the part of Indonesia, for example, 
in proposing to maritime user states potential collaborative 
initiatives that would benefi t Indonesia. Third, although there 
will be consequences for Indonesia when developing a strategy 
on how to ensure that the designation of east–west ASLs does 
not compromise Indonesia’s national interest, future strategic 
planners may see such a situation not as a challenge, but 
as a motivation for Indonesia to enhance its ability to ensure 
navigational safety in its archipelagic waters—a maritime zone 
considered to be one of the most important waterways not only 
for states in the region, but also for the world. 
Options for east–west ASL that Indonesia might consider 
could be derived from a combination of: fi rst, the proposals of 
Australia and the United States, subject to modifi cations and 
enhancements; and second, the informal proposal of an east–
west ASL option produced by an Indonesian Navy working 
group. By combining these proposals—namely, Australia’s 
claim to ‘normal international sea passages’ and Indonesia’s 
omission of east–west ASLs— it is possible to produce a 
relatively comprehensive proposal incorporating east–west 
ASLs. Figure 1(a) illustrates a combination of all proposals, views 
and suggestions, while Figure 1(b) depicts one possible option 
regarding ASLs for Indonesia, with an emphasis on the east–
west routes. It has to be noted that this is not the only possibility 
and this option is a consequence of using an approach that 
prioritises the need to minimise the number of routes. Such 
an approach might be viewed as an appropriate option for 
Indonesia to strike a balance between the convenience of 
navigation by foreign vessels and Indonesia’s obligations as a 
consequence of ASL designation.
Indonesia and the Law of the Sea: Beyond the archipelagic outlook 72
73 National Security College
OPERATIONALISING ASL DESIGNATION
To better manage its maritime zones, Indonesia’s boundary 
administration has to contend with three main issues: 
1. illegal activities occurring at boundary areas;
2. geospatial/technical issues; and 
3. information dissemination. 
The challenge regarding illegal activities revolves around the need 
to provide an adequate number of maritime patrol vessels and 
sufficient staff resources. Established maritime boundaries have 
to be monitored by both military and civilian officials possessing 
adequate knowledge and the necessary equipment. To 
safeguard such a large maritime boundary area, Indonesia would 
require substantial resources, but present levels of inventory 
and skilled staff remain woefully inadequate to this task.19 In 
addition to this, coordination is also an essential challenge. 
19       Defence Minister, Purnomo Yusgiantoro, admitted the need to improve 
facilities for the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). See: Jurnal Nasional, 22 August 
2011, ‘Menhan akan Modernisasi Alutsista’, [Defence Minister will modernise main 
weaponry system (Alutsista). available at: http://www.jurnas.com/news/37982/
Menhan_akan_Modernisasi_Alutsista/1/Nasional/Keamanan. See also ‘Buku Putih 
Pertahanan Indonesia 2008’, [Indonesia’s Defence White Paper 2008] (Jakarta: 
Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence, 2008).
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There are a variety of institutions that play an important role in 
safeguarding Indonesia’s maritime boundaries; without proper 
coordination among those institutions, functional confl ict occurs. 
Therefore, the role of the Maritime Security Coordinating Board 
(BIG, Bakorkamla, Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut)20 is vital 
in facilitating coordination among existing institutions. Should 
Bakorkamla fail in performing its coordinating tasks, it will 
become yet another institution hinders an already complex matrix 
of competing Indonesian actors.
For geospatial/technical issues, the primary challenge lies in 
providing adequate geospatial information for the purposes 
of boundary administration. A challenge for the Geospatial 
Information Agency (Badan Informasi Geospasial, BIG)21 and the 
Indonesian Navy’s Hydro-Oceanographic Offi ce (Dishidros, Dinas 
Hidro-Oseanografi  TNI-AL)22 is to provide charts with adequate 
technical specifi cations. While there is no legal requirement 
regarding the frequency with which charts depicting baselines 
and maritime boundaries should be updated, such charts need 
to be updated regularly to account for environmental changes 
so that reliable maps are available for safe navigation.23  This 
necessitates expensive fi eld surveys and cartographic processes, 
which of themselves are a challenge. Another challenge is how 
to defi ne the right geodetic data for maritime boundary treaties 
already concluded between Indonesia and its neighbours.24 
This will require intensive geospatial research involving various 
parameters and assumptions. Furthermore, the fi xing of data 
may in turn result in changes being made to existing treaties, 
thereby complicating the treaty making process.
Part of the challenge of information dissemination derives 
from the need to balance confi dentiality in information use 
with the urgency to educate relevant parties by providing as 
much accurate information as possible. Added to this is the 
challenge to express legal and technical matters concerning 
maritime boundaries in accessible language in order reach as 
broad an audience as possible. In this case, relevant parties in 
the government need to be aware that the means of conveying 
information is as important as its content.
20       See, ‘Vision, Mission, Tasks and Functions’ of Bakorkamla, available at: 
http://www.bakorkamla.go.id
21       See offi cial website of BIG: http://www.big.go.id
22       See offi cial website of Dishidros: http://www.dishidros.go.id
23       C. Schofi eld and I.M.A. Arsana., ‘Imaginary Islands? Options to Preserve 
Maritime Jurisdictional Entitlements and Provide Stable Maritime Limits in the Face 
of Coastal Instability‘. ABLOS Conference, Monaco, (2010), available at: http://
www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/ablos/
ABLOS10Folder/S2P1-P.pdf.
24       For an example of technical analysis relating to maritime boundary geodetic 
datum, see S. Lokita and A. Rimayanti., ‘The Solution Method for the Problem 
of the Geodetic Datum of the Territorial Sea Boundary between the Republic of 
Indonesia and the Republic of Singapore’.
Apart from the aforementioned challenges, opportunities 
also exist in the context of boundary administration. Disputes 
and incidents in relation to boundary issues may be viewed 
as opportunities to build awareness among relevant parties 
in the government and the public realm. By recognising the 
consequences of how improper boundary administration can 
compromise safety and security, relevant parties involved should 
realise that managing boundaries is as important as establishing 
them. This can, to an extent, accelerate and improve Indonesia’s 
maritime boundary management programme. Similarly, greater 
awareness among the public on the importance of boundary 
management can also generate pressure for the relevant 
government parties to take their job more seriously.
The establishment of the National Agency for Border 
Management (BNPP, Badan Nasional Pengelolaan Perbatasan) 
is the ideal recourse for the government of Indonesia to deal with 
boundary administration issues. However, apart from its idealistic 
objectives, there is considerable room for improvement of the 
agency’s roles, particularly its coordination responsibilities for 
border management in Indonesia. Capacity building remains one 
of the most important issues for the agency to address in order 
to perform its coordination function effectively.25 
CONCLUSION: GOING BEYOND THE 
ARCHIPELAGO OUTLOOK
Although the Archipelago Outlook provides Jakarta with the 
political legitimacy to exert a level of control over Indonesia’s 
internal waters and unite the archipelago, how is it relevant to 
the maritime environment beyond its shores? Despite all of its 
acclaims and accolades, the Archipelago Outlook is an inherently 
inward-looking concept. Its principal aim is to emphasise national 
unity out of diversity as a consequence of being an archipelagic 
nation; this refl ects a sense of fragility and vulnerability towards 
centrifugal forces capable of drawing the outlying islands away 
from Jakarta’s political control. However, this concept also ignores 
the fact that as Jakarta’s interests expand overseas, more than 
unity is required to safeguard the archipelago. It also supersedes 
the dynamic nature of a maritime strategic environment. The rise 
of maritime powers, operating within and outside the region, has 
placed increasing stress on Indonesia’s critical location at the 
maritime cross-roads of Asia, particularly in regard to the choke-
points and archipelagic sea lanes. In this context, the Archipelago 
Outlook in its current state has little to offer for Indonesia in 
enabling it to keep pace with the regional maritime strategic 
environment, let alone to shape and infl uence it. 
25       I.M.A. Arsana and S. Lokita, ‘Indonesia’s New Approach to Border 
Management’, in M.S. Zein, and IMA Arsana, Contribution Matters! 2.0: Insights of 
Indonesian Students in Australia, PPIA, Canberra, Australia, 2011, p. 168.
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We contend that in the coming decades Indonesia’s strategic 
planners of national and foreign policy will seek to address this 
anomaly by proactively managing their maritime environment. 
This is primarily because the future of Indonesia’s maritime 
environment will be characterised by several trends. First, 
the rise of Asian maritime powers will affect regional stability. 
The rapid economic growth of Asia has meant that the region 
has increased its political and military might. For the fi rst time 
in history, Asia has surpassed Europe in terms of defence 
expenditure.26 In Southeast Asia, the majority of defence 
expenditure will be incurred building a more capable and farther 
reaching maritime force.27 This will create new opportunities and 
challenges for regional security and stability. 
Second, simmering regional tensions emerging out of historical 
grievances and territorial disputes are increasingly compounded 
by rising nationalism and regional interstate trust defi cits. 
While the region has undergone rapid economic growth and 
interdependence, these trends have not reshaped the way 
regional states view sovereignty. On the contrary, regional states 
possess increasing military capability to entrench their hold 
on sovereignty, which make sensitive issues such as historical 
grievances and maritime disputes extremely complicated and 
diffi cult to resolve and to manage. 
Third, the rise of China and the role of the United States have 
added to the complexity of factors affecting regional stability. The 
rise of China has been welcomed in the region, as it has brought 
with it new diplomatic and economic alternatives, providing 
options for regional states previously dependent on the West. 
This is particularly so in the case of Indonesia, whose ‘free and 
active’ foreign policy discourages tendentious alignments with 
any major powers. However, regional states are equally wary 
about growing Chinese power and intentions, as China also 
displays ambitions for leadership and hegemony, while being 
perceived as aggressive whenever it comes to protecting its 
interests. Meanwhile, the United States, which has offi cially 
declared China a ‘peer competitor’, gives the impression of 
exploiting the situation as an opportunity renew its strategic 
military presence in Asia after a decade of being distracted 
and absorbed in confl icts in the Middle East. The rise of Asian 
maritime powers and simmering regional tensions will decide the 
future role of the United States in the region. 
26       See, http://www.voanews.com/content/asia-defense-spending/1527336.html.
27       See, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/07/us-defence-southeastasia-
idUSBRE8960JY20121007
Fifth, the evolving nature of non-traditional security challenges 
will also affect the future of Indonesia’s maritime environment. 
While major power competition is certainly a defi ning feature in 
the current strategic landscape, new security challenges warrant 
attention. The threats of piracy and sea robbery, terrorism, 
smuggling, and pollution remain increasingly problematic 
throughout the region. Multinational and cooperative efforts 
have sought to address such challenges, but due to their 
dynamic and evolving nature, new measures and initiatives 
must constantly be developed and implemented. For Indonesia, 
efforts to address non-traditional maritime security threats have 
often led to previously unforeseen types of regional engagement. 
‘Coordinated patrols’ organised with neighbouring countries 
have multiplied regional naval diplomatic initiatives and serve 
as another avenue in confi dence-building measures as regional 
navies increase in size and strength. As a consequence, the 
Indonesian Navy has participated in out-of-area deployments to 
counter piracy and illegal activities at sea in the Gulf of Aden and 
the Mediterranean Sea.28  
The last concern is that of Indonesia’s growing overseas 
interests. According to a recent McKinsey report, Indonesia is 
projected to be the seventh largest economy in the world in 
2030.29 It is currently the sixteenth largest economy in the world, 
and a member of the G20. Indonesia is also one of the world’s 
largest exporters of natural resources including coal, palm 
oil, and natural gas. For example, India and China have now 
become Indonesia’s largest coal and gas export destinations.30  
Indonesia also consumes more energy than in the past. It 
became a net oil importer in 2004, shipping the bulk of its oil 
from the Middle East. This is a clear indication that Indonesia’s 
economy is becoming increasingly intertwined with seaborne 
routes, and that disruptions to seaborne trade would deliver a 
severe blow to economic growth. 
28       The Indonesian Navy sent a naval task force to the Gulf of Aden in April 
2011 to rescue 20 Indonesian sailors held hostage by Somali pirates, while a 
permanent naval contingent is deployed in the Mediterranean Sea to support the 
UNIFIL-Maritime Task Force (UNIFIL-MTF) along the Lebanese maritime border. 
Available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/somali-pirates-release-indonesian-
ship----121086654/158016.html and http://www.antaranews
.com/en/news/82154/kri-hasanuddin-366-on-peace-mission-to-lebanon 
29       http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/asia/the_archipelago_
economy
30       http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/bisindonesia/indonesia-to-lead-coal-
export-growth-through-2020/444341
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These trends point to the outward-looking nature of Indonesia’s 
maritime strategic environment: such a perspective exceeds the 
scope of the Archipelago Outlook. Although these trends persist, 
Indonesia is presently bereft of an equivalent concept capable of 
combining them in an outward-looking projection of its regional 
and international infl uence. One offi cial has suggested the 
need for the adoption of an ‘archipelagic foreign policy’ that is 
refl ective of Indonesian geography as well as a desire to move 
beyond the inward-looking Archipelago Outlook, while remaining 
faithful to its ‘free and active‘ foreign policy principle.31  The 
effi cacy of archipelagic foreign policy can be seen in three ways. 
First, it is able to defi ne the priorities that meet archipelagic 
needs relating to issues of development, climate change, and 
food and energy security. Second, it can defi ne the choice of 
foreign policy instruments by using a maritime perspective, 
improving maritime connectivity in support of the development 
of Southeast Asian regional markets, and actively contributing 
to UN-sanctioned naval peace support operations. Third, by 
locating the meeting points between national security policy 
and foreign policy, it is capable of recognising that Indonesia 
warrants defence and security arrangements peculiar to its 
archipelagic geography. 
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INTRODUCTION
It has become fashionable in scholarly and even policymaking 
circles to describe Australia as a middle power.1 Middle 
powers, the argument goes, have particular qualities that not 
only distinguish them from other states, but which may provide 
the basis for cooperative relationships with each other. Indeed, 
a preference for collaboration within multilateral organisations 
is widely taken to be one of the hallmarks of contemporary 
middle powers.2 What distinguishes Australian foreign policy 
in this regard is that Australian policymakers have taken what 
was formerly a fairly obscure academic term and used it to 
defi ne Australia’s overall approach to international relations. 
After a long hiatus under the Howard Coalition government, the 
label was resurrected by Kevin Rudd and was enthusiastically 
adopted by Julia Gillard as the basis for her government’s 
foreign policy.3 
Although opinions vary about quite how useful the term ‘middle 
power’ actually is, even skeptics would have to concede that 
it has assumed a sudden salience in Australia. For better or 
worse, the fashion is spreading: one of the consequences of 
the remarkable economic transformation of East Asia has been 
a concomitant rise in the number of increasingly prosperous, 
potential middle powers in the region. While not actually using 
the term, Indonesian Foreign Minister Natalegawa’s statement 
that ‘in any international forum, including ASEAN and the G20, 
Indonesia will bridge different visions between nation-states 
and show Indonesia’s moderate and strong views’, captures 
the predilection of middle powers for multilateral cooperation.4 
Although there is no complete agreement on what precisely 
makes a middle power, the position of such a power in the 
international hierarchy of states and its diplomatic behavior 
are generally thought to be pivotal. In this regard Australia is 
comfortably in the world’s top twenty economies; it possesses 
a not-insignifi cant strategic capacity; and maintains a track 
record of activist, multilateral diplomacy. So, too, do a number 
of its neighbours.
No country is more signifi cant in this regard than Indonesia. 
Not only has Indonesia rapidly joined Australia in the 
world’s economic top twenty, and may soon overtake it, 
but increasingly it functions as a prominent member of the 
international community. Like the idea of middle powers, 
this phrase is less illuminating than we might wish,5 but it 
1       C. Ungerer, ‘The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy’, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, 53(4): pp. 538–51.
2       A.F. Cooper, R.A. Higgott, and K.R. Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: 
Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne 
University Press, 1993).
3       K. Rudd, ‘Advancing Australia’s Global and Regional Economic Interests’. 
Address to the East Asia Forum, March 26; Commonwealth of Australia (2012) 
Australia in the Asian Century, (CoA: Canberra, 2008).
4       Y. Hermawan et al., ‘The Role of Indonesia in the G20: Background, Role and 
Objectives of Indonesia’s membership’, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, available at: www.
g20.utoronto.ca/biblio/role-of-indonesia-2011.pdf accessed 15 December 2012. 
5       C.E. David, ‘On the Possibility of “International Community”’, International 
Studies Review, 11(1): 1–26.
is suggestive of those states that aspire to greater foreign 
policy prominence. In this context the possible importance 
of the middle power label is potentially even more signifi cant 
for Indonesia than it is for Australia: no longer quite as 
preoccupied with maintaining internal stability, newly enriched, 
and internationally recognised as  fi rst among notional equals 
in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has begun to assume a more 
prominent international profi le.6 The marker of its transition 
from a Southeast Asian power to one with global heft was, 
like Australia, its accession to the G20. Before trying to decide 
whether this will change Indonesia’s relationship with Australia 
– or the rest of Southeast Asia, for that matter – it is useful to 
say something about the historical context in which the bilateral 
relationship has evolved.
THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP
The bilateral relationship between Australia and Indonesia 
is becoming increasingly important. In part, this refl ects 
Indonesia’s growing economic and strategic weight in the 
region as its most populous state, and one that is Islamic. 
The nightmare at the back of Australian minds—especially in 
the aftermath of S11 and the Bali bombings—has been that 
Indonesia’s rather relaxed version of Islamism might become 
radicalised. Thus far, there are few signs of this occurring. The 
security cooperation between Australia and Indonesia and 
the success of counter-terrorism operations is testimony to 
deepening of the relationship, even if it reinforces unfortunate 
stereotypes about Australia coming to the aid of its fragile 
neighbour.7 However, things have not always been as cordial as 
this, and there is no guarantee that they will remain so.
It is important to remember that for most of Indonesia’s 
relatively brief history as an independent state, middle power 
status looked unlikely. Although it is not clear whether aspiring 
middle powers need to be democratic, it plainly adds a degree 
of legitimacy that greases diplomatic wheels for those that are.8 
Indonesia, by contrast, has until recently been ruled by Suharto, 
with whom Australian policymakers had considerable diffi culty 
convincing a skeptical public of the merits of establishing close 
ties. Nevertheless, a key part of Paul Keating’s ‘engagement’ 
with Asia was the attempt to ‘throw in Australia’s lot with 
Indonesia in a more committed and unreserved way than ever 
before’.9 Rejection of the Keating agenda in the 1996 election 
is a reminder of the diffi culty of translating major foreign policy 
initiatives into saleable elements of domestic public policy. 
6       E.A. Laksmana, ‘Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profi le: Does Size 
Really Matter?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, (2011), 32(2): pp. 157–183.
7       R. Chauvel, ‘Australia and Indonesia: living in different strategic worlds’, in 
D. McDougall and P. Shearman (eds.), Australian security after 9/11: new and old 
agendas, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 145 and 159.
8       T.L. Chapman, ‘Audience beliefs and international organization legitimacy’, 
International Organization 63(04): (2009), pp. 733–764; R.B. Hall (1997) ‘Moral 
authority as a power resource’, International Organization 51(4): pp. 591–622.
9       R. Dalrymple, Continental drift: Australia’s search for a regional identity, 
(Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2003).
The great hope now is that a democratic Indonesia—arguably 
more structurally integrated in capitalist markets than before—
will prove to be a reliable and acceptable partner. While this may 
eventually prove to be the case, it is important to remember that 
the nature of the future relationship is far from certain and—
when judged from the self-interested calculus of realpolitik—the 
old relationship has not been without its merits. Unattractive as 
the Suharto regime may have been in many ways, it had two 
great redeeming features as far as Australian policymakers were 
concerned: predictability and stability. For decades, Suharto 
maintained domestic order and thus minimised the potential 
threat posed by a chaotic, destabilised Indonesia. While the 
direct military threat posed by Indonesia may have been 
modest, even this could be discounted in the knowledge that 
its primary strategic focus was internal. Keating pragmatically 
noted that ‘Suharto is the best thing in strategic terms that had 
happened for Australia; by bringing stability to the archipelago 
he has minimised the Australian defence budget’.10
One of the disadvantages of Indonesia’s democratic transition 
from the perspective of Canberra is that policymaking in 
Indonesia has become more complex. More actors and 
potential ‘veto players’ are involved in the construction of 
foreign policy in democratic Indonesia, and as a consequence 
this necessarily makes it less predictable.11 Authoritarianism 
in Indonesia was not without its attractions, for it dovetailed 
with Australia’s anxiety about Asia. It is not necessary to 
become bogged down in relatively arcane debates about the 
construction of national identities to recognise that Australia’s 
Western social and political heritage is a potential source of 
friction when juxtaposed with Asia. The focus of such tensions 
has often been human rights issues, about which critics argue 
successive Australian governments have maintained a studious 
silence.12 National interests, the argument goes, routinely trump 
ethical principles.
Yet, the calculus of national interests is equally complex in 
Indonesia.13 Views about Australia generally and the best 
way to conduct bilateral ties refl ect this underlying reality. Kai 
He argues that different calibrations of international pressure 
combine with the political legitimacy of the relevant post-Suharto 
administration to determine patterns of state behaviour across 
policy issues.14 Those aspects of Australia represented by its 
unrelenting pressure on Indonesia to contribute to programs 
10      M. Boyle, ‘Policy-making and pragmatism: Australia’s management of 
security cooperation with Indonesia during the new order period’, UNSW / ADFA 
PhD thesis, (2002), p. 334.
11       J. Ruland, ‘Deepening ASEAN cooperation through democratization? The 
Indonesian legislature and foreign policymaking, International Relations of the Asia–
Pacifi c’, (9) pp. 373–402; P. Sulistiyanto (2010), ‘Indonesia–Australia relations in the 
era of democracy: the view from the Indonesian side’, Australian Journal of Political 
Science, 45 (1), pp. 117– 32.
12       A. Burke, ‘Questions of community: Australian identity and Asian change’, 
Australian Journal of Political Science, 45 (1), (2010), p. 80.
13       On the construction of national interests, see J. Weldes, ‘Constructing national 
interests’, European Journal of International Relations, 2(3), (1996), pp. 275–318.
14       K. He, ‘Indonesia’s foreign policy after Soeharto: international pressure, 
democratization, and policy change’, International Relations of the Asia–Pacifi c, 8 
(1), (2008), p. 49.
of deterring asylum-seekers, and as a potential ally to hedge 
against the rise of China, elicit different responses from within 
Indonesia. In this regard, Southeast Asian states are no different 
to their counterparts elsewhere and refl ect contingent struggles 
for power and the expression of competing interests.15 
COMPETING INTERESTS
For Indonesia and especially Australia, relations with other 
countries are more important than relations with each other. 
Despite talk about the commonalities that supposedly exist 
between—if not actually unite—middle powers, the reality 
is more prosaic and raises questions about how much the 
international system has changed. Although there is much 
animated discussion about the rise of the BRICs and the 
possible inclusion of Indonesia in an expanded BRIICs (Brazil, 
Russia, India, Indonesia, China, South Africa),16 at this stage 
much about the international system looks surprisingly familiar 
and the foreign policies of Australia and Indonesia continue to 
refl ect this. 
For Australia in particular, its principal economic and strategic 
relations lie elsewhere. China has rapidly become Australia’s 
main trade partner and the United States remains its foremost 
security guarantor. Indeed, relations with the United States 
dominate all other foreign policy concerns, including how it 
manages its relations with China and the rest of the region.17 
The recent decision to station troops in Darwin was part of 
Australia’s long-running policy of strategically binding itself to the 
dominant Western power of the era. It was not only the Chinese 
who predictably expressed indignation at this turn of events.18  
Indonesia also expressed surprise at the development of a 
major military base on its doorstep,19 even though the primary 
intent of the base was to curb Chinese, rather than Indonesian 
infl uence. The point to emphasise is that many of Australia’s 
most important bilateral relationships remain subordinate to 
those with the United States, arguably circumscribing Australia’s 
policymaking autonomy as a consequence.
15       L. Jones (2009) ‘Democratisation and foreign policy in Southeast Asia: the 
case of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus’, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 22 (3), (2008), p. 391.
16       K. Brooks, ‘Is Indonesia bound for the BRICS? How stalling reform could 
hold Jakarta back’, Foreign Affairs 90(6), (2011), pp. 109–118.
17       M. Beeson, ‘Can Australia save the world? The limits and possibilities of 
middle power diplomacy’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 65(5), (2011), 
pp. 563–577.
18       M. Sainsbury, ‘Chinese grilling has Stephen Smith on defensive over US 
ties’, The Australian, 7 June (2012).
19       S. McDonald and H. Brown, ‘China, Indonesia wary of US troops in Darwin’, 
ABC News, (2011), available at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-11-17/china-
indonesia-wary-of-us-troops-in-darwin/3675866, accessed 15 December 2012.
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But for Indonesia, too, relations with other states complicate 
bilateral relations. In Indonesia’s case the primary independent 
variable is ASEAN. For all of the states of Southeast Asia, 
ASEAN has had historical importance as a vehicle with which to 
manage sometimes fractious intra-regional relations, reinforcing 
domestic sovereignty, and generally raising the international 
profi le and signifi cance of the entire Southeast Asian region.20 
Recently, however, the famed ASEAN consensus has begun to 
unravel and the organisation has appeared increasingly unable 
to respond to a rapidly changing regional environment – much 
to the frustration of some of its more progressive members, 
such as Indonesia.21 
In such circumstances, Indonesia has begun to look beyond the 
region to pursue its increasingly broad-ranging and ambitious 
foreign policy goals. Indonesia is routinely considered to be one 
of the more consequential actors in the region, something its 
growing economic presence and status as the world’s largest 
Muslim country has reinforced. Not all Indonesians agree with 
this shift of emphasis or Indonesia’s evolving foreign policy 
priorities, something that is manifest in Indonesia’s inconsistent 
international stance. When thwarted by its more authoritarian 
neighbours, Jakarta has advocated internationalism in the form 
of a peacekeeping force in an ASEAN Security Community 
underpinned by liberal-democratic norms. However, its 
reticence in ratifying the ASEAN Transboundary Pollution 
Agreement, citing ‘national interests’, is a reminder of the 
continuing domestic constraints on policy.22 This is making 
Australia’s increasingly important neighbour less predictable 
in some ways. For admirers of middle power theory, this may 
come as something of a surprise, but it is a reminder of how 
varied conceptions of ‘national interests’ can be, and just how 
much national priorities can be shaped by parochial concerns.
20       S. Narine, Explaining Asean: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2002).
21       P. Barta and C. Tejada, ‘Sea dispute upends Asian summit’, Wall Street 
Journal, 15 July 2012.
22       A. Acharya, Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN 
and the problem of regional order, 2nd edition, (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 
2009), PP. 254 and 265.
STILL STRANGE NEIGHBOURS?
One of the problems facing both Indonesia and Australia is that 
it is often assumed that there is a relatively clear sense of the 
national interest when it comes to international relations. And 
yet, whether we consider specifi c bilateral ties or a more general 
international role, there is often intense national debate regarding 
the content of foreign policy and the best venues for prosecuting 
it. In Australia’s case, this was most evident during the Howard 
era, when the former prime minister and his foreign minister 
Alexander Downer displayed a marked preference for bilateral, 
rather than multilateral relationships where possible.23 In part 
this refl ected heightened skepticism over the role and value of 
institutions such as the United Nations. It was also partially an 
expression of the Howard government’s intense strategic loyalty 
to and ideological affi nity with the administration of George W. 
Bush. But even if we acknowledge that this was an especially 
controversial geopolitical period, the idea that Australia might 
have had particular interests that fl owed primarily from its 
position as a middle power looked inherently implausible.
As we have seen, the Gillard government has continued the 
Howard government policy of cultivating close strategic ties with 
the United States. But even in an arena where we might expect 
Australia to take a more independent line and unambiguously 
establish its independent middle-power credentials, reality 
indicates otherwise. Australia’s successful campaign to obtain 
a temporary seat on the UN Security Council might mark an 
important vote of confi dence in one of the world’s premier 
multinational organisations, but it is unlikely to result in policies 
that are out of kilter with an established pattern of strategic and 
even ideational dependency.24 The idea that Australia would 
take a position at odds with the United States or  key US allies 
such as Israel is almost unthinkable.
Interestingly, there are signs that newly democratic Indonesia 
may be more capable of assuming an independent position on 
key issues than Australia. In some ways Indonesia is fortunate 
that it is not directly involved in the growing territorial disputes 
with China to the extent of some of its fellow ASEAN members 
such as the Philippines and Vietnam.25 But as noted, this 
has only served to highlight the differences between ASEAN 
members and to heighten Indonesia’s growing frustration. 
Indonesia is also unconstrained by long-term strategic 
dependence of the sort that Australia maintains with the United 
States. Although this confers some notional freedom of action, 
that action is limited by Indonesia’s recognised need to take the 
actions and preferences of the great powers inside and outside 
its region seriously.26
23       M. Wesley, ‘The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia 1996–2006’, 
(Sydney: ABC Books, 2007).
24       R. Peake, ‘Council seat demands independent thinking’, (Canberra Times, 
20 October 2012).
25       I. Storey, ‘Asean Is a house divided’, Wall Street Journal, 14 June 2012.
26       D. Novotny, ‘Torn between America and China: Elite Perceptions And 
Indonesian Foreign Policy’, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010).
Even where we might expect the greatest potential for 
collaboration to exist, hegemonic priorities and expectations 
continue to impose limitations. The G20, which pivots on 
the ‘compromise’ between developed and ‘systemically 
important’ emerging economies,27 is a new institution of which 
both Australian and Indonesian policymakers are delighted 
to be a part. Schirm’s analysis of contestations within the 
G20 suggests that new thinking and alignments may be able 
to overcome divisions between industrialised and emerging 
states, auguring well for Australia–Indonesia cooperation if 
true.28 Their joint convening of the ‘Growth with resilience’ 
chapter of the G20 development working group during 2011, 
focusing on ‘social protection’, is illustrative of converging 
expectations about how politics should govern economies: 
expectations that are only tepidly shared by the G7. Likewise, 
the G20 potentially offers a venue in which Indonesia in 
particular can escape the frustrations and limited scope of 
ASEAN. But as far as the Group’s ostensible rationale of 
reforming the international fi nancial system is concerned, little 
of consequence has changed—a circumstance that refl ects the 
continuing infl uence of the United States, Wall Street, and the 
sheer diffi culty of achieving consensus on needed reforms.29 
As Australian offi cials have also discovered, while it may be 
gratifying to have a seat at the international table, with the 
chance to put one’s views, this is no guarantee that they will be 
taken seriously or make a difference.30
There are a number of other emerging multilateral organisations 
that have the potential to infl uence the development of the 
region in which both Australia and Indonesia are members. In 
some ways, Australia has more at stake in a regional context 
than does Indonesia. After all, Indonesia is securely embedded 
in, if not the de facto leader of, the region’s most established 
grouping: ASEAN. Australia, by contrast, is potentially an 
outsider, which makes the very defi nition of the ‘the region’ and 
its putative membership far more consequential.31 Although 
Australia has abandoned Kevin Rudd’s brainchild – the Asia 
Pacifi c Community – the consolidation of the East Asian Summit 
achieves essentially the same goals: not only is Australia in, but 
so, too, is the United States. 
27       S. Soederberg, ‘The politics of representation and fi nancial fetishism: the 
case of the G20 summits’, Third World Quarterly, 31 (4), (2010), p. 529.
28       S. Schirm, (forthcoming), ‘Global politics are domestic politics: a societal 
approach to divergence in the G20’, Review of International Studies, p. 2.
29       M. Beeson, and S. Bell, ‘The G-20 and International Economic Governance: 
Hegemony, collectivism, or both?’, Global Governance, 15(1), (2009), pp. 67–86.
30       R.H. Wade, ‘Emerging World Order? From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the 
G20, the World Bank, and the IMF’, Politics & Society, 39(3), (2011), pp. 347–378.
31       See: M. Beeson, ‘American Hegemony and Regionalism: The Rise of East 
Asia and the End of the Asia–Pacifi c’, Geopolitics 11(4), (2006), pp. 541–560; 
Higgott and Nossal, ‘Odd man in, odd man out: Australia’s liminal position in Asia 
revisited – a reply to Ann Capling’, Pacifi c Review, 21 (5), (2008), pp. 623–634.
Indonesia’s policy towards the EAS, especially in retaining 
Washington’s external balancing role, is remarkably similar to 
Australia’s, despite a notionally independent ‘free and active’ 
(bebas dan aktif) foreign policy. Indeed, Canberra and Jakarta 
have a broadly similar view of the possible benefi ts of continuing 
American dominance and engagement in underpinning regional 
order. Nevertheless, they struggle to act in concert to bring 
this about. This is in part because of what Hugh White calls 
Canberra’s ‘strategic ambivalence’ towards Indonesia, and 
the importance Australian policymakers attach to the alliance 
with the United States above all else.32 The notion of ‘strategic 
ambivalence’ conveys something important about Australian 
policymakers’ historical attitudes towards its most immediate 
and consequential neighbour: whether Indonesia is strong or 
weak, it is a source of concern for many in Canberra. Therefore, 
despite Paul Keating’s recent call for much closer ties with 
Indonesia,33 there remain real limits to the degree of cooperation 
that is possible, either bilaterally or through multilateral auspices. 
The point to emphasise, once again, is that Australia and 
Indonesia maintain considerably dissimilar priorities and foreign 
policy goals. This should come as no surprise, of course, to 
observers with a sense of the distinctive histories of the two 
countries. For all the fashionable talk concerning the possibilities 
of policy ‘convergence’,34 which is often implicit in discussions 
of middle powers, it is also plain that the contemporary 
policymaking context and dynamics in Australia and Indonesia 
remain very different – the latter’s transition to democracy 
notwithstanding. Democracies may not fi ght each other as often 
as they do other regimes,35 but this is not necessarily because 
their leaders subscribe to similar world views. Much the 
same can be said of middle powers. Indeed, it is striking that 
Australia—a democracy and middle power of some standing—
retains what Edward Luttwak describes as ‘the Anglo-Saxon 
trait of bellicosity.’36 In other words, Australia’s participation in 
every recent war of note and Indonesia’s relative quiescence 
cannot simply be interpreted as the result of their respective 
international circumstances. On the contrary, the foreign policies 
of middle powers—like those of any others—continue to refl ect 
a complex, contingent amalgam of historical and contemporary 
infl uences. What distinguishes them as a group is their relatively 
limited ability to implement them. Similarly positioned and 
endowed states could collaborate; whether they will is more an 
expression of agency than structure.
32       H. White, ‘The New Australia–Indonesia Strategic Relationship: A Note of 
Caution’, in J. Monfries (ed.), Different societies, shared futures: Australia, Indonesia 
and the region, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p. 45.
33       P.J. Keating, ‘Asia in the New Order: Australia’s Diminishing Sphere of 
Infl uence’, The Keith Murdoch Oration, (State Library of Victoria, 14 November 2012).
34       C. Xun, ‘Global Networks and Domestic Policy Convergence: A Network 
Explanation of Policy Changes’, World Politics 64(03), (2012), pp. 375–425.
35       B.M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a post-Cold 
War World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
36       E.N. Luttwak, The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy, (Cambridge, 
Mass: The Belknap Press, 2012), p. 107.
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INTRODUCTION
At 244.5 million people, Indonesia is now ten times more 
populous than Australia. Moreover, Indonesia’s middle class is 
larger than Australia’s entire population and Indonesia’s economy 
is now over thirty per cent larger than Australia’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in Purchasing Power Parity terms (PPP). While 
scholars continue to debate whether Indonesia will rise to 
become a major power,1 Indonesia is almost destined to become 
the more powerful partner in the Indonesia–Australia relationship. 
Importantly, the separation of Australia’s mainland from Indonesia 
by only 240 kilometres of ocean means that the two countries 
share strong security interdependencies. However, such 
proximity also delivers added effi ciencies and potential for future 
economic relations. While much analysis has focused on specifi c 
relational problems, such as the situation in West Papua, there 
has been very little recent literature on the broader relationship. 
Therefore, this issue brief assesses the current state-of-affairs in 
the relationship and the key challenges to address in the future. 
The fi rst section focuses on the political and security sphere, 
while the second section analyses how any associated progress 
is underpinned (and potentially undermined) by socio-cultural 
and economic links. The fi nal section examines some of the key 
implications for future policy. 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AND 
SECURITY RELATIONS
Despite some historically alarmist voices in Australia’s public 
sphere,2 neither Indonesia nor Australia represents a traditional 
security threat for the other. Rather, both the academic and policy 
communities of Australia have increasingly recognised Indonesia’s 
strategic role as a buffer against future aggression and that, 
more broadly, ‘a positive relationship with Indonesia contributes 
profoundly to Australia’s overall security’ – a contention that was 
explicitly recognised in Australia’s ‘National Security Strategy’ 
and ‘Asian Century White Paper’.3 In this vein, Australia and 
Indonesia negotiated the Lombok Treaty in 2006 (ratifi ed in 2008) 
which commits the two countries to support each other’s unity 
and territorial integrity and to refrain from the threat or use of 
force. This has since been reinforced by the September 2012 
Defence Cooperation Arrangement which provides, in the words 
of then Minister for Defence Stephen Smith, a ‘formal framework 
1      For example, the following provides informative analysis: Donald K. 
Emmerson, ‘Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends’. In Anthony Reid (ed.), Indonesia 
Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012), pp. 
77–92.
2      For a detailed account on this subject, see: Anthony Burke, Fear of Security: 
Australia’s Invasion Anxiety (Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2008); 
Emmerson, ‘Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends’.
3      Emphasis by authors. ‘Australia’s National Security Strategy’. (Canberra: 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2013), p.12. ‘Australia in the Asian 
Century: White Paper’. (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2012), p. 25.. 
See also: Hugh White, ‘Northern Exposure: What the Rise of Indonesia Means for 
Australia’. Monthly (2013).
for practical Defence cooperation under the Lombok Treaty’.4 
Moreover, the relationship was elevated to a ‘strategic partnership’ 
in March 2010.5  
As a partial consequence of these developments, by 2013 the 
level of bilateral defence engagement had reached its highest 
level in over fi fteen years. Examples include a third Coordinated 
Maritime Patrol of the joint maritime borders by the Indonesian 
and Australian navies; Indonesia’s fi rst-time participation in the 
multi-nation Exercise Pitch Black;6 the fi rst bilateral peacekeeping 
exercise (May 2013);7 the strengthening of search and rescue 
coordination;8 and continued offi cer and English language 
training through the Bilateral Defence Cooperation Program.9 
Following the devastating 2004 tsunami, Australia’s military 
worked alongside Indonesia’s military in the emergency relief 
effort and the Australian government responded through the 
provision of more than $1 billion in aid. More recently, Australia 
donated four C-130H Hercules transport aircraft to Indonesia 
and, in April 2013, Australia agreed to sell a further fi ve of the 
aircraft on a discounted basis.10 Discussions have been held 
concerning ‘possible defence industry co-operation’ and Jane’s 
Defence Weekly suggested that this is likely to include the joint 
development of patrol boats in addition to Australian exports 
of naval systems and military electronics.11 Critically, should 
Indonesia continue to ascend, the next few decades will witness 
a paradigm shift in its capacity to not only participate in joint 
exercises but to also lead them.  
4      Stephen Smith, ‘Australia and Indonesia: Strategic Partners’. Australian 
Department of Defence, http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/09/04/minister-
for-defence-australia-and-indonesia-strategic-partners/. The previous treaty 
between Australia and Indonesia was unilaterally revoked by Jakarta in 1999 due 
to tensions over Australia’s support for East Timor’s independence from Indonesia. 
See also: ‘Indonesia, Australia Consent to Enhance Defence Cooperation’. 
Indonesia Government News, 4 April 2013. ‘Australia-Indonesia Annual Leaders’ 
Meeting’. Commonwealth of Australia, www.pm.gov.au/press-offi ce/joint-
communique.
5      Indonesia Country Brief’. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, http://www.
dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/indonesia_brief.html.
6      Other participants included Singapore, Thailand, New Zealand and the United 
States. ‘Exercise Pitch Black 12 Begins’. Australian Department of Defence, http://
www.defence.gov.au/defencenews/stories/2012/jul/0727.htm.
7      ‘Australia and Indonesia Militaries Participate in the Inaugural Bilateral 
Peacekeeping Exercise, Garuda Kookaburra’. Australian Department of Defence, 
http://news.defence.gov.au/2013/05/17/australia-and-indonesia-militaries-
participate-in-the-inaugural-bilateral-peacekeeping-exercise-garuda-kookaburra/.
8      ‘Minister for Defence, Minister for Infrastructure and Transport and Minister 
for Home Affairs – Joint Media Release – Strengthening Australia-Indonesia Search 
and Rescue Coordination’. Australian Department of Defence, http://www.minister.
defence.gov.au/2012/09/04/minister-for-defence-minister-for-infrastructure-and-
transport-and-minister-for-home-affairs-joint-media-release-strengthening-australia-
indonesia-search-and-rescue-coordination/
9      ‘Defence Minister Completes Indonesia Visit’. Australian Department of 
Defence, http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/09/05/defence-minister-
completes-indonesia-visit/.
10      ‘Jakarta to Buy More Hercules’. Flight International, 6 August 2013.
11      ‘Australia and Indonesia Signal Intent to Collaborate in Defence Industry’. 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 September 2012.
Heightened collaboration between the two countries has been 
rendered all the more important due to the shifting strategic 
order of Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacifi c. The 
future of this order is becoming increasingly uncertain due to 
the continuation of various disputes such as the South China 
Sea and an associated increase to great power rivalry (i.e., 
between the United States and China).12 Consequently, Australia 
and Indonesia have sought to hedge against such rivalry and 
Australia has particularly benefi ted from Indonesia’s strong 
support for its inclusion in the East Asia Summit (EAS). While 
there are a number of limitations to this institution, the eighteen 
member EAS is now the premier leaders’ forum in which to 
discuss a broad range of security issues.13 Moreover, Indonesia 
is central to Australia’s diplomacy through the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and sound relations will be 
mutually benefi cial for multilateral diplomacy in APEC, the Group 
of 20, and various United Nations forums.14
While the political systems in Indonesia and in Australia are far 
from perfect, the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia has 
led to a convergence of certain social and political values. For 
example, Indonesia now has a fl ourishing civil society and a 
highly active media.15 Meanwhile, the country’s political elite – 
particularly within the President’s offi ce, Foreign Ministry (Kemlu), 
and segments of the military16 – have also fi rmly embraced 
Indonesia’s new identity as a democratic nation. This identity has 
signifi cantly affected the nature of Indonesia’s foreign policy and 
the political and social values that implicitly underpin it. Today, 
Indonesia is a like-minded partner in many regional and global 
affairs including environmental activism (e.g., climate change), 
the promotion of interfaith dialogue, transnational crime and 
irregular migration (e.g., the Bali Process), the promotion of 
democracy and human rights (e.g., the Bali Democracy Forum), 
and its active and constructive diplomacy over highly volatile 
issues such as Iran.17
12      For an overview, see: Christopher Roberts, ‘The Future of East and 
Southeast Asian Regionalism’. in East and Southeast Asia: International Relations 
and Security Perspectives, ed. Andrew Tan (London: Routledge, 2013).
13      Its membership also includes India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and 
all ten of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations members.
14      Ramesh Thakur, ‘Australia, Indonesia Moving as Close as Perceptions Allow’. 
The Japan Times, 2 May 2013. For an in-depth analysis of Indonesia’s signifi cance 
in ASEAN, see Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values 
and Institutionalisation (Milton Park: Routledge, 2012).
15      For an overview of how Indonesia’s democratic transition has affected 
its political values and foreign policy, see: ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, 
Values and Institutionalisation, pp.102-26; ‘State Weakness and Political Values: 
Ramifi cations for the ASEAN Community’. in ASEAN and the Institutionalization of 
East Asia, ed. Ralf Emmers (Milton Park: Routledge, 2012), pp.11-26.
16      Interviews by Christopher Roberts in Jakarta during the course of seven fi eld 
trips between 2006 and 2012. In the context of the military, see also Jorn Dosch, 
The Changing Dynamics of Southeast Asian Politics (London: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 
pp.39-40.
17      For example, Indonesia offered to mediate on the deadlock between Iran, 
the United States, and the European Union concerning the alleged development of 
nuclear weapons. Ellen Nakashima, ‘Indonesia Offers to Mediate Talks with Iran’. 
The Washington Post, 11 May 2006.
The extent to which an intersection of interests has emerged 
was exemplifi ed when the Indonesian government requested 
that Australia ask the United States, on its behalf, whether 
it would be interested in receiving a battalion of Indonesian 
peacekeepers in Iraq. While President Bush imprudently 
declined the offer, Jakarta’s approach provides an example 
of how Australia’s alliance with the United States has been 
interpreted, in some quarters, as expedient for Indonesia.18 
Jakarta had also been appreciative of broader Australian 
support for closer relations between the United States and 
Indonesia, a strategy that Australia had promoted based on 
Indonesia’s rise as a democracy and its stature as the world’s 
largest Muslim nation.19 These developments refl ect the fact 
that in practice it has been diffi cult for Indonesia to adhere to its 
offi cial policy of non-alignment.20 While Indonesia has also been 
pursuing closer relations with China,21 progress in the security 
sphere will be diffi cult so long as its democratic identity renders 
its values and interests more compatible with Western and other 
democratic powers.
Through to October 2013, when various leaks about Australian 
intelligence surveillance emerged (discussed below), cooperation 
over a range of non-traditional security issues had also been 
rising. For example, Australia views cooperation with Indonesia 
on terrorism as vital to the security of its people at home and 
abroad, while Indonesia shares similar perceptions together 
with concern over the nexus between terrorist acts and anti-
government and insurgency movements.22 Consequently, a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Counter-terrorism – with 
cooperation between Australia’s Special Air Services (SAS) and 
Indonesia’s Detachment 88 within Kopassus – was proposed 
just a few months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and was 
reaffi rmed within days of the October 2002 Bali bombings.23 
18     Alexander Downer, ‘Australia Retreats from Asia’. Asialink 3, no. 4 (2011): p.2.
19      Ibid. The US and Indonesia have since entered into discussions concerning a 
comprehensive partnership with the potential for six agreements concerning oil and 
gas exploration, energy, forestry, agriculture and natural resources more broadly 
(check status of this). Hanson, op. cit., p. 4
20      Donald K Emmerson, ‘Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends’, in Indonesia Rising: 
The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, ed. Anthony Reid (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012) 
pp.65-68. See also: Ristian A. Supriyanto, ‘Rebalancing and Indonesia: US Pacifi c 
Presence Will Force Jakarta to Choose’. Defence News International, 8 July 2013.
21      This goal has been symbolised by the joint declaration on ‘Building a 
Strategic Partnership’ in April 2005 and reinforced by other developments including 
the fi rst joint exercise between the special forces of Indonesia and China in June 
2011. ‘External Affairs, Indonesia’. Jane’s Intelligence 2013.
22      Sidney Jones, ‘Papuan ‘Seperatists’ vs Jihadi ‘Terrorists‘: Indonesian Policy 
Dilemmas’. International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-
type/speeches/2013/jones-papuan-separatists.aspx.
23 ‘Australia, Indonesia Agree to Joint Probe’. ABC, 16 October 2002; 
Ian Henderson and Don Greenlees, ‘Megawati, PM Frame Pact on Terrorism’. 
Australian, 7 February 2002. However, due to concerns about human rights 
abuses, it was not until 2005 that Australia lifted its ban on joint training and military 
cooperation with Kopassus. Peter Alford, ‘Anti-Terrorism Role for Indonesian Army’. 
Ibid., 19 October 2010.
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Counter-terrorist (CT) cooperation also steadily matured through 
to October 2013, leading to ‘wide ranging partnerships’ between 
Indonesian and Australian agencies in intelligence, defence, 
transport and border security, CT fi nancing, criminal justice, legal 
framework development, and law enforcement.24 In the case of 
law enforcement, a key development has been establishment of 
the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC). 
Here, Australia’s Federal Police had been working alongside 
Indonesia’s police in the development and provision of intensive 
law enforcement training regarding terrorism and transnational 
crime. By 2012, the center had trained 12,900 offi cials from 
59 countries through 540 courses.25 The increased capacity of 
Indonesia to combat both domestic and international terrorist 
threats is refl ected in the fact that that there has been more 
than 800 terrorist-related arrests and over 600 convictions since 
2002.26 Should Australia continue to provide comprehensive 
support through inter-agency collaboration and aid (discussed 
below), then this will further strengthen Indonesia’s capacity to 
respond to these challenges in the future.
Notwithstanding these positive achievements, much more 
needs to be done before the two countries’ political relations 
can reach their full potential. Here, Sabam Siagian and 
Endy Bayuni argue that Australia’s own efforts have not 
been reciprocated by Jakarta, and this is demonstrated by 
the absence of a comprehensive policy on its relationship 
with Canberra together with its tendency to take Australia 
for granted until intermittent incidents when fl ashpoints 
occur.27 Aside from the socio-cultural dimension discussed 
below, this tendency has also been reinforced by Indonesia’s 
preoccupation with nation-building, a historical focus on 
security to the north and, in more recent times, increased 
competition by the great powers who have been vying for 
infl uence and improved relations with an ascending Indonesia.28 
Nonetheless, Australia’s role in Timor Leste did demonstrate, 
for better or worse, the signifi cance of Australia for Indonesia, 
and there have been subsequent signs that Jakarta is starting 
to adopt a more proactive role in the relationship.
A further problem concerns the nature of political discourse 
in Australia. During the Howard Government, some 
particularly provocative announcements included Australia’s 
self-proclaimed right to launch pre-emptive strikes against 
terrorists in other countries, and the projection of a 1,000 mile 
Maritime Identifi cation Zone into Indonesian territorial waters.29 
The subsequent Labor government made comparably 
provocative announcements, such as Prime Minister Gillard’s 
determination that East Timor would process asylum seekers; 
the later ‘PNG solution’; trade issues including bans on 
24      ‘Indonesia Country Brief’.
25      Ibid. 
26      ‘Australia’s National Security Strategy’,  p.12.
27      Sabam Siagian and Endy Bayuni, RI-Australia ties — It’s more important to 
be nice, Jakarta Post, 14 November 2012
28      Jennings Peter, ‘Indonesia: Priorities, Politics, Perceptions and Papua’. 
Strategist, www.aspistrategist.org.au.
29      Ali Alatas, ‘Different Societies, Shared Futures’. Jakarta Post, 6 July 2006.
logging and cattle exports;30 and the stationing of US marines 
in Darwin;31 Foreign Minister Carr’s comments concerning the 
killing of activists in West Papua;32 and Prime Minister Rudd’s 
statement that the opposition’s rhetoric to ‘turn back the 
boats’ could result in ‘confl ict’.33 Given the 2013 Australian 
Federal election, a further challenge concerns the perception 
of some Indonesians that, in the words of the Indonesian 
Foreign Ministry website, the Australian Labor Party ‘tends to 
be more liberal and hold a positive view toward Indonesia’.34  
While the socio-cultural dimension is addressed in the next 
section, a lack of understanding together with a perceived lack of 
consultation and respect for Australia’s northern neighbour has 
informed many bilateral fl are-ups. Thus, one government offi cial 
in Jakarta referred to the announcement that Timor Leste would 
process asylum seekers, stating that the Australian government 
should know that Timor Leste does not agree to arrangements 
such as this without fi rst consulting Indonesia.35 Given these 
challenges, the combined leadership of both President Susilo 
Bambung Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Marty Natalagawa 
has been a fortunate coincidence, as both have demonstrated 
a sense of affi nity with Australia and have actively pursued 
closer relations.36 For example, at the inaugural annual leader’s 
forum, President Yudhoyono quashed a diplomatic row when 
he declared that Prime Minister Julia Gillard had convinced him 
that the stationing of US marines in Darwin did not represent a 
problem for Indonesia.37
30      Rosemarie Lentini, ‘Julia Gillard Halts Live Cattle Exports to Indonesia’. 
Telegraph, 8 June 2013. See ‘Sour Times with a Big Neighbour’.
31      There were also allegations of an associated proposal to station US drones 
at Christmas Island. Mark J. Valencia, ‘US Pivot Making Waves in the Region’. 
Straits Times, 3 April 2012.
32      Michael Bachelard, ‘Indonesia Rebukes Carr over West Papua Call’. Age, 30 
August 2012.
33      Alberto Gomes, ‘Beyond Boats, Beef, and Bali: Reassessing Australia’s 
Relations with Indonesia’. Conversation, 3 July 2013. Despite assurances from Julie 
Bishop that Indonesia would cooperate with Australia when it forcibly sends asylum 
seeker boats back to Indonesia, Indonesia’s Vice President, Foreign Minister, and 
Ambassador to Australia have all publically declared that the policy is unacceptable. 
In relation to the subject, Vice President Boediono stated that the ‘most important 
thing for the two next door neighbours would be trust. That is key, mutual 
understanding, mutual respect’. Lenore Taylor, ‘Indonesia ‘Would Co-Operate’ with 
Coalition on Boats’. Guardian, 3 June 2013. George Roberts, ‘Indonesia Rejects 
the Coalition’s Asylum Seeker Policy’. ABC News, 14 June 2013.
34      ‘Australia’. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu), http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/
IFPDisplay.aspx?Name=
BilateralCooperation&IDP=56&P=Bilateral&l=en. 
35     Interview with Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry (Kemlu), Jakarta, February 2013.
36      According to Indonesia expert from the Australian National University, Greg 
Fealy, ‘SBY constantly hoses things down [on Australia’s account] …. When 
Commission 1 in Parliament looks like winding up for a big attack on Australia, 
SBY makes calming statements and takes the heat out of certain issues’, Peter 
Hartcher, ‘Dogs of Boat War Must Learn Value of Silence’. The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 2 July 2013.
37      Abdul Khalik, ‘US Base No Threat to Indonesia’. The Jakarta Post, 21 
November 2011
The intervention by President Yudhoyono demonstrates the 
benefi ts of increased dialogue and consultation. Cognizant of 
this, Jakarta and Canberra have also institutionalised the annual 
Australia–Indonesia Foreign and Defence Ministers’ 2+2 meeting, 
while an annual Law and Justice Ministers’ meeting has been 
proposed.38 At the second 2+2 meeting, Indonesia’s Defence 
Minister refl ected on recent consultation by Australia over its 
2013 Defence White Paper and made a corresponding pledge 
to consult with Australia in the development of Indonesia’s 
own White Paper.39 A delegation was subsequently sent to 
Canberra in November 2013.40 Since September 2007, over 
130 ministerial visits between Jakarta and Canberra have 
occurred.41 Jakarta also appears to be devoting more energy to 
the relationship: a recent example is its April 2013 initiation of the 
Australia–Indonesia High Level Committee.42 
Nonetheless, the relationship continues to stand on fragile 
foundations. The causal dynamics behind such fragility 
were particularly evident in the wake of a series of leaks by 
whistleblower Edward Snowden regarding intelligence intercepts 
by the Australian Signals Directorate (formerly the Defence 
Signals Directorate). Between October and November 2013 
there were widespread media reports concerning intelligence 
gathering via Australian embassies and consulates in Asia as 
well as a more specifi c leak about the tapping of the phones of 
Indonesian offi cials by Canberra and Washington at the 2007 
United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Bali.43 Then, 
in November, the ABC and the Guardian published leaked 
intelligence concerning a sustained campaign to monitor 
the phone activities of President Yudhoyono, his wife, and 
several key ministers.44 While Indonesia has likely accepted 
and benefi ted from Australian intelligence during the course of 
the aforementioned cooperation against terrorist threats, the 
Australian government failed to explain how monitoring the wife 
of Indonesia’s President, for example, could be justifi ed on the 
grounds of ‘security’ or the ‘national interest’. 
The disconcerting nature of the possible motives behind 
some Australian intelligence intercepts was reinforced during 
a further scandal in February 2014 where leaked documents 
indicated that Australia offered to share information with 
Washington about a trade dispute it had with Jakarta. The 
response by Foreign Minister Natalegawa was that he found 
‘it mindboggling, … how can I reconcile discussions about 
shrimp and the impact on Australian security?’45 Meanwhile, 
38      ‘Australia-Indonesia Annual Leaders’ Meeting’.
39      Peter, ‘Indonesia: Priorities, Politics, Perceptions and Papua’.
40      Indonesia’s defence delegation met with both Australian government 
agencies as well as academics and analysts from the ANU and ASPI.
41      ‘Indonesia Country Brief’.
42      Alan Dupont, ‘Indonesian Ties Much Tighter’. Australian, 8 April 2013.
43      ‘Leaked NSA Report Reveals Australia-US Spying Operations During Bali 
Conference.’ ABC News, 3 November 2013; Charles Hutzler, ‘Australian Spying 
Report Stirs Anger in Asia; China, Indonesia Demand Explanations for Allegations of 
Aid in U.S. Spy Effort.’ The Wall Street Journal, 2 November 2013.
44      Michael Brissenden, ‘Australia Spied on Indonesian President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, Leaked Edward Snowden Documents Revealed.’ ABC 
News, 18 November 2013.
45      Catriona Croft-Cusworth, ‘Spying Row: Why Indonesia Is Tougher on 
Canberra than on Washington.’ The Interpreter, 21 February 2014.
Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott did publicly apologise 
over revelations that Australian naval and coast guard vessels 
had ‘unintentionally’ entered Indonesian waters.46 However, the 
advanced nature of modern global positioning systems calls 
into question the veracity of the Prime Minister’s statement 
and this, together with the manner by which the Australian 
government has responded to revelations about the nature of 
its intelligence intercepts from Indonesia, has thus far failed to 
satisfy Jakarta. 
As a consequence of these developments, Indonesia’s ambassador 
to Australia was recalled on 19 November 2013, and Jakarta 
formerly suspended military and law enforcement cooperation a 
day later.47 However, in reality the impact on bilateral cooperation 
is much broader, as most Indonesian ministries and agencies are 
delaying action and awaiting further developments before investing 
resources in the advancement of cooperation with Canberra.48 
Critically, President Yudhoyono’s fi nal term in offi ce will end when 
the next round of Presidential elections are held in July. Interlocutors 
from government and academia, in Canberra and in Jakarta, have 
generally agreed that the current leadership in Indonesia is likely to 
represent a highpoint for relations with Australia. 
Therefore, Jakarta and Canberra need to resolve the current 
break in bilateral relations as soon as possible, and this will 
necessitate rapid progress in concluding a promised ‘code of 
ethics and protocol’ regarding future intelligence gathering.49 One 
challenge involves Jakarta’s concern that the chaotic electoral 
climate could be worsened by further intelligence leaks after 
establishment of an agreed ‘code’.50 However, a greater hurdle 
concerns the highly politicised and populist policies of Canberra 
concerning irregular migration and this is interdependent with the 
unnecessary but deliberate securitisation of irregular migration 
which, in turn, is interdependent with the socio-cultural and trade 
dimensions discussed below. 
46      Brendan Nicholson and Peter Alford. ‘Back Off, Jakarta Tells Australia.’ The 
Australian, 18 January 2014.
47      ‘Jakarta in No Hurry to Fixe Ties with Australia: Indonesian Ambassador 
Will Not Return to Australia until Relations Have Improved.’ Today (Singapore), 20 
February 2014; ‘Biweekly Update: Indonesia.’ Southeast Asia from the Corner of 
18th and K Streets, CSIS vol.4, no.24 (26 November 2013), p.7.
48      Discussions with Indonesian embassy, Canberra, March 2014.
49      There is a mounting belief in certain Indonesian policy circles that Australia’s 
leadership is waiting until the election of the next administration in Indonesia, but 
this would be a mistake. As has been raised during discussions with Indonesian 
policy makers, there are no presidential candidates that are likely to share the same 
level of affi nity with Australia as that shared by President Yudhoyono.
50      Brendan Nicholson, ‘Spies, Not Boats, Put Jakarta Ties on Ice.’ The 
Australian, 27 February 2014.
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SOCIO-CULTURAL AND TRADE 
DIMENSIONS: UNDERDEVELOPED 
FOUNDATIONS IN THE RELATIONSHIP? 
The earlier-mentioned reference to a more compatible set of 
political and social identities is not meant to imply the emergence 
of a collective identity.51 Given the numerous sources of tension 
outlined in the previous section, such an outcome has yet to 
be consolidated between the two countries’ political elite and, 
taking into account the lack of mutual understanding currently 
extant, not even the seeds of a collective identity have been 
sown at the societal level. Both countries are well aware of this 
problem: the associated challenges were aptly articulated by 
President Yudhoyono when he addressed both houses of the 
Australian parliament in 2010: 
…the most persistent problem in our relations is the 
persistence of age-old stereotypes – misleading, 
simplistic mental caricature that depicts the 
other side in a bad light. Even in the age of cable 
television and the internet, there are Australians 
who still see Indonesia as an authoritarian country, 
as a military dictatorship, as a hotbed of Islamic 
extremism or even as an expansionist power. 
On the other hand, in Indonesia there are people 
who remain affl icted with Australiaphobia – those 
who believe that the notion of White Australia still 
persists, that Australia harbours ill intension toward 
Indonesia and is either sympathetic to or supports 
separatist elements in our country.52 
The focus of Australia’s political rhetoric and associated media 
coverage has either continued to reinforce misperceptions or 
failed to correct them. Thus, one 2013 survey commissioned by 
the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade indicated 
that as many as 53 per cent of Australians believe that Indonesia 
is not a democracy, 70 per cent think that Bali is not part of 
Indonesia, and 72 per cent believe that Indonesian law-making is 
based on ‘Islamic codes’.53 Particularly troubling was a separate 
survey indicating that 54 per cent of Australians believe ‘Australia 
is right to worry about Indonesia as a military threat’ and 54 per 
cent believe that ‘Indonesia is a dangerous source of Islamic 
51      A collective identity exists where people consider themselves to be, at some 
level, part of the same group, and this translates into a collection of positive images 
that are projected towards others within the group. James Cotton, ‘Regional Order 
and the over-Determination of Regional Institutions in the Asia-Pacifi c’ (paper 
presented at the UTS-Guadalajara Workshop, Guadalajara, January 2004), p.7.
52       Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ‘Address by the President of the Republic of 
Indoneisa’. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, 2010. 
At an earlier conference, a former Indonesian ambassador to Australia, S. Wiryono, 
also highlighted the problem of public ignorance on both sides, but added that this 
was in contrast to a relatively better understanding between offi cials. Wiryono, S., 
‘An Indonesian View: Indonesia, Australia and the Region’. In Montries, John, ed., 
Different Societies, Shared Futures: Australia, Indonesia and the Region, Indonesia 
Update Series, ISEAS, 2006.
53      ‘Australian Attitudes Towards Indonesia’. Canberra: Newspoll, 2013. This 91 
page report was commissioned by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade. See also, ‘Australia Has Just Trashed the Perception of Indonesia’. Scoop, 
29 June 2013.
terrorism’.54 In an earlier 2011 survey, only 5 per cent indicated 
‘a great deal of trust’ that ‘Indonesia would act responsibly 
in the world’.55 Given this climate, Prime Minister Rudd’s 
comment that the Coalition’s ‘turn back the boats’ rhetoric 
could lead to confl ict, together with his reference to konfrontasi 
(confrontation),56  was more problematic for the damage it 
caused to Australian perceptions than it was to Indonesian 
perceptions of Australia.57 
Indonesians are also well aware of Australian attitudes, with 
55 per cent agreeing that ‘Australia is a country suspicious 
of Indonesia’.58 However, while Indonesians have maintained 
relatively positive perceptions of Australia, a signifi cant 
proportion continues to believe that Australia ‘masterminded’ the 
independence of Timor Leste; that the independence of West 
Papua remains high on the Australian government’s agenda;59 
and that ‘Australia poses a threat to Indonesia’ (31 per cent).60 At 
the worst end of the spectrum, outright anger has been voiced: a 
recent commentary by the senior managing editor of the Jakarta 
Post argued that Australia ‘is perceived as an arrogant neighbour 
with a strong sense of superiority towards Indonesia’.61  As 
President Yudhoyono has stated, such misperceptions must be 
expunged ‘…if we are to achieve a more resilient partnership’.62 
Distrust and the lack of understanding between the two 
countries have already resulted in a number of practical 
ramifi cations intended to improve relations. For example, a senior 
Australian defence offi cial noted that defence cooperation had 
been evolving as fast as the Australian people would permit.63 
54      Alex Oliver, ‘Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’. 
Sydney: Lowy Institute Poll, 2013, pp.12-13.
55      While 41 per cent believed that they could ‘somewhat’ trust Indonesia to act 
responsibly in the world, this was below China, Russia and Egypt. Moreover, 15 
per cent answered the same question ‘not at all’ in terms of ‘trust’. Fergus Hanson, 
‘Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’. Sydney: Lowy Institute 
Poll 2011, pp.15-18. 
56      Konfrontasi was a policy that was launched by President Sukarno during 
the 1960s and was primarily directed against the establishment of the Federation 
of Malaysia, which Sukarno viewed as a ‘neo-colonialist plot to perpetuate British 
infl uence’. As a member of the Five Powers Defence Agreement, Australia’s military 
was also involved in the highly ‘limited’ confl ict. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: 
Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation, p.35.
57      These comments resulted in a broad range of hostile statements on the 
internet. One example includes the following: ‘[w]e are a sovereign state and our 
policies will not be dictated to by a jumped up corrupt Country like Indonesia. If 
they were to try it on with Australia the U.S. would pound their sorry arses into 
oblivion’. ‘Australia Has Just Trashed the Perception of Indonesia’.
58      Fergus Hanson, ‘Shattering Stereotypes: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’. 
in Lowy Institute Indonesia Poll (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2012), p.8.
59      Ibid., p.26; Kornelius Purba, ‘Patronising Approach Won’t Impress 
Indonesia’. The Australian, 5 July 2013; Peter, ‘Indonesia: Priorities, Politics, 
Perceptions and Papua’. On this issue, Hajrijanto Y. Thohari stated that ‘I am 
always suspicious of the NGOs as well as the governments of Australia and the 
United States in responding to the separatism issue in Papua. On the one hand, 
the governments showed their support to Indonesia’s integrity, but on the other 
hand their NGOs support separatists groups … who knows [sic] all kinds of political 
tricks are intentionally launched under a good plan or design, so that they will 
eventually gain benefi ts from the situation’, ‘Australian Govt, their NGOs Collude in 
Responding to Papua’. Antara News, 13 October 2006.
60      However, 63 per cent indicated that Malaysia posed a ‘threat’. Hanson, 
‘Shattering Stereotypes: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’. p.11.
61      Purba, ‘Patronising Approach Won’t Impress Indonesia’.
62      Yudhoyono, ‘Address by the President of the Republic of Indoneisa’.
63      Interview, Australian Department of Defence, Canberra, April 2013.
The Australian embassy in Jakarta has played a leading role in 
responding to such challenges by building societal interest and 
people-to-people connections between the two countries. These 
activities include invitations to media editors and journalists to 
visit each country, and a greater emphasis on cultural exchanges 
and art.64 More broadly, Jakarta and Canberra have already been 
working together to promote tourism and the idea that Indonesia 
is far more than just ‘Bali’.65 Many of these proposals are brought 
together in a single document by the Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade titled the ‘Indonesia Country Strategy’. 
While the document highlights the positive achievements in 
bilateral relations to date, it problematically does not support its 
prescriptions with tangible funding commitments.66 
Despite the above efforts, bilateral relations will be increasingly 
challenged by Australian misperceptions and indifference to 
Indonesia due to a decline in education about Indonesia and 
Asia more broadly. In 2011, there were only 87 Year 12 students 
studying Indonesian language (Bahasa Indonesia) in New South 
Wales and current trends indicate that the study of Indonesian 
at high school will end by 2018.67 A similar decline has occurred 
in the tertiary sector, as less than 1,100 university students were 
studying Indonesian in 2010 and since 2004 six universities 
have discontinued their Indonesian language courses.68 The 
collapse of Australian education in Asian languages is one of 
the key multigenerational challenges for Australian engagement 
with Indonesia and broader Asia. Evidence of archaic and 
outdated perspectives on this issue is still visible within certain 
quarters of the Australian government.69 The rapid deterioration 
of Asian language education followed the Howard government’s 
early termination of the National Asian Languages and Studies 
in Schools Program in 2002.70 Despite a host of high-level 
government declarations since – including the 2008 re-
establishment of the $62.4 million National Asian Languages and 
64      One example includes the coordination of a visit to Indonesia by Australian 
art directors who had no idea how vibrant the contemporary arts scene is in 
Jakarta. The Australian embassy is also bringing Indonesian journalists and Islamic 
leaders to Australia, and Australian journalists, in turn, have been brought to 
Indonesia.
65      Still more can be done in order to promote greater awareness regarding 
strong relations with Australia: the Lowy Institute Poll indicated that the Indonesian 
public is now warmer towards the US than Australia and that most Indonesians do 
not know that Australia is its largest donor of aid. Hanson, ‘Shattering Stereotypes: 
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’, p.11.
66      ‘Indonesia Country Strategy’.  in Australia in the Asian Century. Canberra: 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013. For a concise assessment of this 
strategy, see Michelle Ford, ‘An Indonesia Strategy in Search of a Commitment’. 
Australian, 10 July 2013.
67      Olivia Cable, ‘Indonesia: Australia’s Gateway into the Asia-Century’. 
Australian Institute of International Affairs, http://www.aiia.asn.au/access-monthly-
access/ma-issue-19. Meanwhile, only 300 non-Chinese heritage students studied 
Mandarin at year 12 level in 2009. Jenny McGregor, ‘Australian Students in the 
Dark as Asia’s Century Dawns’. Age, 13 April 2011.
68      David T. Hill, ‘Indonesia’s knowledge is dying- just when we need it most’. 
The Conversation, https://theconversation.com.
69      During a 2011 presentation by Christopher Roberts to Australian government 
offi cials on Australian engagement, a co-presenter and senior offi cial from the 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade strongly objected to the idea 
that Australia should regalvanise efforts to promote Asian languages at high school. 
He argued that everyone knows that all you have to do is pay for a translator.
70      Louise Milligan, ‘Government Drops $30m Asian Language Program’. 
Australian, 3 May 2002.
Studies in Schools Program (concluded in 2012) and the rhetoric 
of the Asian Century White Paper (2012)71 – Asian language 
offerings and enrolments have not yet rebounded.
Problematically, the Australian government’s fi nancial 
commitments regarding the study of Asian languages, cultures, 
and histories have become increasingly inadequate and this has 
resulted in the loss of relevant educational capacity. A reversal 
of this trend will require signifi cant and long-term reinvestment 
together with other practical measures such as the easing of 
visa restrictions for qualifi ed teachers from Indonesia.72 Beyond 
language education, it will also be critical to build capacity for 
general education concerning Indonesia and Asia at the high 
school and tertiary levels.73 Here, a 2009 study found only two 
per cent of fi nal-year Victorian high school students undertook 
history courses with any Asian content.74 Moreover, each 
year only 100–150 students from Australia study in Indonesia; 
however, this number is set to increase to 400 per year from 
2014 under the AsiaBound program.75 Jakarta can also assist by 
streamlining the visa system for Australian students.76 
71      This includes the $47 million AsiaBound grants program, which is very similar 
to the Australian coalition’s ‘reverse Colombo plan’ that had been announced in 
June 2012.
72      Cable, ‘Indonesia: Australia’s Gateway into the Asia-Century’.
73      Following a series of education cuts during the late 1990s, only a handful of 
specialised Asian studies departments now exist in the tertiary sector.
74      McGregor, ‘Australian Students in the Dark as Asia’s Century Dawns’.
75      Julie Bishop, ‘Address to Australia/Indonesia Dialogue’.  http://www.
juliebishop.com.au/speeches/1223-address-to-australia-indonesia-dialogue.html. 
John Hearn, ‘Seeking Good RI-Australia Relations’. Jakarta Post, 1 May 2010. The 
AsiaBound Program was announced by then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in July 
2013. There remains an open question as to whether this funding will be maintained 
by the new coalition government beyond 2014.
76      Ross Tapsell, ‘Friendship between Leaders Is Not Necessarily the Key to 
Good Relations’. Ibid., 22 March.
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Australian ODA to Indonesia, 2001–02 to 2013–14 ($m)77
A positive counterbalance to the above issues has been 
provided by Australia’s extensive and long-term aid program. 
For the year 2014–15, it is anticipated that 525 scholarships 
will be awarded to Indonesians for study in Australia.78 This is in 
addition to more than 17,000 Indonesian students who currently 
study in Australia each year.79 Within Indonesia, Australia funded 
nearly half of Indonesia’s school building program between 2006 
and 2009, and in 2010 announced a further $500 million to 
construct an additional 2,000 schools that will lead to 300,000 
new school places.80 Beyond education, Australia has provided 
an average of $472.3 million in aid each year for the last fi ve 
years, and this is scheduled to increase to $646.8 million during 
the 2013/14 fi nancial year.81 Australia is in fact Indonesia’s largest 
aid donor, and Australia now provides more aid to Indonesia 
than to any other country. Aside from the aforementioned 
initiatives in the security and policing spheres, it has used this 
aid to strengthen, inter alia, Indonesia’s long-term capacity 
including health, agriculture, governance, and humanitarian and 
disaster response.82 Nonetheless, it is ironic that the Australian 
government has invested heavily in aid to Indonesia, including 
funding Indonesian students to study in Australia, but has overtly 
neglected its duty to educate Australians about Indonesia and 
broader Asia.
Both Australia and Indonesia should be key trading partners. 
The proximity of the two countries reduces transportation costs 
and they both have a complementary mix of natural resources, 
opportunities for investment, and products for export.83 In the 
case of Indonesia, consistent economic growth and positive 
77      ‘Overview’, AusAid website, cited at: http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/
eastasia/indonesia/Pages/home.aspx 
78      ‘Indonesia: Information for Awards Commencing in 2014’. AusAid, http://
www.ausaid.gov.au/australia-awards/documents/indonesia.pdf.
79      ‘Indonesia Country Brief’.
80      ‘Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia (2011–2016)’. AusAid, 
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/eastasia/indonesia/Pages/education-init1.aspx.
81      Calculations based on fi gures provided at the AusAid, see: ‘Funding’, 
AusAid, cited at http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/eastasia/indonesia/Pages/
home.aspx.
82      Ibid.
83      Shaun MGushin, ‘Australia-Indonesia: Time for a Closer Future’. Mondaq 
Business Briefi ng, 28 August 2013.
demographics – including a relatively young workforce – 
also reinforce the potential for and benefi ts from trade and 
investment.84 However, a key issue raised by interlocutors in both 
Jakarta and Canberra was expansion of the currently slight two-
way trade: in 2012, Indonesia was only Australia’s twelfth largest 
trading partner.85 Further, only about 250 Australian companies 
maintain a presence in Indonesia.86 Yet, as argued by Australian 
Ambassador Greg Moriarty, strong trade relations provide a 
critical foundation to a stable and close long-term relationship; 
this is a key pillar that is missing in relations between Indonesia 
and Australia.87 A stronger trading partnership will also naturally 
boost the level of inter-societal interaction and knowledge.
The level of bilateral trade will also be strengthened through the 
commencement of the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free 
Trade Area that has signifi cantly reduced tariffs and provided 
greater certainty to businesses from both countries. Australia 
and Indonesia have also proposed the establishment of an 
Indonesia–Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement (IA-CEPA) and a preliminary round of negotiations 
were held in March 2013.88 The successful conclusion of 
this agreement would result in even greater liberalisation in 
trade, heightened foreign direct investment, and strengthened 
economic cooperation more broadly. 
Nonetheless, further challenges remain. Mounting economic 
nationalism in Indonesia combined with a vexed record of 
resource exploitation by Australian fi rms threatens to undermine 
long-term commitments for investment.89 These challenges 
compound the lack of mutual understanding between the 
societies of the two countries and the various politicians and 
ministries whose portfolios do not necessitate or drive strong 
international, regional, and bilateral understanding. Indonesia 
will also need to maintain progress in tackling corruption and 
to improve its own business and investment climate before 
Australian businesses will redirect their trade and investment 
from alternative destinations.90
84      A rising middle class (now larger than Australia’s entire population) has 
been responsible for much of the domestic demand, in addition to an abundance 
of natural resources that has underpinned such growth: ‘Risks that may hinder 
boom in Indonesia’, Straits Times, 15 January 2013 reprinted in Jakarta Globe, 
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/business/risks-that-may-hinder-boom-in-
Indonesia/565796. Indonesian tourism has also been another major growth 
industry for Australia: ‘Queensland Tourism Targets Indonesia on Trade Tour’. Mena 
Report, 19 February 2013.
85      Interviews with government offi cials and academics in Canberra and Jakarta 
between October 2012 and March 2013. See also ‘Australia-Indonesia: Time for a 
Closer Future’.
86      Despite this, Australia’s trade in services increased by an average of 22 per 
cent per year between 2007 and 2010. David T. Hill, ‘Indonesian Knowledge Is 
Dying - Just When We Need It Most’. Conversation, https://theconversation.com.
87      Interview with Ambassador Greg Moriarty, Jakarta, 21 January 2013. See 
also Alan Oxley, ‘Beyond the Boats Lies Indonesia’s Rising Power’. Financial 
Review, 2 July 2013.
88      ‘Joint Communique: Indonesia-Australia Leaders’ Meeting’. Australian 
Embassy, Indonesia, http://www.indonesia.embassy.gov.au/jakt/JC13_001.html.
89      Zakir Hussain, ‘Indonesia’s Politicians Play ‘Protectionist’ Card’. Straits 
Times, 4 July 2012.
90      In 2012, Indonesia was ranked number 128 out of 185 countries, with a 
ranking of 1 being the best place to do business. ‘Ease of Doing Business Index’. 
The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND THE WAYS 
FORWARD
Through to October 2013, the combined leadership of President 
Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Natalagawa had contributed 
to the best political climate yet for advancing relations between 
Indonesia and Australia. This had also been reinforced by the 
prudent policies and actions of AusAID – now part of DFAT – 
and the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, together with the two 
countries’ police and defence forces. Nonetheless, recent 
episodes such as Australian territorial intrusions and the spy 
scandals demonstrate that these hard-won gains should not 
be taken for granted. Elite-level dynamics are all too often an 
extension of broader societal perspectives, and vice versa. In 
other words, for states that are both democratic, but which 
otherwise exhibit signifi cant societal and political differences, 
their interactions are likely to be complicated by the increased 
interdependence and infl uence of those societal interests. 
Therefore, a key challenge lies in identifying an effective means of 
improving the relationship framework so that the fl ashpoints that 
inevitably occur do not affect sound policy formulation.  
As a fi rst step, the recent change of government in Australia, 
together with Indonesia’s presidential elections in 2014, 
means that the two governments will need to be especially 
cautious if they are to avoid statements that could offend, 
be misinterpreted or hijacked by domestic politics. In this 
regard, the institutionalisation of increased multi-level dialogue 
between the elite of the two countries has been a critically 
important development. However, more needs to be done and 
this includes better coordination between various Australian 
departments and their subsections. For instance, recent events 
indicate that some intelligence offi cers are operating under an 
inappropriate and narrowly defi ned mandate by which they 
consider the end to justify the means. In reality, they and their 
supervisors have failed to consider adequately the broader 
long-term costs for Australia’s soft power and moral authority. 
Therefore, the Australian government needs to: (a) conclude 
the promised ‘code of ethics and protocol’; (b) improve inter-
agency coordination and oversight (possibly through some sort 
of enquiry or review); and (c) do more than is currently the case 
to mend relations with Jakarta. Moreover, the latter goal needs to 
be achieved before President Yudhoyono’s term expires. 
Meanwhile, the continuation of unnecessary political rhetoric 
that is perceived to be disrespectful to Indonesia, together 
with the failure of Canberra to consult regarding matters 
relevant to Indonesian interests provides further evidence of 
a need to continue to reconfi gure perceptions and attitudes 
in certain quarters of Australian politics and the media. In line 
with the prioritisation accorded to Indonesia in Australia’s 
‘Asian Century White Paper’, such a reconfi guration will be 
demonstrated when Australian leaders act with the same level 
of respect and considered assessment as they would for China, 
India, South Korea and Japan. A step in this direction would 
involve mandatory training on diplomacy and the international 
affairs of the region for, in the very least, politicians and senior 
bureaucrats. Given a range of competing demands, such training 
could be achieved through intensive short courses or a possible 
web-based interface designed to provide a more fl exible and 
effi cient learning experience. 
An increased focus on developing the economic and socio-
cultural spheres of interaction will also reinforce the political–
security and military dimensions of the relationship. This 
will require heavy investment in both language and broader 
Asian studies education that, in real terms, exceeds the 
funding commitments provided under the Hawke and Keating 
administrations. As an interim measure, the development of 
special programs to support the quality of journalism reporting 
on Indonesia and Asia will also have a positive impact on broader 
societal knowledge and perceptions. Such programs could 
develop the recent media tours coordinated by the Australian 
embassy to comprise longer-term exchange and education 
programs, with the latter including an emphasis on education 
concerning opportunities for trade and investment. Nonetheless, 
these strategies will require a multi-decade approach in order 
to consolidate a strong and robust bilateral relationship; the 
challenge for Australia and Indonesia will be the acquisition of the 
political will to implement them. 
Should Indonesia’s current pace of ascent be maintained, 
then Australia will increasingly become the smaller partner 
in this bilateral relationship. This, in turn, will entail increased 
dependence by Australia on Indonesian support in order to 
secure its economic, political and security interests – both 
bilaterally and in terms or its broader engagement with Southeast 
Asia and the Indo-Pacifi c. Nonetheless, as detailed in other issue 
briefs from this series, Indonesia’s current trajectory is anything 
but assured. Several complicated elements of state frailty remain 
including ethnic and religious divides as well as the continued 
potential for rapid loss of a future government’s legitimacy 
should it fail to perform – particularly in the economic sphere. 
Any signifi cant regression in Indonesia’s security environment 
could potentially lead to dire consequences for Australia. 
Consequently, Australia’s bilateral aid program remains critical 
if it is to support Indonesia’s democracy, good governance, 
equitable development, and stability. Regardless of Indonesia’s 
future trajectory, now is the time to consolidate, as far as is 
possible, the relationship between the two countries. 
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INTRODUCTION
As the ‘fi rst among equals’, Indonesia has been a critical 
player in managing intra-ASEAN relations, a role that has 
increased its leadership status in the region and beyond. This 
issue brief examines the opportunities and challenges for 
security cooperation between Indonesia and three of its key 
ASEAN neighbours: Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. Today, 
Indonesia’s policy towards these three countries is largely a 
function of the following factors: its historical experiences; its 
ASEAN policy; strategic calculations; and domestic politics. 
Despite the existence of several challenges, Indonesia’s policy of 
‘a thousand friends and zero enemies’,1 coupled with the shared 
purpose of advancing the ASEAN Community project, will exert a 
positive infl uence on how Indonesia and the nations of Malaysia, 
Singapore and Vietnam interact.
INDONESIA–MALAYSIA RELATIONS
Historically, Indonesia’s relations with Malaysia have fl uctuated 
considerably. When Sukarno was in power, bilateral relations 
were severely constrained, and Indonesia took an anti-colonialist 
and imperialist stance. Sukarno displayed a modicum of 
interest in foreign relations in forming the Maphilindo (the 
Greater Malayan Confederation of Malaya, the Philippines, and 
Indonesia), in order to hold together the Malay world in the 
region, but when Malaysia was established, Jakarta quickly 
launched a confrontation policy towards Kuala Lumpur (KL), and 
the Maphilindo was abandoned soon after. Sukarno perceived 
Malaysia as a vehicle through which Western countries could 
exert their infl uence and intervene in the region. This suspicion 
was also the main reason that Sukarno rejected the Association 
of Southeast Asia (ASA), which he saw once again as serving the 
interests of Western imperialists. In the aftermath of the nation’s 
hard-fought independence, Indonesia was not ready to tolerate 
any potential for external intervention in the region.
1       Irfa Puspitasari, ‘Indonesia’s New Foreign Policy- ‘Thousand Friends, Zero 
Enemy’, IDSA Issue Brief (23 August 2012), available at: http://www.idsa.in/system/
fi les/IB_IndonesiaForeignPolicy.pdf
When Suharto replaced Sukarno, socio-cultural relations 
between the two countries were restored. Symbolic of the 
restoration of the relations was the unifi cation of the Malay 
language and Bahasa Indonesia by a common spelling system 
in 1972.2 With the shift of political focus to domestic socio-
economic development under Suharto, Indonesia sought a 
stable and peaceful external environment by improving its 
relations with neighbouring countries. As a way to promote 
regional cooperation, in 1967 Indonesia brought an end to 
its confrontasi with Malaysia and joined fi ve non-communist 
countries of Southeast Asia to form the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). In addition, with Suharto’s anti-
communist stance, bilateral security cooperation became easier 
to achieve. Joint security exercises were launched in order to 
combat Communist activities in Sabah and Sarawak, and an 
agreement on the Straits of Malacca was signed by Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore.
The convergence of external threat perceptions as well as a 
common security purpose constituted the main reasons for 
deepening bilateral security cooperation between Indonesia 
and Malaysia during this period. Despite the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1974, KL’s relations with 
Beijing were less than cordial. China was still considered a 
major threat to the security of Malaysia because of its support 
for the Malayan Communist Party.3 Indonesia, under Suharto, 
also harboured suspicions of Beijing and considered the PRC 
as a major threat to its security because of Beijing’s support 
for the PKI. When China invaded Vietnam for retributive 
reasons, Jakarta strengthened its security cooperation with 
KL. Initially, cooperation was confi ned to the Joint Border 
Committee (JBC), which was established in 1972 to deal with 
communist insurgency along the borders of East Malaysia. Later, 
cooperation expanded to other areas, including intelligence 
exchange, joint exercises, and exchange of offi cers to attend 
military colleges. In 1984, the 1972 security arrangement was 
revised to include joint naval and air patrols along the common 
borders of Indonesia and Malaysia.
Tun Razak’s reorientation of Malaysia’s foreign policy to advocate 
neutralisation also accorded well with Indonesia’s desire to keep 
the region free of external intervention. Subsequently, a Zone 
of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) was established 
in 1971, and when three Indochinese countries became 
communist in 1975, ASEAN leaders held the fi rst ASEAN summit 
in Bali, during which the Treaty of ASEAN Concord and the Bali 
Declaration were signed in 1976.
2       For more details, see Leo Suryadinata, Times Comparative Dictionary of 
Malay-Indonesia Synonyms: With Defi nitions in English (KL, Times Editions, 1991)
3       Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One 
Kin, Two Nations’, (New York, Routledge: 2004), p. 122.
Bilateral security cooperation has developed over the years 
between Malaysia and Indonesia, especially in maritime patrols 
and counter-terrorism activities. Since 2004, both countries, 
along with Singapore, have cooperated on patrolling the Malacca 
Straits, a key sea lane through which one fourth of the world’s 
commerce and almost half of the world’s oil shipments travel. 
Initially, each nation deployed up to seven naval vessels and 
maintained a task force of security personnel that would patrol 
the straits in a coordinated manner, but falling short of joint 
patrols. Today, the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP), which consist 
of both the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols (MSSP), the ‘Eyes in the 
Sky’ air patrols, and the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG),4 
represent the set of practical cooperative security measures 
undertaken by the littoral states of Southeast Asia – Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Under the arrangement, the 
participating states conduct coordinated naval and air patrols, 
while sharing of information between ships and the Monitoring 
and Action Agency. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) 
record shows a dramatic improvement in maritime security, as 
the number of piracy attacks in the Malacca Strait dropped from 
112 in 2000 to 2 in 2009.5 
There is much potential for the expansion of maritime security 
cooperation into related areas as well as beyond the region. 
Indonesia and Singapore have signed a submarine rescue pact 
in July 2012, constituting a pioneering move amid the ongoing 
regional quest for submarines. Indonesia and Malaysia could 
attempt to emulate a similar pact in the future. Moreover, maritime 
security cooperation in Southeast Asia could well extend into 
Northeast Asia with the cooperation of Japan and South Korea, 
as both countries have interests in maintaining the secure sea 
lanes for the importation of oil and other natural resources.
Another example of bilateral security cooperation has been the 
decision to resolve the disputed islands of Sipadan and Ligitan 
through the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Initially, there 
was disagreement over where to send the dispute for resolution, 
with Malaysia preferring the ICJ, while Indonesia demanded 
the ASEAN High Council. In the end, the parties referred the 
dispute to the ICJ, which ruled that both islands belonged to 
Malaysia in 2002. Indonesia accepted the decision despite 
much domestic protest. While the outcome was no doubt 
disappointing to Indonesia, the action taken by the two parties 
has set an important precedent in the region on how best to deal 
with seemingly intractable disputes so that they can focus on 
cooperation and development. 
4       For more details, see the Ministry of Defence of Singapore website, available 
at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/activity/malacca-strait-patrols, accessed 
10 April 2013.
5       For the trend in the frequency of piracy in the Malacca Strait, see Ada Suk 
Fung Ng, ‘A Maritime Security Framework for Fighting Piracy’, Institute of Transport 
and Logistics Studies Working Paper (Sydney: University of Sydney, November 
2011), p. 2.
Bilateral disputes such as territorial disputes and maritime 
boundary demarcation are seeds for potential confl ict, 
and their existence is a hindrance to bilateral and regional 
cooperation. Indonesia’s willingness to refer the dispute to the 
ICJ and to accept the court’s decision as binding has done 
much to remove a key stumbling block to Indonesia–Malaysia 
cooperation. Not only does it refl ect the liberal orientation of 
Indonesia’s more democratic, secure and responsible foreign 
policy after the inception of the Reformasi period, but it also 
shows its desire to put ASEAN matters at the centre of its 
foreign policy. Only by resolving key disputes among ASEAN 
member states can ASEAN progress towards the construction 
of a genuine ASEAN Community.
Three challenges remain, and their salience could adversely 
affect bilateral relations and security cooperation. While 
these challenges can sour bilateral relations, they are not 
insurmountable problems and can provide new grounds for 
bilateral cooperation. The fi rst challenge concerns the maritime 
border issue and tensions over the oil and gas-rich waters in the 
Ambalat block. In 2005, when the Malaysian state oil company, 
Petronas, granted a concession for oil and gas exploration in a 
part of the Sulawesi Sea, which Jakarta claims as its territory, 
a dispute erupted between the two nations and almost led 
to armed confl ict. Malaysia objected to the Indonesian claim 
and insisted that Ambalat is within its jurisdiction following KL’s 
successful claim of ownership of Sipadan and Ligitan. In 2009, 
anti-Malaysian demonstrations broke out in Jakarta due to the 
border dispute with Malaysia over Ambalat. 
The confl icting claims over maritime territory highlight the 
potential risks of confl ict between the two nations. While it is 
unlikely that Indonesia would be willing to resolve the boundary 
issue concerning Ambalat through the ICJ, doing so would go 
a long way to eliminating a major stumbling block for bilateral 
security cooperation and a potential source of regional tension 
as Indonesia continues to rise in power. Unlike the case over 
sovereignty of disputed Sipadan and Ligitan, the ICJ’s decision 
this time would not be such that either party would be awarded 
all of the disputed maritime area, as the principle of equity 
and fairness is the guiding norm for the ICJ’s ruling in cases 
concerning jurisdiction over disputed maritime boundaries.
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Another challenge for both countries concerns the maltreatment 
of migrant Indonesian workers in Malaysia. Most migrant workers 
are unskilled female labourers working in the informal sector, 
such as housemaids. It is estimated that there were more than 
500,000 Indonesian workers in West Malaysia in 1990, and the 
total number reached close to 1.2 million by 1994. From 1999 to 
2006, the number of Indonesian registered workers sent to Asian 
countries was over 2.7 million. In 2009, following numerous 
high profi le cases of abuse, the Indonesian government placed 
a moratorium on its citizens taking up employment in Malaysia 
as domestic workers. These issues can quickly translate into a 
matter of national pride, and there is uneasiness in Jakarta that 
Malaysia often does not treat the country with respect. Indeed, 
there is a general sense among Indonesians that Malaysians 
look down upon them,6 and these deep-seated negative 
perceptions can quickly erupt into anti-Malaysian protest – as 
the alleged mistreatment of the Indonesian model Manohara by 
her Malaysian husband, the Prince of Kelantan in 2009, and the 
2011 Southeast Asian football fi nal demonstrate. As Indonesia’s 
sense of self-esteem grows in the wake of continued economic 
and political success, such perceptions are likely to become 
increasingly problematic. 
The last challenge relates to environmental issues, especially 
the problem of smoke haze caused by forest fi res in Indonesia, 
which spreads to neighbouring countries, especially Malaysia 
and Singapore, and which demands proper measures to be 
taken by the Indonesian authorities in order to redress the 
situation. Since the 1990s, severe haze has blanketed both 
countries and resulted in economic costs of tens of millions of 
dollars. The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution 
was signed by all ten ASEAN members in June 2002, and it 
entered into force in November 2003. To date, Indonesia is the 
only ASEAN member state that has not ratifi ed the agreement, 
but is expected to do so later this year. The agreement resulted 
in the establishment of a regional coordinating centre, which 
could react quickly to the haze caused by Indonesian plantation 
owners and farmers. Once ratifi ed, bilateral as well as regional 
cooperation on the haze problem can progress with fewer 
impediments than before, and will provide new opportunities for 
interstate cooperation.
6       Marshall Clark, ‘Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: Cultural Heritage and the 
Politics of Garuda vs Harimau’, (28 August 2012), Unpublished conference paper at 
Australian National University, available at: http://indonesiasynergy.fi les.wordpress.
com/2012/08/m_clark_2012_is_indonesiamalaysiarelation.pdf
INDONESIA–VIETNAM RELATIONS
Indonesia and Vietnam share a common historical experience 
in that the two nations achieved their independence through 
revolution, and from time to time the leaders of each country 
have emphasised this point. Indonesia’s policy towards Vietnam 
has been a delicate balancing act, adhering to ASEAN’s 
collective position on the one hand and advancing its own desire 
to lure Vietnam away from external great powers.
During the Sukarno era, Indonesia’s relations with Hanoi were 
close, while its relations with Saigon were far from cordial. 
Sukarno perceived the South Vietnamese as American puppets. 
When he decided to upgrade diplomatic relations with Hanoi 
from consulate to ambassadorial level, Saigon decided to close 
the Indonesian consulate. It was not until the fall of Sukarno 
after the 1965 coup and the rise of Suharto’s anti-communist 
government that Indonesia adjusted its foreign policy towards 
Vietnam. Nevertheless, diplomatic ties between Jakarta and 
Hanoi were maintained during the Suharto era, while Jakarta’s 
relations with Saigon were never reestablished. 
Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea under Soviet patronage 
challenged Indonesia’s relations with Vietnam, but even though 
it went along with ASEAN’s collective stance on the Kampuchea 
problem, criticising Vietnam for the violation of state sovereignty, 
it never really shared the same degree of threat perception of 
Vietnam as Singapore and Thailand did. As the interlocutor of 
ASEAN on the Kampuchea issue, Indonesia was concerned 
that the confl ict could divide the region into two clusters: 
maritime ASEAN and the land power of Indochina. It feared that 
a bipolar Southeast Asia could pit the communist against the 
non-communist countries and invite external intervention by 
great powers. In March 1990, Suharto met with Hussein Onn 
and produced what was known as the Kuantan doctrine. The 
doctrine assumed that Vietnam was under Chinese pressure 
and, as a result, it was moving closer to the Soviet Union, which 
would be dangerous for regional stability. Hence Indonesia 
offered to assist the Vietnamese and aimed to lure Vietnam away 
from the Soviet Union. However, Thailand and Singapore held a 
different strategic assessment of the Kampuchea confl ict, and 
the doctrine subsequently created friction within ASEAN.7
7       Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), p. 288.
Indonesian–Vietnamese relations under Suharto have been a 
function of Jakarta’s policy towards both Beijing and ASEAN. It 
was a function of the former because Indonesia saw Vietnam 
as a buffer against China; it was a function of the latter because 
Jakarta assigned considerable importance to ASEAN and hence 
maintained consonance with the other ASEAN states in order to 
present a common stance on Kampuchea.8 Indonesia’s policy 
towards Vietnam aimed at transforming an armed and poor 
neighbour into a cooperative and economically oriented country 
in SEA. The growing rift between Hanoi and Beijing compelled 
Hanoi to work closer with Indonesia as a means of garnering 
support for its struggle against the PRC over Kampuchea.
There are areas of potential cooperation and dispute between 
Indonesia and Vietnam. First, Vietnam is not yet a major 
trading partner of Indonesia, unlike Singapore and Malaysia. 
When the Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited 
Indonesia in 2011, he agreed with Indonesian President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono to elevate bilateral ties to the level of a 
strategic partnership. Overall this would include more intense 
and institutionalised functional cooperation and communication 
between the two countries, and bodes well for the future 
trajectory of the bilateral relationship. For instance, the action 
plan for the strategic partnership calls for increasing bilateral 
trade from $2 billion to $5 billion by 2015. In 2012, Indonesian 
foreign minister Marty Natalegawa led the Indonesian delegation 
in the fi rst Indonesia–Vietnam Joint Commission Assembly, 
which stemmed from the 2012-2015 Strategic Partnership 
Action Plan signed in 2011. The assembly is aimed at providing 
a regular and systematic mechanism to study and evaluate the 
countries’ bilateral cooperation in all sectors, including trade and 
investment and maritime and defence issues.9 With the newly 
launched Ho Chi Minh–Jakarta route by Vietnam Airlines, bilateral 
interactions are set to grow in quantity as well as in quality.
One area of potential challenge and cooperation relates to 
maritime boundary demarcation. While the two countries do 
not have territorial disputes with one another, their Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) claims overlap. A small milestone was 
achieved in 2003 when both governments signed an agreement 
on the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary. The 
agreement defi ned the continental shelf boundary of the two 
countries as the imaginary straight line located between the two 
terminal points of the 1969 continental shelf agreement between 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Although located nearby, the border 
is not located in the Spratly Islands area, over which Indonesia 
does not have any claim. Indonesia attaches importance to the 
conclusion of the negotiations because of concerns with Chinese 
intervention and expansion in the region. The two countries also 
agreed to establish joint patrols of their overlapping maritime 
borders, and have already conducted several joint naval patrols 
with the aim of reducing and eliminating illegal fi shing and other 
maritime criminal activities. 
8       For analysis, see Ngoc-Diep Trinh Thi, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Toward 
Vietnam’, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1995).
9       Donald Weatherbee, ‘Global Insider: Indonesia-Vietnam Relations’, (World 
Politics Review, 26 September 2011).
China looms large in the strategic calculations of both countries. 
Vietnam, which has a direct territorial dispute with China, would 
like to keep Indonesia on its side to reduce tensions over the 
Spratlys and Paracels, while Indonesia is concerned with China’s 
growing infl uence in the region. Both countries, along with 
other ASEAN states, can cooperate to set the guidelines on 
the extent and type of activities that are permitted in the South 
China Sea. In 2002, ASEAN and China signed a non-binding 
political statement known as the Declaration on Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). However, the DOC did 
little to prevent tensions from escalating, and it failed to prevent 
the claimants from intensifying sovereignty claims over disputed 
areas. Progress on implementation of the DOC has been 
extremely slow, partly because China objected and insisted that 
the disputes be resolved bilaterally, and partly because several 
ASEAN states have confl icting interests and claims among 
themselves over the disputed islands.
In July 2011, the guidelines to implement the DOC were 
fi nally adopted with the agreement to promote dialogue and 
consultation among the parties. A new point was added that 
activities and projects carried out under the DOC should be 
reported to the ASEAN–China Ministerial Meeting. The fi rst 
discussions were held in Beijing from January 13–15, 2012, 
and agreement was reached to set up four expert committees 
on maritime scientifi c research, environmental protection, 
search and rescue, and transnational crime. The initial hope of 
a multi-party agreement with teeth turned out to be diffi cult to 
realise, and ASEAN’s fi nal Proposed Elements of a Regional 
Code of Conduct in the South China Sea was a heavily 
toned-down version of the original Philippine working draft, 
representing internal disagreement among the ASEAN member 
states.10 For example, the fi nal document eliminated references 
to ‘the principles and norms of international law applicable to 
maritime space, in particular the principles on the peaceful uses 
and cooperative management of the oceans’ and to ‘the need 
to preserve the region from any form of increased militarization 
and intimidation.’
Indonesia occupies a unique position in the issue of the Spratlys 
and Paracels because it is not a direct party to the territorial 
claims, but has a close interest in resolution of the disputes. As 
it has often done historically, it could play an intermediary role in 
alleviating tensions by hosting workshops. More importantly, it 
could exercise its leadership role within ASEAN by encouraging 
the member states to determine a collective approach before 
negotiating with China. Any internal fi ssure within ASEAN can 
be easily exploited by Beijing, as the 2012 ASEAN meetings in 
Cambodia amply demonstrated.
10       Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A 
Litmus Test for Commuity-Building?’ The Asia-Pacifi c Journal 10 (4) August 2012.
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INDONESIA–SINGAPORE RELATIONS
Indonesia’s relations with Singapore in the 1950s and the 1960s 
can be characterised as one of distrust rooted in its resentment 
with the predominantly ethnic Chinese state’s control over trade 
fl ows in and out of Indonesia. Foreign aid transported through 
Singapore to the rebels involved in the Permesta revolts in the 
1950s added to this negative perception of Singapore’s entrepot 
role.11 But the change of leadership in Indonesia from Sukarno 
to Suharto marked a fundamental transformation in bilateral 
relations. Formal visits and contacts between Suharto and Lee 
Kuan Yew deepened their personal relationship and led to an 
improvement in bilateral cooperation in politics and economics 
as well as in military and socio-cultural areas.12 As Lee Kuan 
Yew recalled, ‘In retrospect, no event has had a more profound 
infl uence on the development of the region than the character 
and outlook of President Suharto of Indonesia.’13
Since then, Singapore has become an important trading partner 
for Indonesia. The bilateral trade volume reached approximately 
$70 billion in 2010, and Singapore has consistently ranked as 
the top foreign investor in Indonesia. Human interactions have 
also fl ourished, and both countries are the number one source of 
visitors for each other. In 2010, almost 1.4 million Singaporeans 
visited Indonesia, while close to 2.6 million Indonesians visited 
Singapore in the same year. The two countries have recently 
cooperated on demarcating their maritime boundaries, which 
has led to greater economic cooperation.
For instance, after almost four years of negotiation, Indonesia 
and Singapore agreed on a new maritime boundary in 2009. 
The two countries had agreed on the central segment of their 
territorial sea boundary in the early 1970s; the median line 
establishes a new boundary on the western segment. The 
new agreement is expected to boost economic ties between 
Indonesia and Singapore, as Nipah will be integrated into 
the development of the inter-provincial Batam, Bintan and 
Karimun free trade zones as well as the development of the 
Sijori (Singapore, Malaysia’s Johor and Indonesia’s Riau Islands) 
Growth Triangle. Singapore has also opened a consulate 
in Batam in 2009, in order to enhance economic ties and 
cooperation between the two countries. Following the successful 
conclusion of establishing borders on the western segment, in 
2010 both countries began talks demarcating the eastern border 
between Changi and Batam.
11       For details, see Terence Lee Chek Liang, ‘Explaining Indonesia’s Relations 
with Singapore During the New Order Period: The Case of Regime Maintenance 
and Foreign Policy’, IDSS Working Paper Series #10 2001
12       Lau Teik Soon and Bilveer Singh (eds), ‘Indonesia-Singapore Relations: 
Problems and Prospects’, (Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1991).
13       Lee Kuan Yew Speech 16 April 1986 cited in Liang, ‘Explaining Indonesia’s 
Relations with Singapore During the New Order Period’, p. 12.
As for security cooperation, the armed forces of Indonesia 
and Singapore regularly hold joint exercises and run exchange 
programs for military offi cials. They also cooperate closely in 
combating terrorism by sharing intelligence, and operate joint 
patrols in the Malacca Strait. As a result, the insecurity rate has 
signifi cantly decreased, and in 2011 only three major incidents 
were reported in the Malacca Strait. Anti-piracy exercises have 
also been jointly held, and there are regular interactions and 
exchanges between the personnel of the militaries of the two 
nations. Both Indonesia and Singapore are working together 
to fi ght against the spread of avian infl uenza in Tangerang, and 
are cooperating in controlled  land burning and forest fi res. 
Also, Singapore has trained some 4,000 Indonesian offi cials 
under the Singapore Cooperation Program to enhance their 
skills and knowledge in areas such as port management, 
banking and fi nance.
There are several unresolved issues between the two countries. 
First, Indonesia’s airspace over the Riau Islands should be 
returned to Indonesia. The airspace has been under Singaporean 
control for the past decade because of the limited capacity of 
Indonesia’s radar systems. In May 2012, Singapore announced 
that it was ready to return the airspace to Indonesia, provided 
that the International Civil Aviation Organization approved the 
return. Second, both countries have attempted without success 
to sign an extradition deal that would allow both countries to 
extradite criminal suspects. In 2007, an agreement on defence 
was signed by the two governments, but it was later annulled 
by Indonesian lawmakers who rejected a term that allowed 
Singapore’s armed forces to conduct exercises on Indonesian 
soil in return for Indonesia being allowed to force the return of 
Indonesian criminals in Singapore. Third, the two nations have 
shown disagreement over the admittance of Timor Leste into 
ASEAN. When the issue emerged during the 2011 ASEAN 
leaders’ retreat, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
insisted that ASEAN reject Timor Leste’s bid for membership, 
lest that the addition of a new member slow down the progress 
of ASEAN. Indonesian president SBY differed from Lee and 
advocated the admittance of Timor Leste to the bloc. But these 
issues are relatively minor, and both countries are willing to work 
with one another to resolve them.
CONCLUSIONS
Indonesia’s bilateral relationships with the three neighbouring 
countries – Malaysia, Vietnam and Singapore – are not without 
challenges. If not managed properly, they could result in mutual 
mistrust and suspicion, and would hinder bilateral and regional 
cooperation. The magnitude of the problem could become 
greater in an era of a rising Indonesia that seeks to assert its 
leadership role within ASEAN. Despite the challenges, however, 
a sense of optimism should prevail, for two reasons. First, 
although an ascending Indonesia is likely to become more 
assertive, the general direction and tone of its foreign policy 
has been decisively liberal and accommodating thus far, as 
shown by the recent resolution of a key territorial dispute with 
Malaysia. The consolidation of democratic governance in 
Indonesia will have a positive impact on the liberal orientation 
of her foreign policy in the future. And second, the institutional 
web of ASEAN will sustain engagement and regular meetings 
among regional elites, and deepen their mutual understanding 
and personal connections. These connections will prevent 
potential confl ict from becoming actual, preserving peace and 
stability in Southeast Asia. Thus, Indonesia’s expression of its 
enhanced power will take place within the institutional framework 
of ASEAN, and its leadership role will develop in conjunction with 
bilateral cooperation with neighbouring countries, which bodes 
well for the successful management of the challenges present in 
Indonesia’s bilateral relations with its neighbouring countries.
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INTRODUCTION
This issue brief analyses the factors supporting and motivating 
Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN and their implications for the 
organisation. It discusses Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN in 
terms of: its role in managing crises and mediating confl icts/
disputes; second, the novel proposals Indonesia has made to 
enhance ASEAN; and fi nally, Indonesia’s rising global profi le, 
which complements the signifi cance of its leadership. Each 
factor results in diverse implications for the organisation in 
constructive and negative ways, leading to the issue brief’s 
concluding assessments regarding the opportunities and 
challenges of Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN in the future.
Indonesia has long been regarded as the natural born leader 
or, at minimum, fi rst among equals within the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The leadership role 
of Indonesia dates back to the establishment of ASEAN in 
1967. The end of konfrontasi and Indonesia’s willingness to 
join ASEAN were critical to ASEAN’s formation, which served 
President Soeharto’s goal of portraying Indonesia to the 
region as a constructive neighbour.1 As Dewi Fortuna Anwar 
argues in relation to the period following ASEAN’s formation, 
‘Indonesia’s restraint, plus its substantial contribution to regional 
cooperation, has earned the country the respect and recognition 
of the other members as a primus inter pares.’2 However, the 
establishment of ASEAN has also been interpreted as an effort 
to constrain Indonesian hegemony in Southeast Asia. Therefore, 
Soeharto’s policy towards the organisation was also infl uenced 
by a desire to reassure its regional partners.3 While Indonesia 
became relatively introverted following the 1997–1998 East-
Asian Financial Crisis and the associated collapse of President 
Soeharto’s New Order regime, Indonesia has once again 
become an active leader in ASEAN following the reconsolidation 
of stability, economic growth, and democratic values. 
Given these considerations, this issue brief assesses the evolution 
of Indonesia’s role in ASEAN together with the implications of 
a more powerful and robust Indonesia for the future of ASEAN. 
Although Indonesia’s leadership encompasses economic and 
sociocultural dimensions, this issue brief primarily focuses 
on the nation’s political and security spheres. The analysis is 
undertaken in three sections: the fi rst section examines the 
Jakarta’s role as manager and mediator of crises and confl ict; 
the second assesses the evolving nature of Indonesia’s ideational 
leadership (e.g., norms and values) in ASEAN; while the fi nal 
section assesses the implications for ASEAN of Indonesia’s rising 
international power and prestige. As will be demonstrated, there 
are both positive and negative inferences for each issue and there 
1       Anthony L. Smith, ‘ASEAN’s Ninth Summit: Solidifying Regional Cohesion, 
Advancing External Linkage’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.3, no.26, 
December 2004, p. 419.
2       Dewi Fortuna, Anwar, ‘ASEAN and Indonesia: Some Refl ections’, Asian 
Journal of Political Science, vol.5, no.1, 1997, p 33.
3       Indonesia also played a leading role in supporting ASEAN’s ambition to 
develop the Association in a manner that reinforced its resilience from external 
infl uence. Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN 
and the ARF, (London. Routledge Curzon, 2003) pp. 62-63.
are a number of opportunities and constraints for Indonesia’s 
future leadership in ASEAN. Nonetheless, the analysis argues that 
Indonesia has developed a critical leadership role regarding the 
mediation of confl ict and the management of crises in Southeast 
Asia and the immediate region.
INDONESIA AS MANAGER OF CRISES AND 
MEDIATOR OF CONFLICTS
Indonesia has had the necessary power and infl uence to 
undertake an important role in almost all confl icts and crises with 
the potential to jeopardise the region’s stability. For instance, 
when diplomatic relations broke down between Malaysia and 
the Philippines in 1968 over allegations that Manila had been 
plotting to fund a separatist rebellion in Sabah (the Corregidor 
Affair), Indonesia’s President Soeharto intervened at an ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting with a proposal for a cooling-off period.4 
As a further instance, Indonesia worked with Malaysia in 
formulating the March 1980 Kuantan statement5 in relation to 
the Cambodian confl ict; when other attempts to resolve the 
crisis failed, Jakarta sent its military chief to negotiate directly 
with Hanoi, and ASEAN later appointed Indonesia as its offi cial 
interlocutor for these negotiations.6 Positioning itself in a 
mediatory role, Indonesia was able to acquire Vietnam’s trust, 
which led to an agreement for two informal meetings to be held 
between Hanoi and ASEAN.7 While the negotiations during these 
meetings stalled, the fi nal resolution at the Paris Conference on 
Cambodia (chaired by Indonesia) was strongly supported by 
the multilateral framework created by ASEAN and Indonesia’s 
leadership within it.8 
4       However, this attempt at preventive diplomacy did not have a lasting impact 
as diplomatic relations were once again suspended when, a month later, the 
Philippines passed a senate resolution reaffi rming its claim to Sabah. Ralf Emmers, 
Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (London 
and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) p.16.
5       The statement drew on the philosophy of the ‘Zone of Peace, Freedom 
and Neutrality’ (ZOPFAN) and sought to fi nd common ground by recognising the 
security concerns of Vietnam (e.g. previous border incursions and Beijing’s support 
for the Khmer Rouge) while also calling for an end to Soviet infl uence in Vietnam. 
Justus M. van der Kroef, ‘ASEAN, Hanoi, and the Kampuchean Confl ict: Between 
“Kuantan” and a “Third Alternative”’, Asian Survey 21, no.5 (1981) p.516. While the 
statement was engineered outside ASEAN’s formal framework, its key concerns 
and principles were repeated in the Joint Communique from the June 1980 ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting. ‘Joint Communique of the Thirteenth Asean Ministerial Meeting 
(Kuala Lumpur)’, ASEAN Secretariat, available at: 
http://www.aseansec.org/3679.htm.
6       Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002) p. 52.
7       Kroef, ‘ASEAN, Hanoi, and the Kampuchean Confl ict: Between “Kuantan” 
and a “Third Alternative”’, p. 528.
8       Jürgen Rüland, ‘Southeast Asian Regionalism and Global Governance’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 
vol.33, no.1, 2011 p. 84.
Indonesia has been increasingly involved in crises related to 
human security following the consolidation of a new democratic 
government between 1998 and 2004.9 For example, when 
the Myanmar junta continued to block the entry of foreign aid 
organisations following the devastation of Cyclone Nargis in 
2008, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister sought to resolve the situation: 
at an ASEAN Ministerial meeting he ‘leaned across the table 
and asked the Foreign Minister of Myanmar what he thought 
ASEAN membership meant to Myanmar and what—at that time 
and in those circumstances—Myanmar’s membership meant to 
ASEAN—in terms of ASEAN’s internal coherence—international 
profi le—and its membership’s shared vision for the future’.10 
Having specifi cally outlined the stakes for Myanmar, the ASEAN 
foreign ministers explained ‘that the crisis offered Naypyidaw a 
fi nal opportunity to allow the Association a role in facilitating the 
military’s relations with the international community’.11 Ultimately, 
Indonesian pressure, combined with the diplomacy of the ASEAN 
Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan, persuaded the junta to permit 
foreign aid organisations into the country. 
Indonesia also took the lead in responding to armed confl ict 
between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear 
temple. Following the initial eruption of hostilities in early 2011, 
Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, travelled to 
and negotiated with the leaders of both countries and attended 
a meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).12 
Indonesia then convened an ASEAN Informal Foreign Ministerial 
Meeting in Jakarta on 22 February 2011. During this meeting 
the two parties agreed to accept Indonesian military and civilian 
observers along the border to monitor a ceasefi re agreement.13  
However, following protracted negotiations, Thailand refused to 
agree to the fi nal terms of reference to enable monitors into its 
territory. While neither Indonesia nor ASEAN was able to resolve 
the dispute in the absence of arbitration by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ),14 the last hostilities occurred in February 
2011 and the collective pressure of Indonesia, ASEAN, and the 
international community have increased the perceived costs of 
further confl ict since this time. 
9       Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN 
and the Problem of Regional Order, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2009) p. 254.
10       Email Correspondence between Christopher Roberts and Ambassador to 
Singapore, January 2009.
11       Jurgen Haacke, ‘ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a 
Regional Initiative’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no.3 (2008) p. 371.
12       ‘ASEAN Envoy Seeks to End Thai-Cambodia Clashes’, Voice of America, 7 
February 2011.
13       Cheang Sokha, ‘ASEAN Brokers Preah Vihear Deal’, The Phnom Penh Post, 
22 February 2011.
14       However, the fi nal decision by the ICJ on 11 November 2013 only provided 
a determination over the promontory where the temple was located but left the 
broader 4.3 square kilometres to be resolved through negotiations between 
Cambodia and Thailand. Hui Yee Tan, ‘Analysis: Vihear Verdict Boosts Thai-
Cambodia Relations’, The Straits Times, 13 November 2013, ‘Icj Ruling Likely to 
Lead to Intensifi ed and Disruptive Opposition Protests against Thai Goverment’, 
IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, 12 November 2013.
Perhaps the most signifi cant challenge for ASEAN unity concerns 
the confl icting maritime claims in the South China Sea. While 
Indonesia is not offi cially a disputant,15 it has been active in a 
mediatory role. For example, at the July 2012 ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting, tensions quickly escalated when Foreign Minister Hor 
Namhong, representing ASEAN as the then Cambodian Chair, 
refused to issue a joint communique on behalf of the members. 
While a key point of objection concerned the insistence of the 
Philippines and Vietnam to include reference to recent instances 
of Chinese assertiveness,16 revelations that Hor Namhong 
had been simultaneously consulting with Beijing during the 
discussions sparked outrage in some of the ASEAN countries.17 
ASEAN had never previously failed to issue a joint communique. 
As Foreign Minister Natalegawa commented to the press: ‘I think 
it is utterly irresponsible if we cannot come up with a common 
statement on the South China Sea’.18 Natalegawa sought 
to resolve the impasse by travelling to Cambodia, Vietnam 
and Cambodia, holding meetings with leaders from the three 
countries. Based on discussions from the meetings Natalegawa 
drafted a six-point plan, which was publicly released in late July 
2012. Each of the ASEAN members provided their ‘approval to 
the six principles of “ASEAN’s Common Position” on the South 
China Sea’, in particular a commitment to the DOC and an 
‘early adoption of a Code of Conduct’. While this outcome falls 
far short of resolution to the dispute, Indonesia was pivotal in 
reducing tensions. 
15       However, its efforts to maintain such status may represent one of the 
shrudests diplomatic ploys in ASEAN’s history. In reality, China’s 9 dash-line 
(map) overlaps with Indonesia’s Natuna gas fi eld, Exclusive Economic Zone, and 
continental shelf. A senior offi cial from Kemlu (Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry) did 
ackwowledge that Jakarta sent a letter of protest to Beijing over the map but did 
not receive a response. She stated that Jakarta then sent an envoy to ask about 
this and that Beijing verbally assured Jakarta that ‘our interests do not confl ict with 
yours’. Interview by Christopher Roberts with Senior Offi cial from Kemlu (Jakarta), 
January 2013. See also, Christopher B. Roberts, ‘China and the South China Sea: 
What Happened to Asean’s Solidarity?’, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 
available at: http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/.
16       Donald K. Emmerson, ‘ASEAN Stumbles in Phnom Penh’, PacNet, 23 
July 2012.
17       Vietnam and the Philippines wanted specifi c references to Chinese 
aggression such as the Scarborough Shoal incident and Beijing’s award 
of hydrocarbon exploration leases within Vietnam’s EEZ. Ibid. In relation to 
Cambodia’s consultations with China, see ‘Cambodia’s Foreign Relations; Losing 
the Limelight’, The Economist, 17 July 2012. Moreover, Cambodia’s Secretary of 
State for Finance has publically acknowledged that it fi nancially benefi ted from 
Beijing ‘in appreciation for the part played by Cambodia as the chair of ASEAN to 
maintain good cooperation between China and ASEAN’. ‘Brunei Carefully Pursues 
Binding Code to Settle South China Sea Dispute’, IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, 
3 April 2013. These events were further reaffi rmed by political elite from Cambodia 
during fi eldwork in April 2013.
18       ‘ASEAN Struggles for Unity over South China Sea’, Agence France Presse, 
12 July 2012.
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The willingness of Indonesia to maintain an active role in 
mediating disputes and crises is positive because ASEAN 
cannot expect this role to derive from weaker members such 
as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, or Brunei Darussalam. As Pek 
Koon Heng states, ‘[i]t’s like fl ying geese. The lead goose goes 
ahead and the others follow. So, it’s a matter of how quickly 
or how slowly the others are fl ying and this is very much an 
ASEAN process. I think that the weaker will always be helped by 
the stronger in ASEAN.’19 In this context, Dr Yayan Mulyana, a 
Senior Offi cial from the Indonesian President’s Offi ce, argues that 
Indonesia has maintained a very important role as a ‘consensus 
builder’ within ASEAN and, importantly, its ASEAN counterparts 
have recognised this role.20 Nonetheless, the continued necessity 
for Indonesia’s ad hoc diplomacy demonstrates that ASEAN 
has not yet developed an effective set of binding dispute or 
crisis settlement mechanisms.21 Further, the prospects for such 
institutions in the future remain low due to continuing lack of trust 
in the ASEAN Secretariat and/or other ASEAN members to rule 
over a dispute appropriately.22 
INDONESIA AS AN AGENT OF 
INSTITUTIONAL AND NORMATIVE CHANGE? 
Since the establishment of ASEAN, Indonesia has actively led 
and developed ASEAN’s norms and institutions. Early examples 
include Indonesia’s role in the creation of the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (TAC), and the fi rst Bali Concord.23 However, 
as noted, the nature of Indonesia’s foreign policy and leadership 
in ASEAN shifted following its consolidation of democracy. 
Consequently, Indonesia has viewed the aforementioned 
considerations together with a proliferation of new non-
traditional security challenges in a very different light than it had 
previously, and this has contributed to reassessment by Jakarta 
of the utility of the region’s exisitng norms and institutions. For 
example, from the perspective of Indonesia’s Director of Public 
Diplomacy, Umar Hadi, the ASEAN Way represented ‘a solution 
to a given problem in a given time, but today we need to refl ect 
on whether this solution is still valid or is still workable for 
another set of problems.’24 
19       SophatSoeung, ‘As Summit Opens, ASEAN Faces Test of Leadership’, 
[cited 27 December 2012] available at: 
http://www.voacambodia.com/content/as summit-opens-asean-faces-test-of-
leadership-145000845/1356.
20       Presentation by Dr. Yayan Mulyana, ANU National Security College 
Workshop, ‘Indonesia’s Ascent: Power, Leadership and Asia’s Security’, Jakarta, 23 
January 2013.
21       ASEAN has established, on paper, a High Council as well as an ASEAN 
Troika but neither mechanism can be employed unless all parties to a dispute agree 
and their fi ndings are not binding.
22       Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and 
Institutionalisation (Milton Park: Routledge, 2012) pp.147-87.
23       For an overview of these developments, see ibid., pp. 53-55.
24       ‘The Future of East and Southeast Asian Regionalism’, in East and 
Southeast Asia: International Relations and Security Perspectives, ed. Andrew Tan 
(London: Routledge, 2013) p. 286.
Given this new state of affairs, Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry 
drafted a policy document entitled ‘Towards an ASEAN Security 
Community’.25 According to the document, ASEAN should 
commit to the creation of a regional order where its members 
‘share dependable expectations of peaceful change’ and ‘rule 
out the use of force as a means of problem solving’.26 The central 
tenets of the proposal were then endorsed by all the ASEAN 
members through the second Bali Concord in October 2003.27 
The Bali Concord II also provides complementary goals for 
the creation of an ‘economic community’ and a ‘socio-cultural 
community’. In order to reshape the regional order, the document 
declared that the level of ‘ASEAN’s political and security 
cooperation’ would need to move ‘to a higher plane’ and also 
referred to ‘confl ict resolution’ and ‘post confl ict peace building’.28
While the second Bali Concord received signifi cant international 
attention, the full extent of Indonesia’s vision for change 
was encapsulated in its ‘Draft Plan of Action for a Security 
Community’. This document contained seventy-fi ve concrete 
steps for the realisation of a security community, including 
a regional commission for human rights and a regional 
peacekeeping force operating under a standby arrangement.29  
For reasons explained below, some of the more signifi cant 
aspects of the draft were either tempered or removed entirely.30  
Nonetheless, the Bali Concord II and the later Vientiane Plan 
of Action did indicate signifi cant normative change, including 
commitments to ‘human rights’ and a ‘democratic environment’.
25       ‘Towards an ASEAN Security Community’, Departemen Luar Negri 
(Department of Foreign Affairs), Deplu Paper on ASEAN Security Community, 
Tabled at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Cambodia, 16-18 June 2003, based 
on concept paper: Rizal Sukma, ‘The Future of ASEAN: Towards a Security 
Community’, paper presented at the seminar; ‘ASEAN Cooperation: Challenges 
and Prospects in the Current International Situation’, Permanent Mission of the 
Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, New York, 3 June 2003.
26       Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation, p. 3.
27       ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord Ii (Bali Concord Ii)’, ASEAN Secretariat, 
available at: http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm.
28       Ibid.
29       ‘The ASEAN Charter: A Crossroads for the Region?’, IDSS, available at: 
http://www.idss.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/IDSS602005.pdf.
30       Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation, p. 122.
A key outcome of these negotiations was the ASEAN Charter 
in 2007. The Charter was a signifi cant achievement in that 
it provided ASEAN with a legal personality and, through its 
ratifi cation into domestic law, bound the ASEAN members to a 
more formalised structure of regional governance—particularly 
in the economic sphere.31 Some noteworthy aspects included 
an agreement to proceed with certain economic initiatives even 
where the Association is short of complete consensus (e.g., 
the ASEAN-X principle) as well as the consolidation of confl ict 
resolution procedures in the economic sphere. However, while 
the Charter also referred to principles such as democracy 
and human rights, it contained a number of contradictory 
components including reaffi rmation of ASEAN’s long-stated 
principle of non-interference and the continuation of consensus-
based decision making in the political-security sphere.32 Further, 
the Charter did not provide any binding commitments regarding 
‘dispute settlement mechanisms’ or ‘confl ict resolution’. As 
Ambassador Barry Desker, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, argues, ‘the Charter was a disappointment 
because it codifi es existing norms and maintains its historical 
identity as an inter-governmental organisation’.33 
While Indonesia’s proposal for establishment of a human rights 
commission had initially been rejected, in July 2007 ASEAN 
announced that its members had agreed to create what was 
then termed a ‘human rights body’ and that its specifi c structure 
and purpose would be addressed in the Charter.34 However, the 
ASEAN members could not agree on its terms of reference in 
time for the fi nal Charter. Nonetheless, Indonesia persisted and 
the terms of reference for what is now known as the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) were 
concluded in October 2009. Through Indonesia’s leadership, 
ASEAN has established a formal schedule of AICHR programs 
occurring between 2012 and 2015 that are designed to advance 
the goals of the ASEAN Charter.35 The AICHR has conducted 
several dialogues with the ASEAN Commission of the Promotion 
and the Protection of the Rights of Women and Children in 
order to encourage steps towards the promotion of human 
rights in the region.36 These achievements notwithstanding, the 
commission’s purpose has been said to ‘promote’ rather than 
‘protect’ human rights and, consequently, it does not have the 
power to investigate any breaches of human rights.37 
31       Tommy Koh et al., ‘Charter Makes ASEAN Stronger, More United and 
Effective’, The Straits Times, 8 August 2007; ASEAN, ‘Charter of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations’, (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2007) pp.2, 4 & 18.
32       ‘Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’, pp. 2-4.
33       Barry Desker, ‘Where the ASEAN Charter Comes up Short’, The Straits 
Times, 18 July 2008.
34       ‘ASEAN Overcomes Resistance, Will Set up Regional Human Rights 
Commission’, Associated Press Newswires, 30 July 2007 2007, Jim Gomez, 
‘ASEAN Agrees to Human Rights Commission’, The Irrawaddy, available at: http://
www.irrawaddy.org.
35       I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja, ‘Developing Cooperation with ASEAN Dialog 
Partner’, Paper presented at the Centre for Education and Training of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 13 October 2012.
36       Ibid.
37       Shaun Narine, ‘ASEAN in the Twenty-First Century: A Sceptical Review’, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22, no. 3 (2009) p.370, ‘Asean’s ‘Human-
Rights’ Council: Not Off to a Great Start’, The Wall Street Journal, 25 October 2009.
As with its diplomacy in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, Indonesia 
has also been willing to act over human security and/or human 
rights issues. Thus, President Yudhoyono more recently called on 
Myanmar President Thein Sein to resolve the deadly communal 
confl ict between the Rakhine and Rohingya ethnic groups that 
have led to asylum-seekers fl owing into neighbouring ASEAN 
countries.38 While this challenge continues, earlier examples 
mentioned above—such as Indonesia’s role in the wake of 
Cyclone Nargis—are indicative of times when Indonesian 
diplomacy has succeeded in making a critical, benefi cial 
difference. Moreover, Indonesia’s consolidation of stronger 
institutions for governance means that it is now better equipped 
than ever to exercise a leadership role should the chairmanship 
of other members, such as Myanmar, be less than desirable. 
Indonesia’s broad success in democratisation also provides 
a model for other countries such as Myanmar. In relation to 
Myanmar Indonesia has been discreetly promoting political 
reforms and has hosted visits by the country’s presidential 
advisory team while also sending military reformers (e.g., 
Agus Wijoyo) to share Indonesia’s experience of democratic 
transition.39  In this regard, some non-ASEAN states have already 
asked if it would be willing to assist Myanmar with its democratic 
transition during its chair of ASEAN.40 
Indonesia’s role as an architect of ideas has made ASEAN a 
dynamic organisation that has been better able to adjust to—or 
at least to mitigate—many intra-regional and extra-regional 
challenges. However, the ambitious nature of Indonesia’s 
leadership during the past decade has led to other diffi culties and 
even resentment within some ASEAN quarters. During the course 
of research for a book entitled ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, 
Values and Institutionalisation, a broad range of complaints 
included that it was nothing more than an attempt to ‘reassert 
Indonesian leadership’; that it had been induced by the United 
States for the purpose of its war on terror, or that the proposal 
had been pushed through in a very ‘un-ASEAN like manner’.41 
38       Lutfi a, ‘Indonesia Leads From the Front on ASEAN’.
39       ‘Indonesia’s Quiet Diplomacy Triumphs in the Region’, The Jakarta Globe, 6 
August 2012.
40       Nicholas Perpitch, ‘Ausaid Myanmar Focus’, The Australian, 27 November 
2012, ‘Myanmar (Burma)/ASEAN: Myanmar Gets Help with Preparations for 
ASEAN Chair’, Thai News Service, 1 April 2013.
41       Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation, 
pp. 120-21.
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Despite these challenges, Indonesia has remained highly active 
both during its 2011 role as the ASEAN Chair and during the 
years that have followed.42 Aside from the already noted role of 
Indonesia in the South China Sea, Indonesia successfully pressed 
for the adoption of a ‘human rights declaration’ as well as the 
establishment of the ASEAN Institute of Peace and Reconciliation 
at the twenty-fi rst ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh (2012). During 
the chairmanship of Brunei in 2013, Indonesia launched several 
more initiatives including a post-2015 vision for the ‘ASEAN 
Community’. The post-2015 vision proposes further action 
concerning the consolidation of the ASEAN Community: stronger 
regional leadership; progress in the resolution of global issues; and 
the promotion of regional prosperity.43 As elaborated below, an 
additional key initiative was the proposal for an Indo-Pacifi c Treaty. 
As to the situation in the South China Sea, Indonesia also 
proposed the 3+1 formulation of the objectives of a regional 
code of conduct in the South China Sea (COC). The formula 
comprises: (i) promoting trust and confi dence; (ii) preventing 
incidents; and (iii) managing incidents when they occur. A 
precursor to these objectives is creating a condition conducive 
for the COC to take place.44 
LEADERSHIP AND INFLUENCE: INDONESIA, 
ASEAN, AND THE GLOBAL NEXUS
Indonesia’s size, together with the pace of its economic growth, 
means that it is increasingly well placed to represent ASEAN’s 
interests in the broader Indo-Pacifi c region. Thus, the proposal 
for an Indo-Pacifi c treaty is intended to maintain ASEAN 
centrality by extending and consolidating the Association’s 
norms concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-
use of force in the broader Indo-Pacifi c region. A key outcome of 
its realisation would be a shift from the current ‘trust defi cit’ to a 
‘strategic partnership’; a commitment to the peaceful settlement 
of disputes; and the capacity to respond appropriately to 
geopolitical change.45 Given recent increases to the level of 
strategic competition and tension, Indonesia’s belief is that a 
post-2015 ASEAN will need a treaty based arrangement that is 
adequately legally binding for Southeast Asia and the broader 
Indo-Pacifi c.46 
42       As a high level offi cial from Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry states, “Indonesia 
has been very active in almost all crises in ASEAN, if not all, both during its 
chairmanship or other country’s chairmanship. Therefore, Indonesia believes that it 
will still play an important role after the chairmanship is handed over to Cambodia in 
2012 and then from Cambodia to Brunei Darussalam in 2013.”, Interview by Erline 
Widyaningsih with senior level offi cer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1, 
Jakarta, 16 February 2011.
43       ‘Roundup: ASEAN Vows to Speed up Community Building’, Philippines 
News Agency, 20 January 2014.
44       ‘Transcrip of Speech of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia’, DR. R. 
Marty M. Natalegawa, at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat, Hua Hin, Thailand, 
14 August 2013.
45       ‘Indonesian Foreign Minister Receives Honorary Doctorate Degree’, 
Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Canberra, 29 August 2013.
46       Ibid.
The Indo-Pacifi c treaty proposal is in line with Natalegawa’s 
vision to establish a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ in which the expanded 
‘regional architecture’ would more actively involve a broader 
range of middle and great powers in a comprehensive range 
of sectors including those of security, politics, the environment, 
the economy, and the socio-cultural realm.47 While the vision 
for a dynamic equilibrium pragmatically recognises the 
prevalence of power,48 it acknowledges that regional order can 
be enhanced through multi-sectoral enmeshment—complex 
interdependence—and the normative constraints provided by 
an Indo-Pacifi c treaty. However, rising strategic competition 
between Japan and China, India and China, and the United 
States and China; questions concerning the legitimacy of the 
Chinese regime domestically; mounting resource scarcity; and 
continued economic instability globally, raise signifi cant caveats 
against the prospects for converting these visions into reality. 
The limitations of ASEAN and Indonesia are even more apparent 
considering the possibility that the ‘long peace of ASEAN’ may, 
in the words of Mark Beeson, ‘owe as much to the widely noted 
general decline in the level of inter-state confl ict as it does to 
anything ASEAN itself may have done’.49 
Nonetheless, Indonesia’s leadership has also been critical to the 
establishment of the East Asia Summit and ASEAN’s inclusion 
of Australia and New Zealand as well as, eventually, the United 
States and Russia. In line with some of the motives behind the 
Indo-Pacifi c treaty, Indonesia helped to persuade countries 
such as Australia and the United States to accede to the TAC 
as a precondition to becoming members of the EAS.50 In turn, 
Indonesia’s leadership and involvement was a key factor behind 
the willingness of the United States to engage with the forum. 
Indonesia’s ascent, combined with its demographics, location 
and historical role in ASEAN, has meant that the United States 
and China have increasingly viewed enhanced relations with 
Jakarta as the ‘giant prize’ and both have invested signifi cant 
time and resources to that end in their military, security, political 
and economic spheres.51 For example, in September 2010 China 
formalised a defence industrial relationship and the United States 
followed, two months later, with a comprehensive partnership 
with Jakarta on military affairs. Economically, Indonesia is also 
a key emerging market for the United States and China, in 
2013 strengthening a fi ve-year program for economic and trade 
cooperation designed to increase bilateral trade to US$80 billion 
by 2015.52 
47       ‘A Conversation with Marty Natalegawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic 
of Indonesia’, Council on Foreign Relations, available at: 
http://www.cfr.org/indonesia/conversation-marty-natalegawa-minister-foreign-
affairs-republic-indonesia/p22984.
48       Rizal Sukma, ‘Friendship and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacifi c: Will a Treaty 
Help?’, The Jakarta Post, 28 May 2013.
49      Mark Beeson, ‘Hegemonic Transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese 
and American Power’, Review of International Studies 35 (2009) p.339. See also 
Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation.
50       Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘Will the United States Join the East Asian 
Summit’, East Asia Forum, 18 June 2010.
51       Brad Nelson, ‘Can Indonesia Lead ASEAN’, The Diplomat, 5 December 2013.
52       ‘External Affairs, Indonesia’, Jane’s Intelligence, 2013.
Jakarta’s new democratic image has strengthened Indonesia’s 
relations with non-ASEAN countries such as Australia and the 
United States. Aside from removing obstacles to cooperation 
with military institutions such as kopassus or the sale of lethal 
military equipment, Indonesia’s contemporary image and role has 
enhanced ASEAN’s image. For example, Hillary Clinton praised 
Indonesia’s efforts in securing cooperation on the part of the 
ASEAN states in regard to the South China Sea, observing: ‘[t]hat 
show of unity is very important for us’.53 The United States has 
also turned to Indonesia to assist constructively with issues such 
as the democratisation process in Myanmar. These developments 
have provided Indonesia with the status and legitimacy to act as 
an intermediary between ASEAN and extra-mural actors, a role 
that was evident in the wake of Cyclone Nargis.
The rise of Indonesia’s infl uence beyond the territorial borders 
of Southeast Asia has led some analysts to depict it as a pivot 
state that possesses the ‘resilience’ and ‘fl exibility’ to reposition 
itself to adapt to shifting strategic needs, i.e., ‘the fl exibility to 
pivot among potential partners’.54 Such capacity is strengthened 
by its long-standing policy of ‘non-alignment’ (‘free and active’) 
and associated status as a founding member of the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM).55 Indonesia’s leverage and voice is 
also reinforced by its membership in the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference (OIC), the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), Asia-Pacifi c 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) and, since 2008, the G20.56 In 
many respects, Indonesia’s gain is ASEAN’s gain as Indonesia can 
its infl uence to represent the needs of ASEAN—and developing 
countries more broadly—as has been the case regarding 
President Yudhoyono’s diplomacy in the G20 forum.57  President 
Yudhoyono was selected to co-Chair the High-Level Panel of the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda together with the President of 
Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom David Cameron. The High-Level Panel consisted of 27 
members and was tasked by the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
to advise on the global development framework beyond 2015, 
53       Ismira Lutfi a, ‘Clinton Applauds Indonesia’s ASEAN Role’, The Jakarta 
Globe, 4 September 2012.
54       Irar Nusa Bhakti and Leng C. Tan, ‘Presidential Hopefuls’ Checklist 2014: 
Resilience’, The Jakarta Post, 12 November 2012.
55       For a contemporary example of the role of Indonesia in NAM together 
with the continued relevance of the NAM block in the UNGA, see Christopher 
B. Roberts, Asean’s Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security 
Community, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), pp. 150-51.
56       Indonesia was also pivotal to the consolidation of APEC as an institution as, 
in the face of opposition from Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir bin Mohamad, 
President Soeharto offered to host the second summit.
57       Nani Afrida, ‘Indonesia to Talk on Crisis Prevention’, The Jakarta Post, 29 
October 2011. See also Winfried Weck, ‘ASEAN and G-20 – Indonesia’s Foreign 
Policy Representatives’, Kas International Reports, No.2, 2011, p. 22, Zamroni 
Salim, ‘Indonesia in the G20: Benefi ts and Cahllenges Amidst National Interests 
and Priorities’, in G20 - Perceptions and Perspectives for Global Governance, 
ed. Wilhelm Hofmeister (Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011). Further, 
according to BegindaPakpahan, ‘[i]n practice, Indonesia should be a bridge builder 
between ASEAN, East Asia and the G20. Indonesia can balance its role as a 
promoter of aspirations from the developing nations in ASEAN, the EAS and the 
G20. At the same time, Indonesia can further its national interests by channelling 
them into the policy formulations within ASEAN, the EAS and the G20’. Beginda 
Pakpahan, ‘The Role of Indonesia in ASEAN, in East Asia Summit and in G20’, The 
Jakarta Post, 4 October 2011.
the target date for the Millennium Development Goals. The Panel 
submitted its report on 21 May 2013.58 
Nonetheless, Indonesia’s rising global profi le and activism has 
led to some negative implications including, for example, the 
perspective that Indonesia prefers ‘to go it alone’, and is ‘acting 
in its own interests, not those of ASEAN’.59 Such perspectives 
are inevitable given the continuation of intra-ASEAN distrust and 
concerns about the risk of confl ict. For example, in an elite-level 
survey involving one hundred participants from throughout the 
ASEAN nations, only 40.2 per cent of interviewees said that 
they could trust other countries in Southeast Asia to be good 
neighbours. Interestingly, in a separate communal-level survey 
of 819 ASEAN citizens, 37.5 per cent responded ‘yes’ to the 
same question and only 26.5 per cent of the 108 Indonesian 
participants indicated that they could trust their neighbours.60 
The challenge of trust is reinforced by historical animosities (e.g., 
konfrontasi), ethnic rivalries (e.g., Singapore as a Chinese state), 
and more contemporary sources of tension including territorial 
issues such as Ambalat and the Ligitan and Sipadan Islands. 
58       ‘High Level Post-2015 Development Agenda’, [cited on 18 January 2014], 
available at: http://www.post2015hlp.org/about/
59       Luke Hunt, ‘Indonesia capitalizes on ASEAN Divisions’, (cited 2 January 
2013) available at: http://thediplomat.com/asean-beat/2012/07/25/indonesia-
capitalizes-on-asean-divisions/. Similar perspectives were also raised by Tang Siew 
Mun and Ralf Emmers. Interview with Tang Siew Mun, Director of Foreign Policy and 
Security Studies at the ISIS Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 4 March 2011. ‘Interview with 
Dr. Ralf Emmers, Associate Professor’, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 March 2011.
60       Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation, 
pp. 155-56.
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The trust defi cit in ASEAN and the broader Indo-Pacifi c is 
strongly interdependent with confl icting strategic alignments,61  
contending identities, and/or divergent political values.62 This 
mix of factors has impeded ASEAN’s progress and Indonesia’s 
leadership. Consequently, segments of the elite in Jakarta have 
become increasingly frustrated and this has led to calls for a 
‘post ASEAN foreign policy’.63 This perspective has at times 
found traction within Indonesia’s leadership. For example, when 
Singapore objected to Indonesia’s proposal to admit East Timor 
as a member of ASEAN at the 1999 informal ASEAN Summit, 
President Abdurman Wahid (known as Gus Dur) later suggested 
that ASEAN could be replaced with a new ‘West Pacifi c Forum’ 
with Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines at its heart.64 While 
this was a relatively isolated perspective at the time, such calls 
have become increasingly prevalent within Indonesia’s parliament 
and other sectors of the political elite.
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECTS
Indonesia has performed a role in ASEAN as a manager of crises 
and a mediator of disputes, proposing new ideas to enhance the 
Association, and strengthening the Association’s global profi le. 
Each role has positive and sometimes negative implications for 
Indonesia and ASEAN. Jakarta’s function as a mediator has 
often helped to resolve, or at least mitigate, ASEAN’s problems; 
however, it simultaneously demonstrates that ASEAN does 
not have effective dispute or crisis settlement mechanisms. 
Meanwhile, Indonesia’s role as a creator of ideas is benefi cial 
to the evolution of the Association if it is to become more 
effective as a coordinating and decision-making body capable of 
protecting the citizens of ASEAN’s member states. While much 
remains to be done in this regard, this issue brief has provided 
several examples whereby Indonesia has made a tangible 
difference – management of responses to Cyclone Nargis; 
the Preah Vihear Temple; and Indonesia’s lead in developing 
ASEAN’s institutions. 
61       Thus, the aforementioned survey also indicated that Indonesia’s leadership 
in ASEAN and beyond is further challenged by the diversity of strategic alignment 
where the political and academic elite from four of the ASEAN member countries 
listed China as one of their country’s three most important strategic allies while 
three other ASEAN countries selected the U.S. for the same question. Ibid., p. 163.
62       ‘State Weakness and Political Values: Ramifi cations for the ASEAN 
Community’, in ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia, ed. Ralf Emmers, 
(Milton Park: Routledge, 2012) pp. 11-26.
63       Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ‘Indonesia to Boost Human Rights, Doubts 
Support from ASEAN’, The Nation, 19 January 2011, ‘A Post-ASEAN Foreign 
Policy for a Post-G8 World’, The Jakarta Post, 5 October 2009.
64       Gus Dur initially made this call during a speech at the Indonesian embassy in 
Singapore but the idea was then repeated and escalated to formal discussions with 
other pacifi c countries such as Australia. John McBeth, ‘Indonesia - Wahid and 
Sukarno’s Gold’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 December 2000 Amit Baruah, 
‘Australia Backs W. Pacifi c Forum’, The Hindu, 9 December 2000.
The nature of Indonesia’s ascent has also provided a model for 
other ASEAN members; it has improved ASEAN’s international 
profi le and enhanced the opportunities to promote ASEAN’s 
interests in global fora. Despite Indonesia’s utility for ASEAN, 
some quarters within ASEAN have resented or competed 
against Indonesia’s leadership—or, arguably, hegemony—within 
ASEAN while others have resisted its new form of leadership 
since its consolidation of democracy. Such resistance has been 
strongest over the proposals that that are seen to impinge 
on sovereignty and regime security—e.g., the creation of a 
human rights body, a peacekeeping force, a changed decision-
making system, and formalised confl ict resolution mechanisms. 
Further, there have also been signifi cant diffi culties regarding 
the transformation of vision into reality due to an associated 
aversion to legally binding institutions.
The current divide in the political systems of ASEAN and the 
broader Indo-Pacifi c has other implications. For example, should 
other countries follow the lead of Indonesia, and more recently 
Myanmar, in moving towards the consolidation of democracy, 
then the challenge of trust and contradictory strategic alignments 
will be far easier to resolve. Such dynamics were evident in the 
recent rapprochement between Indonesia and the United States. 
In this context, while Indonesia’s ambition to maintain ‘dynamic 
equilibrium’ for itself and ASEAN is in a material sense the 
optimal option, such a policy may become impossible should the 
actions of a major power be irreconcilable with its identity and 
values, e.g., China in the South China Sea. 
Additional challenges concerning the degree and nature of 
Indonesia’s future leadership include uncertainty over Indonesia’s 
ASEAN policy following the 2014 Presidential elections as well as 
other domestic issues such as religious intolerance, corruption, 
and West Papua. However, there are many opportunities ahead 
for Indonesia and ASEAN including Indonesia’s continued 
membership in the G20, the openness of some of the weaker 
ASEAN countries to work with and learn from Indonesia (e.g., 
Myanmar), and the multifaceted benefi ts for ASEAN should 
Indonesia’s economy continue to grow. As revealed in many 
of the other issue briefs from this special edition, Indonesia’s 
continued ascent faces many uncertainties. Nonetheless, 
and regardless of the pace by which Indonesia grows or 
declines, one thing is certain: ASEAN’s future is inseparable 
from Indonesia’s future. Therefore, it is in the interests of all the 
ASEAN members to do whatever possible to aid Indonesia’s 
continued growth and stability while also trying to ensure that 
Jakarta remains actively engaged in Southeast Asia. 
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INTRODUCTION
The contemporary rise of Indonesia, ‘Asia’s third giant’ according 
to a recently released anthology on Indonesia,1 has in recent 
times elicited a gush of compliments from pundits about 
Indonesia’s prospects as an economic power—it remains the 
only Southeast Asian country granted membership in the Group 
of Twenty (G20), and is a member-designate of the soon-to-be 
‘BRIICS’ club of emerging economic titans—and as a diplomatic 
power.2 This has coincided with the country’s democratic 
transition in the post-Suharto era: a diffi cult one, by most 
counts.3 Coupled with its historical leadership of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) and its claim to fame as the world’s most 
populous Muslim-majority nation, Indonesia’s transformation 
has served notice to major and regional powers alike that 
Jakarta deserves to be courted and welcomed among the ranks 
of the world’s most powerful and privileged nations. Indeed, 
Indonesia’s self-awareness of its growing importance has led it 
to pursue what one pundit has termed ‘confi dence’ diplomacy, 
as embodied in its enhanced role in the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), increased engagement with the great 
powers, active use of multilateral diplomacy, and its embrace of 
peace and democracy as values worth pursing and advocating.4 
On the other hand, Indonesia’s longstanding role as ‘fi rst 
among equals’ in ASEAN has increasingly been frustrated by 
the obduracy of some member nations of the organisation 
who resist efforts by Jakarta and others to deepen regional 
integration and strengthen institutional cohesion. This has 
led at least one eminent Indonesian political commentator to 
remonstrate openly about ASEAN countries that ‘do not share 
Indonesia’s passion for and commitment to ASEAN,’ while 
urging his nation’s leaders to consider the merits of a ‘post-
ASEAN foreign policy’ for Indonesia: 
1        See, Anthony Reid, ed., Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third 
Giant, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012).
2       Santo Darmosumarto, ‘Indonesia: A new ‘middle power’’, The Jakarta Post, 
11 November 2012, Richard Dobbs, Fraser Thompson, and Arief Budiman, ‘5 
Reasons to Believe in the Indonesian Miracle: Why this amazing archipelago is on 
track to be the world’s seventh largest economy’, Foreign Policy, 21 September 
2012, accessed 12 January 2013, available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2012/09/21/5_reasons_to_believe_in_the_indonesian_miracle?page=full, 
‘Everybody’s friend: Indonesia deserves a better image’, The Economist, 11 
September 2009, Hugh White, ‘Indonesia’s rise is the big story we’re missing’, The 
Age, 29 May 2012.
3       See, for example, Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, eds., Problems 
of Democratization in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society, (Singapore: 
ISEAS, 2012).
4       Those elements are discussed in Jiang Zhida, ‘Indonesia’s ‘Confi dence’ 
Diplomacy under the Yudhoyono Government’, China Institute of International 
Studies, 31 December 2012, accessed 17 January 2013, available at: http://www.
ciis.org.cn/english/2012-12/31/content_5638110.htm.
If other ASEAN countries do not share Indonesia’s 
passion for and commitment to ASEAN, then it is 
indeed time for us to start another round of debate 
on the merits of a post-ASEAN foreign policy. We 
have many other important foreign policy agendas to 
attend to other than just whining and agonizing over 
ASEAN’s failures.5 
Yet this sense of frustration felt by Indonesian policy elites over 
their nation’s regional aspirations and ASEAN’s poor track record 
of achievements is by no means new. Commenting on the 
contrast between Indonesia’s regional vision and its limited role 
as ‘regional spectator,’ Michael Leifer once noted Indonesia’s 
sense of frustration at ‘not being able to infl uence events in the 
region [which has been] reinforced by the fact that individual 
members went their own way in foreign policy.’6 This evidently 
led President Suharto to ‘express disappointment at ASEAN’s 
limited progress.’7  
There have been mounting frustrations and allusions to an 
Indonesian foreign policy no longer necessarily bound by 
an abiding commitment to ASEAN, the institution that has 
ostensibly played such a crucial role in Indonesia’s regional and, 
in some ways, extra-regional relations. In view of this, what 
has been the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) government’s 
foreign policy in regard to the extra-regional world, and more 
specifi cally the great powers? Does the concept of ‘dynamic 
equilibrium’ advocated by Indonesia’s foreign minister, Marty 
Natalegawa, at all constitute Jakarta’s new vision—and, for our 
purposes, a ‘post-ASEAN’ vision—of Indonesia’s relations with 
the major powers, or does it refl ect an inherent consistency 
with a more established outlook? Ultimately, how has ASEAN 
mattered historically in Indonesia’s foreign relations, and how, if 
at all, might it do so in the future? 
ARGUMENT
This issue brief makes three interrelated arguments against 
the backdrop of Indonesia’s contemporary emergence as a 
noteworthy economic and diplomatic player in its own right, 
its evolving ties with the great and regional powers, and its 
longstanding vision of Southeast Asia as a region unmolested 
by external powers and managed foremost by its own residents. 
The arguments are as follows: 
5       Rizal Sukma, ‘Insight: Without unity, no centrality’, The Jakarta Post, 17 July 
2012, Rizal Sukma, ‘Indonesia needs a post-ASEAN foreign policy’, The Jakarta 
Post, 30 June 2009, Rizal Sukma, ‘A post-ASEAN foreign policy for a post-G8 
world’, The Jakarta Post, 5 October 2009, Jusuf Wanandi, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign 
Policy and the Meaning of ASEAN’, PacNet No.27, 15 May 2008.
6       Leifer, cited in Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and 
Regionalism, (Singapore: ISEAS, 1994), p. 9.
7       Ibid.
1. Indonesia will continue to hedge against the major 
powers, especially China and the United States 
First, Indonesia’s perdurable concern that its regional 
environment should be as secure and stable as possible—in 
short, conditions most suited for developing an Indonesia that is 
‘sovereign, independent, just and prosperous’8 and, it might be 
added, democratic—has remained fundamentally unchanged. 
Indonesian foreign minister Marty Natalegawa’s concept of 
‘dynamic equilibrium,’9 which urges peaceful coexistence 
among the great powers in Asia, is the most recent expression 
of that longstanding aspiration. Nor, as a consequence of 
its contemporary transformation, has Indonesia’s enduring 
predilection for strategic hedging been replaced by an explicit 
policy to bandwagon with or to balance against particular 
powers.10 According to Rizal Sukma, Indonesia’s strategic 
partnerships with extra-regional countries such as Australia, 
India, Japan and South Korea ‘clearly refl ects Jakarta’s desire 
to see that the emerging regional order would not be dominated 
only by the US and China.’11 Going further, Leonard Sebastian 
has argued that ‘Indonesia does not want to be tied to a US or 
China dominated security web. It wants an independent middle-
power role to assert itself both regionally and globally.’12 This 
implies Indonesia’s long-held aim of having a ‘free and active’ 
(Bebas-Aktif) foreign policy, fi rst articulated by Vice President 
Mohammad Hatta in a speech in September 1948 and originally 
designed to mitigate persistent domestic tensions between 
secular nationalism and religious nationalism,13 which continues 
to guide the country’s approach to its external relations despite 
its democratic transition in the post-Suharto period. 
Jakarta has held fi rmly to the notion that the management 
of regional order in Southeast Asia is best left to the region’s 
countries themselves. As Adam Malik, former Indonesian foreign 
minister, observed in 1971:
8       Mohammad Hatta, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.31, No.3, 
April 1953, pp. 441—52.
9       Indonesia’s Foreign Affairs Minister, ‘‘‘Dynamic Equilibrium” in the Asia Pacifi c: 
Interview with Marty Natalegawa’, Australia Network, 23 February 2012, accessed 
7 January 2013, available at: http://australianetwork.com/focus/s3440427.htm
10       See, Evelyn Goh, ‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast 
Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies’, International Security, Vol.32, No.3 
(2007/08), pp. 113–57, Jeongseok Lee, ‘Hedging against Uncertain Future: The 
Response of East Asian Secondary Powers to Rising China’, International Political 
Science Association XXII World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, Spain, 8–12 
July 2012.
11       Rizal Sukma, ‘Regional Security Order in Southeast Asia: An Indonesian View’, 
paper presented at the Asia–Pacifi c Roundtable (APR), 28–30 May 2012, p. 5.
12       Leonard Sebastian, ‘Indonesia’s regional diplomacy: Imperative to maintain 
ASEAN cohesion’, RSIS Commentaries, No.132/2012, 23 July 2012.
13       See, Anak Agung Bany Perwita, Indonesia and the Muslim World: Islam 
and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond (Copenhagen: NIAS 
Press, 2007); Rizal Sukma, Islam in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, (London: Routledge 
Curzon, 2003).
The nations of Southeast Asia should consciously 
work toward the day when security in their own region 
will be the primary responsibility of the Southeast 
Asian nations themselves. Not through big power 
alignments, not through the building of contending 
military pacts or military arsenals but through 
strengthening the state of respective endurance, 
through effective regional cooperation with other 
states sharing this basic view on world affairs.14  
In other words, regional security is to be achieved through 
intramural cooperation rather than through dependence on 
external powers. At the same time, the realisation of such an 
approach to regional security—‘regional solutions to regional 
problems,’ as the mantra goes15—has always been subject to the 
competing preferences of individual Southeast Asian countries, 
on the one hand, and the limits of national capacity on the other.16 
However, not unlike its Southeast Asian counterparts, Indonesia’s 
aspiration for regional autonomy did not prevent it from engaging, 
where it deemed necessary, in bilateral security relationships 
with an external power. In that regard, Indonesia has pursued 
security ties with the United States since 1951—other than 
Washington’s suspension of the International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) programme for much of the 1990s into the 
fi rst half of the 2000s in protest against human rights abuses 
perpetrated by the Indonesian military17—and with Australia since 
the 1990s. And while historical ties with China have in the past 
been complicated by Jakarta’s fears over Beijing’s political and 
ideological infl uence on Indonesia’s Chinese minority—indeed, 
the project of post-Confrontation regional reconciliation through 
ASEAN was arguably embraced by Indonesia as a prospective 
bulwark against the apparent threat posed by China18—Indonesia 
normalised ties with China in 1990, and bilateral relations have 
signifi cantly improved since 1998.19  Nor has Indonesian disdain 
towards collective defence systems prevented Jakarta from 
actively participating in wider regional security arrangements 
such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), whose membership 
includes external major powers. If anything, Indonesia’s support 
for the ARF is, as Rizal Sukma has argued, an indication of its 
willingness to accommodate the legitimate security interests of 
extra-regional powers in regional affairs.20
14       Cited in Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1983), pp. 148–9.
15       Michael Leifer, ‘Regional Solutions to Regional Problems?’, in Gerald Segal 
and David S. G. Goodman, eds., Towards Recovery in Pacifi c Asia (London: 
Routledge, 2000), pp. 108–118.
16       Rizal Sukma, ‘Indonesia and Regional Security: The Quest for Cooperative 
Security’, in See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds., Asia–Pacifi c Security 
Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order, (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 
2004), p. 71.
17       Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, ‘Indonesia looks forward to reinstatement of IMET 
program’, The Jakarta Post, 30 November 2002.
18       Bernard K. Gordon and Sheldon W. Simon, among others, have 
emphasised this point.
19       Rizal Sukma, ‘Indonesia–China Relations: The Politics of Re-Engagement’, 
Asian Survey, Vol.49, Issue 4, (2009), pp. 591–608.
20       Sukma, Indonesia and Regional Security: The Quest for Cooperative 
Security, p. 72
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All this suggests that Indonesia has no interest in seeing the 
Southeast Asian region, much less the Indonesian archipelago, 
become a theatre of great power competition. Nor would 
Indonesia seek to infl uence the regional balance of power by 
siding with either the Chinese or the Americans against the other. 
2. ASEAN and its wider complex of institutions will 
remain relevant to Indonesia’s engagement of the 
great powers
Second, while Indonesia’s rise and its persistent frustration over 
the lack of cohesion and progress in ASEAN has led to renewed 
calls within certain Indonesian quarters for a post-ASEAN foreign 
policy—further buoyed by suggestions from particular Australians 
for a regional concert of powers which includes Indonesia but 
arguably sidelines ASEAN21—ASEAN nonetheless remains 
crucial to Indonesia. It is important not least as a convenient 
institutional platform through which Indonesia could proactively 
engage the great and regional powers that regularly dialogue 
with ASEAN and participate in wider regional arrangements led 
by ASEAN, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN+3, 
the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and—
arguably less so as a consequence of this arrangement’s waning 
relevance—the ARF. Crucially, if Sebastian were right about 
Indonesia’s desire to play a ‘middle power role’ in international 
affairs commensurate with its rising power and infl uence,22 then 
it makes more sense for Jakarta to see ASEAN and its wider 
complex of region-wide institutions as ready platforms through 
which Indonesia can fulfi l its middle power ambitions. More often 
than not, middle powers rely on multilateral diplomacy to achieve 
foreign policy goals,23 and there is little to suggest that Indonesia 
will deviate from this norm. 
21       Refer here to the idea for an Asian concert of powers purportedly suggested 
by leading Australian security intellectuals such as Michael Wesley, among others, 
at a Sydney conference in December 2009 dedicated to introducing Kevin Rudd’s 
proposal for an ‘Asia–Pacifi c Community’ to policy practitioners and intellectuals 
from around the Asian region and soliciting their reactions to it. For a recent 
analysis of the Rudd proposal and its implications for the Asia–Pacifi c region, refer 
to See Seng Tan, ‘Spectres of Leifer: Insights on Regional Order and Security for 
Southeast Asia Today’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.34, No.3 (2012), p. 316.
22       Sebastian, Indonesia’s regional diplomacy: Imperative to maintain ASEAN 
cohesion.
23       The link between middle power diplomacy and the appropriation of 
multilateral institutions and initiatives through which to achieve its aims is often 
acknowledged. See, Sook-Jong Lee, ‘South Korea as a New Middle Power: 
Seeking Complex Diplomacy’, EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper, (Seoul: 
East Asia Institute, September 2012), Mark Beeson, ‘Can Australia Save the World? 
The Limits and Possibilities of Middle Power Diplomacy’, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol.65, No.5 (2011), pp. 563–77.
Remarkably, for all its fl aws, ASEAN continues to enjoy the 
support of major and regional powers, which regard ASEAN-
based arrangements like the EAS, despite persistent complaints 
about their ineffi cacy, as useful frameworks for regional 
dialogue and interaction. If anything, such regional cooperative 
frameworks enable Indonesia to pursue and conceivably realise 
its goal of dynamic equilibrium. Granted, Indonesia’s recent 
exertions at preventing meltdowns in ASEAN unity have no 
doubt frustrated Jakarta, but they also highlight the considerable 
lengths to which Indonesia is prepared to go to redeem the 
embattled organisation. At the ASEAN annual meeting of 
foreign ministers in Phnom Penh in July 2012, Natalegawa’s 
frantic shuttle diplomacy in the wake of apparent disharmony 
helped to produce the six point ‘consensus’; similarly, his work 
and that of his fellow ministers at the summit in November 
201224 underscore the salience ASEAN still holds for Indonesia. 
Prior to the Phnom Penh fi asco, Indonesia had also served as 
mediator—and, subsequently, agreed to serve as monitor—
when hostilities broke out between Cambodia and Thailand 
in February 2011 over the land surrounding the Preah Vihear 
temple near the Cambodian–Thai border.25 These efforts suggest 
that contrary to advice urged by a number of Jakarta’s policy 
intellectuals, the Yudhoyono government remains more or less 
committed to ASEAN for the foreseeable future.26 If anything, 
the Indonesian leadership appears to hold the view that 
notwithstanding its nation’s rising power and infl uence, without 
a strong and cohesive ASEAN, Indonesia’s quest to become a 
middle power would be seriously hindered. As one analyst has 
put it, ‘A turbulent and weakened ASEAN will allow a vacuum 
leading to great power collision thereby leaving Indonesia on its 
own and vulnerable.’27 
24       Donald K. Emmerson, ‘Beyond the six points: How far will Indonesia 
go?’, East Asia Forum, 29 July 2011, available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.
org/2012/07/29/beyond-the-six-points-how-far-will-indonesia-go/, accessed 17 
January 2013, Don Emmerson, ‘ASEAN Stumbles in Phnom Penh’, PacNet, No.45, 
19 July 2012.
25       See, International Crisis Group, ‘Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-
Cambodian Border Confl ict’, Crisis Group Asia Report, No.215, 6 December 2011.
26       This point is emphatically made in Jiang, ‘Indonesia’s ‘Confi dence’ 
Diplomacy under the Yudhoyono Government’.
27       Sebastian, Indonesia’s regional diplomacy: Imperative to maintain ASEAN 
cohesion.
3. Indonesian foreign policy has never been 
ASEAN-centric to the exclusion of other pathways 
and pillars
The foregoing two points emphasise the appeal of a post-
ASEAN foreign policy as useful for clarifying Indonesia’s strategic 
interests and the appropriate modalities through which to 
achieve its interests. However, it is necessary to recognise that 
this appeal is misleading because Indonesia’s foreign policy has 
never been centred primarily on ASEAN. To be sure, the received 
wisdom has long presupposed, with good reason, the centrality 
of ASEAN to Indonesia’s foreign policy. Take, for instance, the 
following contention by Jusuf Wanandi, a leading Indonesian 
policy intellectual:
If ASEAN cannot move beyond its lowest common 
denominator, as defi ned by Laos or Myanmar, it 
is likely that Indonesia will seek to become more 
independent from ASEAN. In the last 40 years, 
Indonesia has become too dependent on ASEAN 
as the instrument of its foreign policy, and has 
constrained its freedom of action and use of other 
vehicles to implement its free and independent foreign 
policy. This was right in the fi rst decades of ASEAN, 
to enable Indonesia to get the trust back from its 
neighbours. And Indonesia has achieved that.28 
As a consequence, the logic persuasively continues, Indonesia 
need no longer rely solely on ASEAN, but ‘for the future, [it] 
needs to pursue its own national interests, on top of its loyalty 
and solidarity with ASEAN.’29 
28       Wanandi, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Meaning of ASEAN.
29       Ibid.
On the other hand, ASEAN’s very success as a diplomatic 
community has long been predicated on its achieving the limited 
aim of ensuring the respect of member nations for one another’s 
sovereignty through their mutual adherence to the principle of 
non-interference. Put differently, the organisation’s raison d’être, 
defi ned in this minimalist way, effectively legitimated member 
countries’ recourse to their own devices—via the nebulous 
doctrine of ‘national resilience’ (ketahanan nasional)—so long 
as their actions did not affect their fellow members’ national 
security and sovereignty in adverse ways. To that extent, the 
very formation of ASEAN in 1967 was made possible as a 
consequence of Indonesia’s assurance to the other founding 
member countries of the organisation that they would be able 
to pursue their foreign policy goals in their own ways without 
interference from Indonesia, with each effectively minding its 
own business.30 Not unlike its fellow ASEAN member states, 
Indonesia has long relied on permutations comprising unilateral, 
bilateral, and multilateral strategies to its security, and has 
assiduously avoided placing all of its eggs in the regional basket. 
(Arguably, any hint of ASEAN centricity in Indonesia’s past 
behaviour, if indeed such existed, probably refl ected its lack 
of national capacity, rather than its will, for a more ambitious 
and expansive internationalism.) It is for these reasons that 
commentators such as van der Kroef argue that Indonesia’s 
ASEAN membership has in fact been an insignifi cant concern 
for Jakarta.31 Going further, Donald McCloud has suggested that 
historically, Indonesia’s regional actions did not refl ect any ‘grand 
design [Indonesia might have had] for working through ASEAN to 
gain control of a broad segment of the region.’32
The academic debate over the importance of ASEAN to 
Indonesian foreign policy implies that Indonesia, despite its own 
political discourse about the centricity of ASEAN in Jakarta’s 
regional affairs, likely advanced—or at least sought to advance—
its foreign policy goals through a number of strategies, of which 
ASEAN was but one. True, ASEAN has been and remains 
important to Indonesia, but not singularly and unequivocally so, 
as the contemporary debate about a post-ASEAN foreign policy 
for Indonesia has unwittingly sought to portray. 
30       The argument is made in See Seng Tan, ‘Herding Cats: The Role of 
Persuasion in Political Change and Continuity in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)’, International Relations of the Asia–Pacific, Vol.13, No.2, 2013, 
pp. 233–65.
31       Justus Maria van der Kroef, Indonesia After Sukarno, (Vancouver, BC: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1971).
32       Donald G. McCloud, System and Process in Southeast Asia: The Evolution 
of a Region, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).
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CONCLUSION: INDONESIA DRIVING AND 
SUFFERING THE REGION?33 
This issue brief has sought to make three interrelated points 
about Indonesia’s contemporary engagement of the great 
powers in the midst of its own ascendency to middle power 
status. First, this issue brief has proposed that Indonesia’s 
longstanding concern that its regional environment should stay 
as secure and stable as possible has not changed. This raises 
the prospect that Indonesia is unlikely to alter its traditional 
reliance on a hedging strategy vis-à-vis China and the United 
States. Second, the brief  contends that while Indonesia’s 
contemporary rise and its persistent frustration over the lack of 
cohesion in and progress by ASEAN are undeniable, ASEAN and 
its wider regional cooperative frameworks nonetheless remain 
useful as modalities for supporting Indonesia’s engagements 
of the great powers. Although Indonesia has long endured 
the frustration of dealing with fellow ASEAN countries that, in 
Jakarta’s eyes, lack commitment to the Association, ASEAN, 
for all its visible fl aws, still remains the region’s closest thing 
to a ‘regional solution’ for regional challenges—an unfulfi lled 
aspiration Indonesia has yet to abandon. Third, it has been 
argued, notwithstanding Indonesia’s tireless advocacy on 
behalf of ASEAN, that Jakarta’s foreign policy has, not least 
on a practical basis, relied on a host of strategies of which 
ASEAN regionalism has played a key but by no means 
exclusive modality, nor the most critical one. In this regard, 
recent appeals for a post-ASEAN foreign policy, while perfectly 
understandable in the light of Indonesia’s newfound pride as a 
regional powerhouse vigorously courted by the great powers, 
are somewhat misleading if they suggest that Indonesia’s foreign 
policy has always been principally dedicated to ASEAN. 
33       The phrase is borrowed from the title employed by Michael Leifer in his fi fth 
chapter of his book on Singapore’s foreign policy. See, Michael Leifer, ‘Driving or 
Suffering the Region?’, in Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability, 
(London: Routledge, 2000), Ch.5.
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